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EDITORIAL NOTE

LAURENCE

w. Wooo

As we begin a new millennium, religion and theology are more likely than ever
to be of interest to thinking people. Many observers are noticing the trend in the
postmodern world toward an increasing interest in spirituality of all kinds. There has
been in recent years an explosion of books in religion written for a general audience, and what is particularly noticeable is their relational focus. Issues of social justice, economic fairness, political tolerance, minority rights, ecological concerns,
poverty, abuse, violence, family life, health care, war, religious tolerance, along with a
host of other concerns, are the topics of religious dialog across the curriculum and
across the general public. The growing awareness of most people is that these problems are to be addressed in a religious context in dialog with the world community.
Jurgen Moltrnann has been a global pacesetter par excellence in modeling how theology can speak prophetically and therapeutically to a dysfunctional world. From the
very beginning of his professional life as a theologian, the concept of hope has been a
dominant motif. His theology of hope has not been from an abstract and "ivorytower'' perspective. As a prisoner of war with a sense of utter desperation, Moltrnann
says hope was born within him as he encountered the Christian faith. His writings
have focused largely on eschatology, the theology of the cross, and the doctrine of
the Trinity. He believes the essence of Christian faith is that God is really related in
an intimate way with creation, that God as the Father of the Son through the power
of the Holy Spirit really suffers with the creation and thus is able to redeem it. In this
sense, Moltrnann's theology could be called a relational theology. Moltrnann defines
his theology as having "a biblical foundation, an eschatological orientation, a political
responsibility."' If his method of theology is to dialog with all disciplines of thought in
seeking to achieve a more informed understanding of the Christian faith, it also
includes the social and political realities of the world because they determine the way
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one perceives God, oneself, and the world. john Wesley insisted that experience must be
able to confirm our perceptions of what the Scriptures teach. Otherwise, our perceptions
are faulty. This hermeneutical principle on the inter-relatedness of theory and practice is
basic to Moltmann' s theology.
Here in this work, edited by Robert T. Cornelison, one has a companion volume to
Moltmann's theology, written by his former students, friends, critics, and admirers.
Because of his many contributions across the Church and throughout the world, it is an
honor for us to publish this special edition of The Asbury 1heological Journal. For those who
are already familiar with Moltmann's theology, this volume will add to their understanding, offering further nuances and insights. For those who wish to have a reliable interpretation of his basic ideas, this volume is indispensable. Moltmann's responses to each contributor offer a further commentary on his theology. Moltmann also presents an intellectual
biography in the beginning of this volume, providing the lived context of his theology.
Here it can be seen that for Moltmann theory and practice (orthopraxis) are inseparably
linked. We believe the reader will find in Moltmann's theology a pattern of thinking that
will help to serve the needs of the Church as we move into this next millennium.
NOTES

I.

Jurgen Moltmann,

and the Triune Cod !Crossroad, New York, 1992), p. 182.
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LIVED THEOLOGY:

AN

INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY

JORGEN MOLTMANN

THEWAY TO THEOLOGY

Much of my life has turned out differently than I at one time planned. I wanted to
study physics and mathematics; Max Planck, Niels Bohr, Einstein, and Louis de Broglie
were my heroes. But then, miraculously and with great difficulty, I survived the
firestorm of the RAF-Operation "Gomorrah" which destroyed my hometown of
Hamburg in [uly 1943; 40,000 were killed in the last night of the raid, including my
friend, Gerhard Schopper, who was blown up right before my eyes. It was during that
night that I first called out to God-''Where is God?" and ''Why am I not also dead?"questions that have not left me to this day. They seemed more important to me than
the formula E=MC'. When the attack on the bridges at Amheim began in 1944, we
were hardly done with school when we were thrown onto the front line at Helmond.
After the first tank attack only half of our company survived. In 1945, I was captured
in Kleve, and liberated, at least from lice.
The war finally ended and we all looked forward to returning home. For me, however,
that took another three years. First I was sent to a work camp in Scotland, then to the
Norton Camp, and finally to a YMCA-sponsored theological school behind barbed wire
run by the Swedish pastor, Birger Farell. There, to the disappointment of my humanist
father who believed that his weak son wanted to become a Catholic and perhaps even a
monk, I began to study theology. I wanted answers to my questions about God and wanted to know what was true in faith To me, all of this was wonderfully new. On some fundamental leveL this sticks with me even today: my piety is my theological curiosity.
In 1948, along with the injured and refugees, I came back to Hamburg and immediately went to Giittingen to study at the university. It was through the efforts of Helmut
Traub, the Arch-Barthian, that I came to study with Ernst Wolf. At first, I was allowed to
sleep in the cloakroom of the Seminary and could eat for thirty Pfennig. In the evenings, I
Jurgen Moltmann retired as Professor of Systematic Theology in 1964 from the University of TU bingen
in Gennany. He recently received the 2000 Louisville Grawerneyer Award in Religion, presented by
Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary and the University of Louisville. This award granted him a
$200,000 prize for his book, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology !Fortress Press, 1996!.
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Moltmann

attended !wand's lectures by candlelight on account of the power cuts. What a wonderful time'
We lived in the Spirit alone, with much to spare. My father agreed to finance eight semesters of
study for me, providing I 00 Marks monthly. Thus my time limit for study was set.
After two semesters, however, I fell in love with Elisabeth Wendel, a doctoral student of
Otto Weber's. In order to be closer to her, I asked him to direct my dissertation: "Moyse
Amyraut and the Theological School of Saumur." This, among other good things, kept me
busy throughout the remainder of my studies. In 1952, I concluded my studies with first
exams, oral exams and marriage, all within fourteen days. I overworked myself, and that
remains my fate even today.
In Giittingen, the theological conflict between the Confessing Church and the German
Christians, or more precisely between !wand and Gogarten, seesawed back and forth. With
the anival of the U.S. Army, Emmanuel Hirsch resentfully returned to private life humming
the German National Anthem and the Horst-Wessel Lied. At that time, we concerned ourselves with Gogarten's secularization apologetic and adapting the theology of the Confessing
Church to the post-war era. We and our teachers firmly resisted the movement for the
restoration of Adenauer and Dibelius. Within our new front we attempted to reconcile and
mediate between Barth and Bultmann-Elephant and Whale. Giitz Harbsmeier, Hermann
Diem, Wolf, and Kreck also chimed in. We students threw "demythologization" and "immanent Trinity" into their teeth. That was the true culture of theological argumentation, before
the movement of dispute toward dialogue and then dialogue toward pluralism decayed
Ernst Kiisemann also entered the fray with the bombshell of the truth of the justification of
the goclless. My calmer teachers were Joachim Jeramias and Gerhard van Rad. 'What do
you have that you have not received?" My wife and I developed a friendly relationship with
Otto Weber, and he occasionally helped providence in our direction.
THEOLOGIAN IN A PASTORATE

In 1952, in our youthful kingdom of God idealism, we wanted to take a pastorate in the
East-wne (my wife came from Potsdam). We spent a summer in West Berlin, but four appli-

cations for visas were denied because I was in a British prisoner of war camp, not a Russian
one, and therefore could have been a spy. I was a chaplain at the Hubertus Hospital, which
at that time was totally unknown territory to me, and my wife taught the nurses. We felt at
home in the critical transitional stage of the Church and the political world.
President Scharf called us back in autumn 1952, and Otto Weber arranged for me to
become vicar in the remotest congregation in Wittgenstein, Emdtebriick. There I traveled by
skis carrying a Bible and herring, the food the people had ordered, in my backpack. In 1953,
my friend Johannes Kuhn and I were appointed to the Reformed seminary in Eberfeld,
where I perfected my table tennis game and learned the Reformed Psalmody. Through the
mediation of Otto Weber, I became a pastor in Bremen-Wasserhorst, a dike-surrounded village twelve kilometers long, consisting of 60 farms, 2,000 cows, 500 souls, 20 percent
churchgoers, 80 percent partakers of the Eucharist, where all the young people in town
belonged to the Youth Club and old and young women alike to the Women's Club. The
disparity between two theologians with doctorates and this small-town congregation was
great Luckily, I had learned to play Skat quite well in the camps and the barracks. After a
grandiose attack on the strongest farmers, I kept my distance in fear that I would lose my
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call. It was in the small church in Wasserhorst, however, that 1 learned to preach before
more or less large groups of people. It was very difficult for me because l had heard no sermons as a child, and l certainly was not well-trained rhetorically. They were difficult but
good years in the rectory. There were eight rooms, but in the beginning we were only
allowed the comer of one to live in with a coal heater for heat We were often flooded out
There were rats in the cellar, mice in the kitchen, owls in the roof, and cows running loose
in the garden. In those five years we had our first children, and in the mornings l had time,
following Otto Weber's advice, to write a dissertation on "Christoph Pezel and the
Transition of Bremen to Calvinism." l was also student chaplain in Bremen.
In 1957, Weber brought me to Habilitation in Giittingen. Every Weclnesday l would eat
breakfast on the train to Giittingen to give rather skimpy lectures on the history of
Reformed theology. At the departure, my farmers replied: "OK, Herr Pastor, if it will help
you to advance yourself." For us it was not that clear. We gladly wanted to go to a larger
congregation in Brernerhaven. l was not totally suited to be a pastor, but l was happy to
have experienced the entire height and depth of human life: children and aged, men and
women, healthy and sick, birth and death, etc. l would have been happy to have remained a
theologian/pastor. But then the call to the Church Hochschule in Wuppertal came.
During my doctoral studies, l was transformed from a despairing, but still confident
Kierkegaardian to a Barmen-Confessing Church Barthian. Like others who said after Hegel
philosophy was impossible, l saw no further possibilities for theology beyond Barth: He said
it all. l was freed from this heresy in l 956/ l 957 at a theological conference in Utrecht held
by the theologian Arnold van Ruler with his 'Theology of the Apostolate" and his "Kingdom
of God Theology": "l smell a rose and l smell the kingdom of God." I realized that there was
indeed more to do that the Elder in Basel had not done.
THEOLOGIAN IN THE CHURCH COUEGE IN WUPPERTAL

ln 1958, Hans-Walter Wolff called Rudolf Bohren and me to Wuppertal. Georg Eichholz
taught New Testament and photographed the world. Then Klaus Koch and Wolfhart
Pannenberg came. We were a young faculty and began, without regard for traditions and
older authorities, to develop our own theologies: Pannenberg, his 'Theology of History," I,
my 'Theology of Hope." We took part in and were part of the first movement out of the era
of restoration and the existentialism of the 1950s. In Wuppertal l had my first meeting with
Ernst Bloch, but also with Carl Schmitt, Arnold Gehlen, Rut Fischer, Walter Jens, and
Gottfried Benn. Dr. Leeb brought them all to the city of mediocre industry and 250 sects. l
was even a member of the Rotary Oub for theology-at-large for two years. In l 958, along
with our entire faculty, we formulated our protest against "Atomic Death" as it was then
called. l signed the "Ten Theses of Brotherhood" for peace, which Barth had drafted. In
l 96 l, together with Hans-Ulrich Kirchoff, l collated and published The Beginnings of Dialeaical
Theology. That brought me the title of the "Keeper of the Holy Grail of Dialectical Theology."
While on vacation in Switzerland, l read Bloch and was fascinated: "Why had theology let
go of its own theme of hope?" It was then that the fundamentals of a Theology of Hope began
to coalesce in my mind. l tried them out in lectures in Wuppertal and Bonn in l 963, and finally published it in 1964. l didn't need to say much more; the echo flattened me' It wasn't until
l 967 in Tiibingen that l could recover again. l raced through the country giving lectures, which

12

Moltmann

unfortunately left little time for my family. Then came the Christian-Marxist Dialogues, the last
of which was in Marianbad in 1967. I developed a friendship with Johann Baptist Metz and
with Milan Machovev and Viteslav Gardavsky in the Czech Republic. In 1961, Ernst Wolf
brought me into the "Evangelische Theology" Group. At those conferences on the Walchensee
the great theological controversies between schools and generations were decided.
THEOLOGIAN ON STATE FACULTIES

In I 963, I was called to Bonn and with great hesitation entered into civil service; the incidents during the Third Reich were still too fresh for me. It was not easy in Bonn. Gerhard
Gloege was quite friendly, but Walter Kreck felt threatened and held a general Barthian mistrust of me. I was also friendly with the Catholic moral theologian Franz Biickle and we often
went to meclical congresses together. I was young in this senior faculty, but I finally got my
first doctoral students. In I 966, my situation was complicated: Otto Weber died and, as his
main disciple, I should have gone to Giittingen, but I really did not want to. Ernst Kasemann
threatened me with words of final judgment if I did not come to Tubingen, and I finally yielded to him; my wife regretted that for several years. So we came to Tubingen in the summer
of 1967, but only for the short summer session because my visiting professorship at Duke
University, arranged through Fred Herzog, had already been planned for a year.
On the way to Duke, we stopped off in Paris to bid adieu to European culture, and then
on to New York where we got lost in the canyon of buildings in Manhattan. Then we flew
to North Carolina, the land of pine trees, golf courses, and black ghettos. It was difficult for
me to lecture in English, and I managed only through the help of my American assistant and
true friend, Doug Meeks. Our four children were placed in American schools and had it no
easier than American children in Tubingen schools. In autumn I 96 7, my Theology of Hope
was published in English and was discussed on the front page of the New York Times.
"You've made it'" my students said with wide eyes.
At the end of the tenn in April, Duke held a large symposium on the 'Theology of
Hope." It was during that symposium that Harvey Cox broke in and shouted "Martin Luther
King has been shot 1" Throughout the country, ghettos burned and states of emergency had
been declared in many cities. The symposium participants flew home as quickly as possible.
And then something totally unforgettable for me happened: the usually apathetic and lethargic students held a sorrow vigil for Martin Luther King. Four hundred sat on the quadrangle
for six days and nights, even in the rain. On the sixth day, suddenly black students from
other colleges joined the white students and we all sang 'We shall overcome ... someclay."
Deeply moved, we returned to Tubingen right after that
In Berlin Rudi Dutschke was shot at In Tubingen student protest reached new heights.
"For OUR sake, not only for MY sake" was the cry, with Gerhard Ebeling returning to Zurich
and Joseph Ratzinger to Regensburg, where the world was still in order, at least at "mornings
at seven." Because I sometimes went with the students and wanted to understand them, I
came into some conflict with the majority of the faculty; because I knew Marx quite well, but
was no Marxist, I was not well-received by some of the students either. So I remained on the
border, unable to do anything right, because I went my own way. It was much the same with
the Political Theology that Johann Baptist Metz and I advocated at the time; for the radical
students, as for the Latin American liberation theologians, it was not enough.

Lived Theology: An Intellectual Biography

13

At that time I wanted to write an "Ethics of Hope," but nothing came of it because l
wanted to dialectically deepen my 'Theology of Hope'' with a theology of the Cross. in
order to relieve ourselves of the moral pressure of the political, my assistant Marcel Martin
wrote his book on "play'' and I a treatise on 'The First Liberated of Creation."
Through the Ecumenical Commission on Faith and Order, which I belonged to since
1963, and through the translations of my books, l had made several international contacts in
the 1970s: Black Theology in the United States, Liberation Theology in Latin America,
Minjung Theobgy in Korea, African theology, Kairos Theology in South Africa, and amazingly, with Orthodox theobgy in Romania. When Walter Kasper separated himself from
Hans Kiing in 1979, I became a director of Conalium with Kung. l was constantly traveling,
and my lectures and seminars at Tiibingen and my family were suffering. After Ernst Wolfs
death, l took over as editor of Evangelische 1heologie. That proved to be a bit much for me.
It is strange in theology. Problems arise, are discussed until they become personal conflicts, and then they disappear again, unnoticed and unresolved. They are, so to say, "retired."
In the 50s, it was "the secularized society," in the 60s it was "revolution," in the 70s it was
religion and the interreligious dialogue. in the 80s, the "Me Decade," it was the search for
identity and the new thrust toward individualism. Self-help books and books on the mind
threatened books on theology. In Germany, Eugen Drewerrnann mystified the masses.
Last, but not least, Feminist Theology came on the scene, and for the first time in history
men had been shoved from the center to the side. I think it was in 1977 that I suddenly
realized: I am not black, so l can't write Black Theology; I am not oppressed, so I can't write
Liberation Theology; l am not a woman, so Feminist Theology is also impossible for me. As
that became clear to me, I attempted to use what power I had to support these new contextual theologies, but l made my own way in productive disengagement and concentrated on
long-standing theological problems.
l began with "systematic contributions to theology'' and suiprised both my friends and
opponents with a social doctrine of the Trinity. I followed with a doctrine of creation in the
Gifford Lectures of 1984-85. They did fit well into the ecological trend of that time, but I
did not desire to write a "trendy'' book. After that, I really wanted to stop because I thought I
had said all that I had to say. I found, however, that I couldn't stop, and so with increasing
joy I wrote a totally unplanned book on the "Spirit of Life," and I have just finished a book
on "the Last Things," The Coming of Cod: Christian Esd!atology, a theme I had begun with thirty-five years ago with my 1heology of Hope.
It was the academic pressure to lecture four hours a week that allowed me to write my
books. I could rework my lectures into books and then have them published for others to
read. The freedom that I had to discuss different topics with doctoral students helped my
own thought to develop and allowed me to go even further. I could test out my manuscripts on my "first readers" and they could correct what I had written. The look in their eyes
and their reviews filled me with thankfulness. I have had immeasurable luck to work with
such fine people.
While I was retired in 1994, I have not retired myself. In every end lies a new, hidden
beginning.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE OF
1
MOLTMANN S THEOLOGY

ROBERT

T.

CORNELISON

It has become de rigeur in writing about a theologian's work to provide not only a
theological context for his or her work, but also to begin with some sort of sociopolitical framework which sheds light on the situation and milieu within which the theologian works. In the case of Jurgen Moltmann, such a sociopolitical prolegomena is
absolutely necessary for two reasons: first Moltmann's work is intimately tied in with
the social and political upheaval in post-World War II German culture; second,
Moltmann' s theology is deliberately and decidedly political in character, demanding
that one always look to the political sources and results of his theology. This introductory essay will provide a framework, both sociopolitical and theological, for understanding the various twists and turns that Moltmann' s theology has taken over the last
thirty years. It will hopefully provide guideposts for understanding the subsequent
articles in the volume which deal with specific aspects of Moltmann's thought
Moltrnann is a member of the first post World War II generation of Protestant
theologians in Germany. The challenges that this generation faced were manifold. In
the first place, all institutions, political, religious, social, and economic, were either
destroyed or severely damaged either by Nazi totalitarianism or by the war itself.
Because the churches still maintained some structural integrity, it fell to them to help
provide the most basic of human services to the German people: food was distributed, shelter provided, and the rebuilding of the physical infrastructure of the country was begun. A more knotty problem remained, however: what was to be made
of the atrocities caused by the Nazi regime over the previous decade, and what
direction was the New Germany to take. There was the sense that the latter could
not proceed without coming to grips with the former.
This dilemma was felt no more acutely than in the post-war Protestant churches.
From the beginning of the Nazi dictatorship in 1933, members of the Protestant
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churches, including several of their national leaders, publicly supported the Nazi political
program and in some cases became outright organs of the Nazi state. The so-called
"German Christians" (Deutsche Christen), formed in July 1933, appointed Ludwig Mi.iller, a
Nazi, as its Reichsbishop and in an attempt to build a strongly Nazified Church, the
Lutheran Youth Group was combined with the Hitler Youth Group. Hitler, himself, recognizing the value of having the organized churches behind him, in the beginning let the
individual church governments have a great deal of autonomy. Within a few years however, the totalitarian nature of Naziism demanded that all power, including that traditionally held by the churches, be under its control. To that end, the appointment of Protestant
clergy and hierarchy fell to the Nazi state, and an "Aryan paragraph," which utilized race
as a principle for determining true "Germanness" and true faith, entered into church law.
For post-war Protestant churches, it was recognition of their complicity with the Nazi
whether direct or indirect, that was the first step necessary in building a new
Protestantism in Germany. It was in this spirit that on October 18th and 19th, 1945, the
Council of the Protestant Church in Germany presented the "Stuttgart Declaration of
Guilt" to representatives of the World Council of Churches. In part, the Declaration of
Guilt read:
Not only are we in a great company of suffering, but also in a solidarity of guilt.
With great pain do we say: through us endless sufferings have been brought to
many peoples and nations .. .. We accuse ourselves for not witnessing more courageously, for not praying more faithfully, for not believing more joyously, and for not
loving more ardently.
Now a new beginning can be made in our churches. Grounded on the Holy
Scriptures, directed with all earnestness towards the only Lord of the Church, they
now proceed to cleanse themselves from influences alien to the faith and to set
themselves in order.
While not universally accepted by all Protestant church leaders at the time, this recognition of guilt has maintained a central place in the consciousness of the Protestant
Church in Germany, and, as we shall see, is formative for much of Moltrnann's theological program.
The complicity of the churches with Naziism also raised a question about what the correct relationship between Church and State was to be. Traditionally, Church and State in
Germany operated in close relationship with each other. The relationship of cujus regio,
euus re/igio (the religion of the prince determined the religion of the area), promulgated in
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, still held much power in Germany. The ease with which
Hitler had dominated the churches for his own political agenda now called this relationship
into question. While many of the powerful members of the Protestant churches desired a
return to the old, close relationship of church and state, a group of theologians felt that the
only way to protect the autonomy of the churches was for the churches to maintain a critical distance from the state. The model that was adopted was based on the theology of the
Confessing Church which developed in opposition to the Nazi takeover of the churches in
the Third Reich. For many of the Nazified Deutsche Christen, Christ had indeed come again
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in the person of Adolf Hitler, and National Socialism was indeed the will of God.
Confronted by the specter of total control of the churches and their theology by the Nazi
regime, a group of dissident pastors passed the celebrated Barmen Declaration. Written by
Karl Barth, this declaration attested to the sole lordship of Christ in the Protestant churches:
there can only be one lord of the Church, and that is Christ; any other claims of lordship,
such as that of the Fiihrer, were thus idolatrous. Based in this confession of the lordship of
Christ. a group of dissident pastors formed a loose confederation of believers of various
Protestant denominations known as the Confessing Church <Behennende Kirche). This
Church, as the name implies, was not bound by political, social or national ties, and undertook the training of pastors in its own seminaries. At the end of the war, this model for
founding a new church in Germany had much to offer. It had a theological, faith-centered
foundation that maintained a critical distance from the state, thereby ensuring that the state
had little chance of ever encroaching on church matters again. Organized as a loose confederation, it could allow for a diversity of denominational beliefs, and could provide a
framework for a union of Lutheran and Reformed churches which would not be linked to
geographical area.
It was in this situation of disorder and yet open possibility that Moltrnann began the
first stage of his theological study. While in the various prisoner of war camps, Moltrnann
was attracted to the ad hoc theological classes which were being run by pastors in the
camps. When released in 1949, Moltrnann undertook organized theological study at
Giittingen, where he came under the influence of Barth's thought. Barth's record of resistance to encroachment of the State into Church matters at that time was impeccable.
What Moltrnann found attractive in Barth's thought was that Barth had recognized early
on that Christianity had ultimately become so identified with German culture that the
Christian message was consumed by the culture within which it developed. God and
Kaiser, religion and culture, became so intertwined that they became effectively indistinguishable. And rather than understand this as exclusively a political problem, Barth had
realized that a theological issue was at the core of the problem: the "theology of culture"
prevalent in Germany had vitiated the critical power of the Christian message to stand
over and against culture because it had defined that message precisely through culture. As
early as 1914, Barth had rejected any theological support for the activities of the state. In
his book, The Humanity of God ( 1956), Barth reflects on the event that started him, and
the theological world at large, on a new path:
One day in early August I 914 stands out in my personal memory as a black day.
Ninety-three German intellectuals impressed public opinion by their proclamation
in support of the war policy of Wtlhelm II and his counselors. Among these intellectuals I discovered to my horror almost all of my theological teachers whom I had
greatly venerated. In despair over what this indicated about the signs of the time I
suddenly realized that I could not any longer follow either their ethics and dogmatics or their understanding of the Bible and of history. For me at least, I 9th century
theology no longer held any future.'
Rather than see an easy correspondence between theology and culture as liberal theol-
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ogy had done, Barth, in his controversial book, The Epistle to the Romans, defined his own
method as a "recognition of what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction'
between time and eternity."' This paradigm of the "wholly other God" shifted the locus of
revelation from the human person who is the recipient of revelation, to the transcendent
God who is the source of all revelation. Rather than understand God to be identified with
culture, Barth believed that faith places culture into KRISIS. It removes every ground of
confidence except confidence in God alone. 1 For Barth, religion, understood as the
actions of humans to justify themselves before God, was a form of criminal arrogance.
Thus religion as an organ of culture must be discarded and replaced by a faith in the primacy of the grace of God, wherein grace is the free act of God and faith is the graced
response of the Christian to God.' Confronted by the specter of (and later the reality ofl
the Hitler regime, Barth reiterated this necessary transcendence of God in a more
Christocentric approach to theology. In Moltrnann's mind, only a theology like Barth's
that focussed on the sovereign lordship of Christ could withstand the onslaught of totalitarian regimes. For him, as for Barth, theology, speech about God, had to rediscover its
own subject, Godself.
Within a few years, however, Moltmann was to discern certain weaknesses in Barth's
theology and in the theology grounding the Confessing Church. In the battles with the
German state, both Barth and the Confessing Church had, in effect, called for a "retreat'
into the Word of God. For both, the primary problem facing the churches was the interference of the state into church matters. Consequently, the response to such an attack
took the form of strengthening the bulwark around the rights of the Church to govern
itself. This is not to claim that Barth was insensitive to the injustice going on in the country
at that time; he spoke out often and loudly about the lack of human rights and the rabid
anti-Semitism, proclaiming both as contrary to the will of God. At the same time, however, Barth did state,
I maintain the Evangelical Church ought rather to permit itself to be thinned down
until it remain a tiny group in the catacombs than make a pact, even a covert pact,
with this doctrine [that sees in the Nazi revolution another source of grace and revelation!.'
Many of Barth's post-war writings also reflect a similar attitude.
Moltmann's ultimate move beyond a Barthian perspective into a second stage of his
thought was due in part to his relationship with Ernst Bloch. Bloch, an atheist philosopher
loosely related to the Frankfurt School of Social Research, emigrated from East Germany
to Tubingen in 1961. His Pnndple of Hope, a three-volume philosophy based in the idea of
hope as a means of promoting social change, was hailed by scholars throughout Germany
as an extremely fruitful new departure in philosophy that had practical import. In his first
years at Tubingen, Bloch took part in faculty seminars which brought together university
scholars in various disciplines; it was here that Moltrnann found a dialogue partner and a
new direction for his theology. As Moltmann states in an autobiographical article, in
Bloch's thought,
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all at once the loose threads of a biblical theology, of the theology of the apostolate
and the kingdom of God, and of philosophy, merged into a pattern for a tapestry in
which everything matched.'
For Moltmann, Bloch's philosophy of hope had brought to the center of discussion a
heretofore neglected element of theology: eschatology. In developing his philosophy of
hope, Bloch had "rediscovered" the centrality of an eschatology intimately related to messianic impulses in Jewish and Christian scriptures. For Bloch, this eschatology called for a
rethinking of the understanding of history which philosophy had held throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Traditionally, history had been perceived in a teleological sense, that is, the past was carried on through the present into the future. Historical
meaning was thus derived from looking toward the past and tracing past impulses
through the present and into the future. Jewish and Christian eschatology, on the other
hand, understood historical meaning as not lying so much in the past, but in the future:
the meaning of the past and present is fundamentally conditioned by the expectation of
the future. In such a view, the expectation of the kingdom of God or the coming of the
Messiah demands a rethinking and reordering of our understanding of the past and present. Where the Messiah is expected, all past and present history becomes an anticipation
of the fulfillment which is coming in the future.' In Bloch's view, then, the present is filled
with possibilities and an openness because what is ultimately possible is not determined
by the past, but by the anticipated future. The present is not filled with accretions from
the past, but with potentialities of the promised future; in a word, history becomes filled
with HOPE. This perspective, which Bloch calls "utopian," has political consequences.
Living in anticipation of the future means that one cannot view past political conditions as
strictly determinative of future ones. The future contains elements of the new; it is, in
some sense, a "novum." 8

It was this new eschatological approach which allowed Moltmann to move beyond
Barth and to develop a theology which was more in tune with his own socialist sensitivities. In 1964, Moltmann published 1heo/ogie der Hoffnung: Untersuchungen zur Begriindung
und zu den Konzequenzen einer chrisdichen Eschatologie. (English translation: Theology of Hope:
On the Grounds and Implicanons of Christian Eschatology, 1967>.' In this book Moltmann set
off on his own path based in a futurist eschatology similar to that of Bloch. In the introduction to the German edition, Moltmann explains what he culled from Bloch's work. Of
utmost importance was Bloch's insight that the substratum of all religion is hope.
According to Bloch, hope, the person's longing for political and social freedom, prompts
them to look to religion for answers. As an atheist in a Feuerbachian sense, Bloch understood God as a projection, but not necessarily as a self-alienation of human transcendence
into a supreme being Rather, for Bloch, humans projected their transcendence into an
open future, into a vacuum. What is ultimately projected into this future are human
hopes and wishes. For Bloch, however, if religion is understood fundamentally as hope,
where hope is the "ontic difference between what is and what is not yet," then hope
becomes grounded in the historical process. It is a transcendent horiwn which opens up
and stimulates transcendence in a new historical future; it has become concrete. 10
In a similar manner, Moltmann claims that Christianity had neglected the eschatologi-
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cal impulses which were inherent in its tradition. Where the churches had repeatedly
emphasized the "realized" character of eschatology, that is, had predominantly been looking backward to the fulfillment of the promises of God in the death and resurrection of
Jesus, they had refused to acknowledge the fact that the kingdom of God was to a large
degree still outstanding and would only reach its fulfillment in the future. For Moltmann
this neglect of the futurist elements of eschatology was not simply an oversight. Rather,
this eschatology was in fact repressed by a church attempting to shore up its place and
power in the social world and solidifying its hold over the Word of God.' '
In Theology of Hope, Moltmann claims, like Bloch, that
... eschatology means the doctrine of the Christian hope, which embraces both the
object hoped for and also the hope inspired by it. From first to
and not merely
in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward
moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and transforming the present. ... Hence

eschatology cannot really be only a part of Christian doctrine. Rather, the eschatological outlook is characteristic of all Christian proclamation, of every Christian existence and of the whole Church."
Placing eschatology at the center of Christian theology meant much more than an interesting new starting point; it meant that all of traditional theology needed to be recast in
light of this insight. In particular, the understanding of the nature of God and God's relationship to the world now took on new meaning. Moltmann set his sights on two perspectives which had gained ascendance in the early to mid-twentieth century theology:
the Neo-Orthodox theology of Karl Barth, and the existential theology of Rudolf
Bultmann. In his Epistle to the Romans, and to a similar degree in his Church Dogmatics, in
an attempt to maintain the absolute sovereignty and aseity of God, Karl Barth had
emphasized God's "vertical" transcendence. Utilizing spatial terminology, Barth understands God to stand "over, " "above," and "beyond" the world. The best that Barth can do
within these parameters is proclaim that God has a "parabolic" relationship to the world-"
In such a perspective, rather than be an impulse within history for its transformation,
God's revelation is understood predominantly as an indictment of human history.
Like Barth, Bultmann underscored the qualitative difference between God and human,
emphasized the radical fallenness of human existence, and maintained the paradoxical
relationship of revelation and culture. Different from Barth, however, Bultmann claimed
that knowledge of God is predominantly existential in nature. It is relational knowledge, in
which God confronts the person of faith in such a way that a person's very existence is
called into question and called to authenticity. In a term that became paradigmatic for
Dialectical Theology, it is herygma, a word addressed to the human being by God which
challenges the human being to respond." For Bultmann, this call is revelatory of God as
Other; but even more importantly it is revelatory of human nature.
fur Bultmann, the biblical eschatology that emphasizes the end of history and the resolution of its fragmentary character is ultimately mythical in character. History has gone on, and
will continue to go on. And even if we do expect the world to end in the future, it probably
will be through natural catastrophe, not through some final battle of God and Satan.'' When
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it is demythologized, this cosmological eschatology becomes existential, as the moment
when, confronted by the kerygma, the believer is placed into an existential crisis and ultimately opened up to new possibilities of existence. As such, it is the presence of eternity in
the human present. The call to decision when confronted by the kerygma, in Bultmann's
terms, is the call to authentic selfhood, the key to an individuaf s self-understanding." It
involves being grasped by the word of God and allowing it to call one's whole existence into
question, so that one's life can be reoriented in a way that is more authentic. The decisive
moment, therefore is the various "presents" in which the believer has surrendered his or her
self to the Word of God.
For Moltmann, the perspectives of Barth and Bultmann share a fundamental flaw:
both essentially undercut the social relevance of Christian eschatology. Barth had made
God so "other," even in the Christian proclamation of the Word, that it becomes difficult
to provide an adequate vision for social transformation. Bultmann's kerygmatic, existential
theology provided for personal transformation of individuals, but seemed to ignore the
transformation of the larger social situation. For Moltmann, the question was no longer
how to keep already-established social structures in place, but how to transform them in
light of justice. What was needed was a prod to liberation from old forms and the establishment of new forms. Thus, unlike both Barth and Bultmann, the new Political Theology
was to be first and foremost critically related to society, and it needed to be recognized
that the new relationship of churches in Germany demanded that this theology also be
ecumenical in character." In Moltmann' s new tum, by making eschatology the framework within which theology was to be done, the ecumenical and practicaVcritical functions of theology could be maintained.
For Moltmann, the idea of the Promise of God becomes important as the concretization of that eschatology. Promise reveals the meaning of God, of history, and of the
human person. Understood in terms of Promise, God is not primarily vertically transcendent to the world, touching it as a tangent touches a circle as Barth claimed. Neither is
God the call to personal decision or the forces of preservation in the world. Rather, God
relates to the world through Promise, the willful decision of God to open the horizon of
the human future. It is through the Promise that God binds Godself to the world, and
subsequently theology must always include those poles in its discourse.
Moltmann is clear, however, that the history of the promise is not identical with
human history. We are not working out the Promise on earth. Rather, the Promise is first
a critical movement in which God stands over and against what we humans have
attempted. This is the so-called "eschatological reservation," in which the future promised
by God stands as an indictment of what we humans have attempted to make for our
own future. At the same time, however, the Promise provides a goal for society to attain.
It is a lure to make real the future which is promised by God." Since God is the subject of
the Promise, its agent, its originator, God creates a situation of new possibility for humans
by promising them something which has not been before, is yet to come, but is nonetheless, guaranteed: the kingdom of God. This is where Moltmann differs from Bloch: the
hopes of humans are projected into the future, but not into a vacuum. Rather, the
Resurrection Promise and the kingdom fill that vacuum. This understanding of Promise
demands that history be understood temporally as the tension-filled interim between the
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issuing of the Promise and its fulfillment in the future. As such, it is full of latencies and
potentialities which derive from the kingdom itself. Since every promise includes an
expectation of its own fulfillment within the promise itself, the Promise of God also
includes not only the expectation, but also the anticipation of its fulfillment. Therefore the
time between Promise and fulfillment is not an empty time, but a time which is shot
through with the possibilities of the future kingdom which is understood by Moltmann as
the transformation of the world. Perceived in this way, where Bloch ultimately recognizes
the possibility of the fulfillment of human hopes in future history, Moltmann understands
hope to always "overshoot the mark": It cannot ever be fully realized in history until the
end of history in the kingdom of God. Yet history is not left meaningless; instead, it is
filled with "anticipations," "proclivities," and "potentialities" which arise from looking with
hope toward the kingdom. The completion of fragmentary existence, the fulfillment of
human hopes, the peace and joy of the kingdom can be anticipated proleptically in the
present.
As noted above, the publication of Theology of Hope prompted international discussion
of the function of Christian eschatology in theology. The publication of his second book,
The Crudfied God, produced even more controversy and marks Moltmann' s move into
the third stage of his thought. This stage was inaugurated by a conscious effort on
Moltrnann' s part to incorporate the sociology of knowledge into theology in an attempt
to create a "critical theory of theology." Such a critical theory would be self-reflective and
self-critical. It is the attempt to create
... a critical theory in which knowledge-guiding interests and the practical effects of
this knowledge is revealed and reflected in men .... It is a turning from the theory of
things to a reflection on the use and effects of things."
Central to this development was Moltrnann' s participation in the Christian-Marxist
Dialogues of the 1960s. As Moltmann, himself, stated at the time, the Marxists learned
that Christianity was not merely an "opiate of the people," and we Christians learned
that Christian messianism and eschatology, rightly understood, could take on revolutionary character. 20 This led Moltmann and others into discussions surrounding the question
of the continuities between Christian theology and revolutionary political action. While
both affirmative and negative replies were given, for Moltrnann the Christian hope is
essentially revolutionary. Hope understood as the difference between what is and what
is not yet is first a critique of the current sociopolitical situation. One hopes for the new

because the old is insufficient.
Beyond the revolutionary aspect of Christianity, Moltmann also learned from the
Christian Marxist Dialogue that the "principle of verification" for theology, traditionally
understood as the degree to which theology conformed either to tradition or to the tenets
of logic, was essentially wrong-headed. What now made a theology "true" or not was praxis,
whether the practice that was produced was liberative or not. Moltrnann develops his own
understanding of this in the first chapters of The Crudfied God. In this book, Moltrnann
attempts to delineate the relationship between theory and praxis in theological discourse. He
formulates the relationship between the two as the difficulty of maintaining the balance
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between the identity of Christianity and its relevance." From Moltmann' s perspective,
Christianity derives its identity from the uniqueness of the Christ event: Christ's history is
what lends Christianity its identity. If this were the whole story, however, Christianity would
have remained a closed community, a sect which envisioned itself much as the community
limned in the Epistles of fohn. Christianity is not this closed-in community, however. It is a
community which is in the world, is affected by the world, and in tum affects the world.
Consequently, Christianity has to make clear its relevance to the larger world around it
The problem which confronts Christianity in Moltmann' s view, is that of keeping a balance between the two. If Christianity emphasizes its identity too much, it stands the danger of becoming self-contained and isolated. If, however, it emphasizes its relevance to the
world, it very quickly becomes identified with the culture which surrounds it, and consequently loses its identity, that which makes it unique.
Moltmann attempts to resolve this dilemma through an understanding of the relationship between orthopraxy and orthodoxy. For Moltmann, the question of the relationship
between identity and relevance, orthodoxy and orthopraxy, centers on the problem of the
verification of the truth claims of theology. In traditional theological discourse, the truth of a
theological statement is determined either by its agreement with already determined dogmas of a church, or by its adherence to the rubrics of logic. These two modes of verification lead to what Moltmann considers to be orthodoxy, the focus on correct theory as primary. A second means of verification concerns itself with the agreement of revelation with
already conceived cultural truths. In such a case, the truth of theological statements can be
considered true only if they correspond to what the predominant culture already knows to
be true. The Liberal Theology of the nineteenth century is a prime example of this.
Moltmann attempts to find a middle way between these two positions by adopting
orthopraxis as the only viable means of verifying theological statements. In this perspective,
the truth of theological discourse can only be verified through the practice that it produces."
Understood in this manner, Moltmann's theology is a "functional criticism of the social,
political, and psychological functions of religion and the Church." It must seriously consider
whether theological discourse hinders or furthers liberation, freedom, and justice."
The fourth stage of Moltmann's theological development is his reformulation of
Christian doctrine in light of the insights of the earlier stages. In the early I 980s,
Moltmann began what he called "a series of systematic contributions to theology."" In
these contributions, Moltmann is not trying to present an overarching system of theology
ala Barth, or a Summa theologiae ala Thomas. Rather, Moltmann wants to do doctrinal theology in such a way that the issues which are raised can lead to active dialogue and discussion between and within various religious traditions. Five of these contributions have
already reached print. The first, Trinity and the Kingdom, develops a social doctrine of the
Trinity and attempts a rapprochement between Eastern and Western views of the Trinity.
The second work in this series, God in Creation, presents an ecological doctrine of creation.
The third installment, The Wiry of/esus Christ, makes explicit the messianic implications of
Christian theology. The fourth book in this series is Moltmann' s pneumatology, The Spirit
of Life. In this work, Moltmann explains the Spirit not only as the source of fellowship
within Christianity, but also as a source of fellowship with those outside the Church. He
understands the Spirit to be that which creates, sustains, liberates, justifies, and sanctifies
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life. 21 The most recent installment is The Coming of Cod: Chtistian Eschatology. It is this book
that fleshes out the eschatology that Moltmann began with in Theology of Hope, enlarging
it to include discussion of personal, social, and cosmic elements of eschatology.
MOLTMANN'S RELATIONSHIP TO SUBSEQUENT THEOLOGY

Determining the affiliation of anyone's theology to subsequent theological work is a bit
of a tricky business because one is always aware of the possibility of making more of a
connection than the exponents of such theologies might themselves acknowledge. Since
there is no self-proclaimed "Moltmann School," direct links to other theological perspectives must remain indirect at best. It is probably most appropriate to recognize that theological perspectives similar to Moltmann's were being developed throughout the world
and that there was a cross-fertilization among the different perspectives.
In North America, Carl Braaten, a Lutheran theologian from Chicago, attributed to
Moltmann a central role in raising the political impetuses and consequences of theology.
Braaten describes the role that Moltmann (along with Pannenberg) has had not only
upon his own work, but upon the theological enterprise as a whole:
First, the giants of the older generation-Barth, Bultmann, and Tillich-let the
dimension of the future slip into the eternal present.. .. Second, the "death of God"
stage in theology, following so quickly on the heels of the older generation of
dialectical theologians, was no accident. The "God above us" died as the retribution exacted from theology for the sterility of its future-less eschatology. We are
now in a third stage that began with theologians like Pannenberg and Moltmann
who seized upon the occasion to take up the theme of eschatology as a new point
of departure for a total recasting of the Christian message."
Braaten adopted the futurist eschatologies of Pannenberg and Moltmann and found in
them a revolutionary impulse that he used to critique predominantly the Lutheran theological tradition. His primary target was Luther's "two-kingdoms" doctrine and the negative effect that it has had on politics. In Braaten's eyes, the two-kingdoms doctrine produces a fundamentally conservative political ethic that leaves little or no room (depending
on the interpretation) for political transformation. Its major problem, Braaten opined, is a
"defective eschatology' that totally separated the realm of redemption from the realm of
history. Such a perspective overemphasized individual salvation and made it possible to
declare the political realm as autonomous and beyond the churches' concerns. The political world and its institutions thus had nothing to keep its own self-interest in check."
In Europe, political theology came to the forefront as a dialogue partner for post-Barthian
and post-Bultmannian theologians. In the 1984 discussions surrounding the importance of
the Barmen Declaration for contemporary theology, political theology was viewed as one of
the most appropriate forms for expressing the relationship between theology and politics."
Furthermore, the increased interest in a "theology of revolution" that developed in the late
1960s was viewed by many European scholars as intimately related to the development of
political theology. 29 Again, the futurist eschatology promoted by Moltrnann and others was
seen as a means of introducing a revolutionary, transformative force into political life.
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In Latin America, the development of liberation theology (at least in its early stages)
was influenced by the Moltmann's futurist eschatological perspective. Gustavo Gutierrez's
programmatic book, A Theology of Liberation, considered by many to be one of the founding theological works of liberation theology, states that
Moltmann's work is undoubtedly one of the most important works in contemporary theology. It offers a new approach to the theology of hope and has injected
new life into the reflection on various aspects of Christian existence. Among other
things, it helps us to overcome the association between faith and fear of the future
which Moltmann considers characteristic of many Christians.30
Moltmann' s influence on liberation theology is also supported by a perusal of Jon
Sobrino' s Christology at the Crossroads, in which Moltmann is discussed or noted in virtually every chapter, and references to his work in the index of the book number more than
any other theologian listed."
Another important influence that Moltmann has had is his role in furthering interreligious and ecumenical dialogue. Moltmann is aware that he is writing from a very specific
socio-political context which obviously conditions his work. At the same time, however,
he attempts to relativize his own context by recognizing and utilizing a plurality of contexts which have produced a variety of different theological perspectives. For Moltmann,
it is in the interplay of these perspectives that Christian theology grows and broadens
itself." For theologians it is important to allow one's individual theology to be influenced
by that interplay. This is particularly the case with Moltmann's theology. A perusal of
Moltmann' s works shows that he has had a variety of dialogue partners all of whom have
affected his thought in one way or another. As noted above, many of his early insights
about religion as an ideology were formed through the dialogue between Christians and
Marxists held in the late 1960s by the Paulus Society. Feminist theology, particularly that
produced by his wife, Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, has opened Moltmann's eyes to the
inadequacy of traditional Christian symbols and language about God." The liberation
movements in Latin America, Africa, and Asia have also conditioned Moltmann' s work,
demanding that he move beyond the Eurocentrism perspective which has characterized
traditional European theology."
Other Christian religions often act as dialogue partners for Moltmann's theology.
Orthodox trinitarian thought informs the formation of his doctrine of the Trinity in Trinity
and the Kingdom. Catholic theology, particularly that of Karl Rahner, not only provides a
foil against which Moltmann develops his own theology, but also informs Moltmann's
understanding of the God-world relationship.
Clearly, one of Moltmann's primary dialogue partners has been Judaism. From his first
book, Theology of Hope, through his most recent, 1he Coming of God, his work has brought
forward the continuities and discontinuities between Judaism and Christianity. And in
1984, Moltmann furthered the dialogue directly by collaborating with Pinchas Lapide on
a volume comparing and contrasting Jewish monotheism and Christian trinitarianism."
While Moltmann's theology has been extremely influential, it has not escaped criticism.
The Post-Bultmannian theologian, John Macquarrie, called into question the futurist
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eschatology of Moltmann's theology:
We have noted that 'epiphany' is a bad word with Moltmann. An entire tradition of
Christian theology and spirituality, centering on what John Baille called 'the sense of
the presence of God,' is thus summarily dismissed. With me, let me confess,
'epiphany' is a good word. 10
Furthermore, Macquarrie accused Moltmann (along with Pannenberg and Braaten) of remythologizing theology because they insisted on considering the resurrection as an historical
event Basing his argument on Troeltsch' s principle that a past event must be considered
more or less probable to the degree that it finds analogues in our own present experience,
Macquarrie contended that Moltmann's belief in an historically "real" resurrection cannot be
considered historical in any sense acceptable to historians because it lacks any such analogue
in our experience." Moltmann, it would seem, was hanging on to a mythological vestige
that could not be proved historically.
Moltmann's theology is also critiqued from the "left." Rubem Alves, one of the few
Protestant liberation theologians in Latin America, contends that Moltmann's theology,
while extremely helpful as a critique of the status quo and as a prod to hope, is never fully
grounded in the socio-political forces that shape history. In teasing out the implications of
Moltmann' s futurist eschatology, Alves finds that the negation of the present situation for
Moltmann is grounded solely in God's promise of a new future. Possibilities are derived
from that future, not from any state of affairs already extant; thus, the critique of the present is contradicted by the future promised by God. Alves asserts that in following this line,
Moltmann makes hope purely transcendental, totally unrelated to any specific historical situation. Similar to Barth, whose 'Wholly Other' God he critiqued in his Theology of Hope,
Moltmann likewise has grounded hope in a "wholly other": a totally future Eschaton.
Playing out the logic of Moltmann' s eschatology, therefore would mean that "hope cannot
emerge from our experience, from our present ... It comes from a future truth." 38 Alves, on

the other hand, wants to ground the negation of history in history itself, in the contradiction between the suffering in the present and the possibilities opened up to it if the sufferings were negated. Thus, for Alves, "the negation of pain is the mother of hope and effectiveness."1' Critiques aside, the importance of Moltmann' s theology cannot be denied.
In summary, then, it is appropriate to say that Moltmann is attempting to open up new
horizons for theology by breaking the boundaries that traditional theology has erected. He
has critiqued the theology of classical theism for its inability to provide hope. He has
countered the overemphasis on personalist interpretations of the Gospels, focussing
instead on their larger, sociopolitical, meaning. And finally, he has emphasized the commonalties among religions, fostering and utilizing elements from a variety of different religions and faiths. This he has done from his recognition early on in his theological career
that God has opened human history and human relationships; thus, theology must also
attempt to include that openness within its own discourse.
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HISTORY AS PROBLEM AND HOPE

A.J.

CONYERS

'The modem consciousness of history is a consciousness of crisis, and all modem
philosophy of history is in the last analysis a philosophy of crisis."' To a remarkable
degree, all of Jurgen Moltmann's theological writings can be seen as a response to
this impasse in modem times between a perceived crisis of the social order and
attempts to end the crisis by understanding it. In this chapter, I wish to cover four
points briefly: (I ) Moltmann' s own survey of various attempts to philosophize about
history, in which he also asks pointed questions about what drives such attempts, (2)
his critique of those attempts, (3) Moltmann's way of articulating the relationship
between history and the Christian faith, and (4) how this understanding responds to
the conversation on the theology of history in the twentieth century.
MOLTMANN AND lHE CRISES OF HfsrORY

There was never a time in the history of the church or of Christendom that cataclysmic events affecting society on a large scale did not call forth reflection on the
meaning of history. Thus the series of blows delivered against Rome, after the era of
Christian ascendancy, was the occasion for Augustine's City of God, which was not
truly a philosophy of history, in the modem sense, but was an interpretation of
Christianity based in history. 2 The modern period is different in this regard,
Moltmann points out. Whereas, up until the beginning of the nineteenth century,
the crises of history were in the background of all great reflection on history, since
the French Revolution, "history has been understood entirely in terms of crisis."'
Thus, in various ways, history came to be understood in terms of crisis and the resolution of crisis. From Hegel to Ranke and Burckhard!, the task of a philosophy of
history was to find some general explanation of history's flux, its singular events-its
spontaneity that threatened always to overthrow a sense of order. The philosophy
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of history hoped thus to capture history in some comprehensive vision, and in effect to
master it. That is why explanations of history became "of a total and totalitarian kind."'
The "crisis of history" meant, of course, that the prospects of the future were taken to
threaten disruption. With the Enlightenment, Europeans began to look toward the future
rather than the past for a way of interpreting the human experience. This turn toward the
future, along with the unsettling revolutions and rumors of revolution, caused European
thinkers to begin in earnest seeking a way to accommodate this new orientation, while
coping with the social and political upheavals, and at the same time not utterly losing a
sense of order. Interpreters of history, those who would discover or impose a meaning
upon history-whether they be conservative such as Jacob Burckhardt or revolutionary
such as Auguste Comte-attempted to give answer to the crisis of the present. If they
feared the overthrow or collapse of traditional ways and institutions, the future might be
seen as the hammer of judgment upon the sins of the present, those sins being viewed
largely as deviations from the covenants of the past, betrayals of former generations and
their accumulated wisdom. If they welcomed the future and its "total critique" of the present, then the background of such revolutionary thinking "is always bound up with the
utopian outlook which examines the possibilities and tendencies of things to come, anticipates them, and incorporates them in the present decision." 5 In this way the disasters of
the present become the necessary prelude to the more perfect future; and if necessary to
such an outcome, then desired; and if desired, then actively to be pursued, even if by the
most violent means. Thus "German idealism is the theory of the French revolution." 6 This
is also what Camus meant when he said that "Europe no longer philosophizes by striking
a hammer, but by shooting a cannon."'
In either case, whether conservative or revolutionary, whether motivated by prudential
calculations, by fear, or by utopian anticipation, Moltrnann saw these philosophies of his·
tory as attempts, however subtle and indirect, to bring history to an end. The aim, for
Saint·Simon and Comte, was to bring an end to the revolution. For Burckhard! it was to
mine the wisdom of the past as a means of fortifying against the abysmal dangers of the
future. For Hegel, the aim was the discovery and articulation of a reliable essence within
the unreliable particulars of history. Hegelian philosophy could comfort with the thought
that history only appeared to be random, for its gratuitous appearance only masked an
inner, and essential, "cunning." In fact, the cunning that lay beneath each of these modern
philosophies of history was the attempt to bring an end to crisis.
Saint·Simon and Comte, for instance, imagined a social science that would propel the
human understanding above the circumstances of history. "Scientific knowledge of the
world and of history will supplant the now useless epoch of metaphysics and the still
older epoch of theology."" When the world and its events could then be placed within
this calculus, the crisis would be ended. For Jacob Burckhardt, the crisis is forestalled or
ameliorated by historical continuity and the consciousness of tradition; history became
then a resource for order.

The idea of historical research in the modern period tended increasingly to be imitative
of the natural sciences. The investigation of history gave rise to a methodology that would
allow for an empirical system of investigation. The feeling for history as the remembrance
of something that was once uncertain and dangerous and that met with unexpected cir·
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cumstances gave way to a more or less calculating view of history as a product of knowable forces and made up of verifiable events. History thus conceived was reduced to what
can be reconstructed and understood. Its quality of surprise, of unrepeatable events, of
people and circumstances that are accessible only to lively, interpretive memories is lost.
For this reason, Moltmann came increasingly to emphasize that history can only be understood well if it is considered in light of its sense of the future; in other words, the historical
past had a horiwn in view that made all the difference in how it was experienced.'
The fact that modem people turned from a living tradition to inform them of their
past and consequently their present as well, to the 'science' of history, meant ironically
that they found themselves all the more alienated from their past. ''The positivist materialist reduction of history to the level of past fact and times that have gone suppresses the
future in the past This kind of historicism was in its trend and effect anti-historical. Rather
than the experience of history, it meant a farewell to history." 10 Tradition at least makes a
claim upon human beings and informs them of those gifts, as well as those debts, that
have been passed on to the present generation. It makes the past present Historical criticism works instead to emancipate men and women from their past. As in the natural sciences, said by Descartes to make us 'maitres et possesseurs de la nature', so now in history, criticism gives human beings a lease over the hegemony of the past.'' ''The historicizing
of history frees man from history:"
MOLTMANN'S CRITICAL RECEPTION OF 'HISTORY IN THE MODERN SENSE

A principal insight of Moltmann's Theology of Hope (one affecting the whole of his theological contributions) is that modem 'totalitarian' explanations of history-efforts to
reduce historical experience to a method, or to 'master' the crisis of history-had lost an
essential element of human experience. To explain history, to 'solve its riddle' and to master it as one would a technical problem is to expel unpredictability and thus to eliminate
that which makes experience historical. Without the uncertainty of the future, and the
multiplicity of possibilities in the present, as well as the as-yet-unresolved significance of
the past one cannot speak of history as it is truly experienced. A comprehended history is
a self-contradictory notion. It is an attempt to master and then to end history, but it is not
and can never be, an understanding of history. 'The result of the historicizing and rationalizing of history is then to abolish history and leave human social life bereft of all historic
character." 13

The criticism of ideas that tend to have "domination" as their object is a familiar and
central theme in Moltmann's theological works. In an autobiographically revealing comment on the early development of his theology, he said, "[ grew up during the German
dictatorship and as a young man spent five years in barracks and prison camps ( 1943-48).
I have therefore experienced authority and power as not especially healing-in fact, the
reverse." 14 Thus philosophies of histoty can represent themselves as a solution to the crisis
of history, but in fact represent a kind of domination, one that takes place on the level of
comprehending and thus controlling history. Moltmann recognized that this "cure" for the
dangers of historical crisis also steals from history the very feature that makes it historythat allows human experience to be an experience of history-namely, its unpredictability
and its freedom from domination.
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The problem of understanding history as human experience that is free yet not wholly
indeterminate, as having a capacity for hope without being fatalistic, is a part of the species
of theological problems that commonly fall under the heading of providence and free will.
Early in his theological career, he found that the Federalist Theology <FOdera/theologie, also
referred to as Covenant Theology) that had had a number of exponents since the seventeenth century, yielded insights into the possibilities of freedom within a covenant of the
human being with God. These insights offered the possibility of a theological approach that
would avoid the pitfalls of determinism and domination. A system that had found adherents among a wide variety of Protestants, from German mystics to English and American
Puritans, its understanding of God's relationship to humanity as one of a covenant that
bound both parties, held the possibility of preserving both the sovereignty of God and the
freedom of the human being without compromising either. His early interest in this contribution to theological understanding is especially apparent in his first book, Priidestinalion und
Perseveranz, published in 1961.' 5 From this point in Moltmann's thinking, it is possible to
see how the federalist theology allowed him to see the authority of God as something
clearly distinguishable from the notion of tyranny and oppression."
Moltmann's preference for an approach such as this 'federalist' construction of theology can be seen all the more clearly in his survey of attempts at historical heuristics and
philosophies of history that he undertakes in the Theology of Hope. Wherever there occurs
the attempt to speak comprehensively of the bare facts of history there necessarily arises
the problem of attaching abstract meaning to things and events that do not speak for
themselves. These attempts have taken various forms, some at the level of heuristics, oth·

ers striving for a "philosophy of history":
( 1) There is the attempt to distill a 'law' within history, or laws that govern the succession and movement of events Such evoking of 'laws of history' call to mind the efforts of
Auguste Comte, followed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Laws of history, in this sense,
are imitative of the idea of natural laws which focus on efficient and material causes as adequate explanation of events. The difficulty here, says Moltmann, is that while we "can certainly argue from effects to causes" we can hardly ever argue in reverse. "Hence the really
historic factor lies in the concept of possibility rather than in that of necessity .... ""
(2) Less stringent is the idea of historical 'tendencies' taken up by such esoteric
Marxists as Georg Lukacs and Ernst Bloch. Rather than argue from cause to effects, one
who softened the idea of 'laws' in favor of 'tendencies' would argue from "possibility to
reality." Still, Moltmann reminds us, the intention here is to ascribe an end or goal to history and thus to limit possibilities."
(3) Others attempt to grasp history in the sense of its 'style,' an aesthetic concept that
imposes yet again a certain logos upon the otherwise unpredictable nature of historic
experience." This approach seeks to avoid placing heavy weight upon the 'facts' of history
by comprehending the way in which these facts, whatever they may be, arrange themselves and are comprehended as a whole.
(4) The idea of 'structure' in history attempts to account for the influence of social institutions, especially as they appear to embody the historical sense of a given moment.
Form-critical historiography attempts to view historical statements, for instance, in light of
the institutional requirements of an epoch in history, reflecting the comprehensive influ-
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ence of laws, manners, customs, art, and the overall articulation of values in socia1 arrangements. Thus history is seen as the history of 'forms' or ideas that have had comprehensive
effect on history.20

(5) Finally, history might be understood on the basis of human existence as a dialectic of
"situation" and "decision," of problem and response. Following the existentialist method of
Martin Heidegger, the "historian is then not so much interested in the events themselves and
their causal or tendentious connections with other events, but rather in the historic character
of the several existences that have been, and in the possibilities of human existence.""
All of these heuristic models present possibilities for a comprehensive understanding of
history-if, that is, such possibility exists at all. They become the basis of philosophies of
history that endeavor to do precisely that. The heuristic possibilities range from the quite
objective discovery of 'laws' in the spirit of Newtonian natural sciences to the subjective
appropriation of history through an existentialist approach to knowledge. They are methods that range from being grounded in facts to being grounded in human, even individual, experience.

Over against these heuristic devices and their tendency to raise the possibility of a
comprehending and mastering idea of history, Moltmann's critique is single, simple, and
powerful. History is about change; and change is the opposite of 'essence'. Therefore, historiology is a self-contradictory term: to say there is a logos within history is to say that the
experience of change that we call history is unreal, that it is-in one way or another-the
varying manifestation of an unchanging reality.
Either we must deal with history or we must not Moltmann insists that one cannot
merely pretend to be dealing with the human experience of history while in fact attempting
to locate a central core that renders the notion of crisis and change meaningless. "Philosophy
of history as a philosophy of crisis," he writes, "has the aim of annihilating history :·22
MOLTMANN'S POSITIVE RECEPTION OF THE Exl'ERIENCE OF HISTORY

The question naturally arises, then, in the face of all these efforts, conscious and inadvertent, to "annihilate history," whether there is something about history that one would wish
to keep. The founder of the "theology of hope" is unequivocal in saying "Yes." It is a matter
of instructive contrast that the classical Greek world thought little of history and the
Hebrew world of the prophets saw history as the medium of divine revelation. For
Hellenistic culture history could only be seen as a repetitive presentation of the cosmic
order. Events may differ, and the players upon a sacred stage may vary, but the drama
always speaks of an eternal and unchanging order. The divine order is therefore indifferent
to the form and pathos of the drama and its players. This is what Moltmann refers to as
the "spell of the Aristotelian doctrine of God" which insists that God is incapable of suffering (apatheiaJ; if he is incapable of suffering, Moltmann says, he is also incapable of loving."
But for Hebrew experience and for the prophetic response to Israel's crisis, history is open
to something utterly new and unforeseen. This is to say that God discloses himself in
events that encounter the present circumstances as advent. Historical crisis appears in dual
aspect: it endangers the present (which phibsophers of history had seen) but it also opens
the way to new possibilities. The crisis carries with it both the prospect of fear and of hope.
Christian faith arises out of the memory of the crucified and condemned one who was
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raised from the dead to a new life. It thus transforms the habit of fear to a spirit of hope.
Once he had decided to resist tendencies to de-historicize history, and to explore
instead the fully historical elements of the biblical understanding of reality as history, as a
history founded on promise and that expects a future fulfillment, we can see how this
resolve carries over into his critique of twentieth century trends in theology. In beautifully
compact form, this insight into the unhistorical nature of twentieth-century theologies is
presented in The Way of!esus Christ in relation to the historical nature of the resurrection.
The problems of the resurrection for modem historians are seen in light of Troeltsch' s
1898 axioms for the critical historical method. An event gains historical credibility in that
it can be said to be probable (similar events occur), in that it corresponds to a world of
cause and effect, or that it appears to stand in analogical relationship to other events. One
can readily see that an event such as the resurrection, which (I) cannot be said to be
probable, (2) corresponds in no discoverable way to the "cohesion of cause and effect,"
and (3) is singular and an event that contradicts experience, and thus one that defies analogy, cannot be included among those events defined historical. Therefore, theologians
"who allowed themselves to be drawn into this position looked for different categories as
a way of proving that the Christian faith was well founded and meaningful."" Thus, in a
major way, theologians attempted to speak of Christian faith in a manner that does not
rely on history. In other words, they ventured to create out of a resolutely historical faith a
theology that might get along as well without history.
For Karl Barth, then, matters of history were overwhelmed by a sense that what was of
ultimate and supreme importance was the reality of God "whose eternity confronts all the
times of history simultaneously." The Word of God penetrates the vagaries of history and
discloses itself in history, but it is supremely the same word, not a new word or a different
word. Thus, that which is unchanging, a sort of "Divine History," discloses itself in the horizontal this and that of history: the eternal is not changed in any way by what is disclosed.
So, even for the resurrection of Jesus Christ, Barth would say that it is "nothing other than
a paraphrase for the word 'God'." In this way, Barth's understanding of the raising of
Christ from the dead is not at all affected by Troeltsch's axioms about historicity. And
Moltmann accordingly observes that "This reduction of Christs resurrection to God's sovereignty does not merely demythologize the resurrection; it de-historicizes it as well."25
On the other hand, Rudolf Bultmann captured a generation of theologians and pastors
with his method of subsuming the historical under the category of "existential history."
The resurrection became, in this view, an event of faith. Like Barth's a-historical under-

standing of the event as a disclosure of what is true with God, Bultmann's approach rested upon the idea that the truth discloses itself to the human experience altogether apart
from

its historicity. The importance and the meaning of events in histoiy have no real

bearing on the reality of faith. In that they have saving power or significance, it must be
discovered in the response of faith that they engender in each heart and mind. Thus for
Bultmann, as well as for Barth, the historical question-in the sense that Troeltsch wanted
to define it-could not undercut the deeper, transcending importance of a story that is
essentially not historical. Moltmann's remark on this reduction is telling: "All that remains
is the 'Christ in us' of Christian mysticism.""
Over against the attempt to avoid the historical criticism of biblical history, there is also
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the possibility of seeing the relationship of history and faith in a new way. "It is one thing,"
he says, "to see Christ's resurrection in the perspective of history, where we are faced with
the inescapable question: is the resurrection an event, or an interpretation of faith? It is
another thing to see history in the perspective of Christ's resurrection.''" In this way, he
raises to a conscious level the recognition that history ought really to be more than the
antiseptic discovery of facts in the now dead past, but the discovery of a living history that
took place in the foreground of the experienced hopes and expectations of a people.
History, in other words, is not simply about the past; it is about a past that had a future.
Furthermore, the past's meaning is progressively discovered not by unearthing, layer by
dusty layer, the facts of the past, but by discovering through the progression of time how
that past anticipated its future, and how its anticipated future colored the foreground of
each experienced present.
At this point, we see that Moltmann is joined by Wolfhart Pannenberg in a similar
insight about the incompleteness of history, an incompleteness that can only be completed in light of the last things. Thus history, for Pannenberg, is proleptically illuminated by
the resurrection of Jesus, an event of the end of history that takes place in the 'midst of
history'. This makes possible what Pannenberg calls 'anticipatory reason' raising the possibility of the category of 'universal history'." It is true, as Moltmann readily attests, that this
approach resists the temptation to simply de-historicize a historical faith, as he found in
Barth and Bultmann. It takes seriously the historical character of the faith of Israel and the
Apostles. However, he says, "it can easily become the confirmation of what takes place in
history and human reason anyway." In that case, the raising of Christ "could then become
the historical and symbolic endorsement of the proleptic structures of being, and would
then offer nothing new."" If 'nothing new', then would that not mean 'no transformation',
'no salvation', and in effect 'no gospel'? At this point, therefore, we must note carefully
the distinction of Moltmann' s appropriation of this insistence upon rescuing the historical
dimension of Christian theology and resisting the wish to simply dispel it by un-historical
theologizing such as he found in Barth and Bultmann.
When Moltmann wants to consider the 'sphere of historical experience', he wants to
do so in light of the 'horiwn of historical expectation'. We must remember, at this point
however that Moltmann insists that one does not really do justice to the historical experience by taking from it the risks and the uncertainties that make it what it is. In this sense,
his difference with Pannenberg is as striking as his critique of Barth and Bultmann. The
shorthand way of expressing Moltmann' s approach is to say that history without time is
not the experience of history. "Reality is only experienced as history as long as there is a
perception of time." And furthermore, "Time is only perceived as long as the difference
between past and future exists." Therefore, "Remembrance and hope are the conditions
for possible experiences of history."29 The space between remembrance and hope open
the possibility for praxis, for acting upon the conditions of the present in light of the
remembered hope for human beings and for nature. So, to move back to the historicity
of the resurrection: what is historically important is not the simple fact of the resurrection,
or a defense of the event as a datum to support the dogma of the church on the resurrection of the dead, but it is the reality of its raising the historical hope that suffering and godforsakeness, poverty and oppression, can be experienced in the horiwn of God's rernern-
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bered promise for the future. It means that suffering and hope take place in a manner
that gives substance to the practice of attending to those who suffer and working in behalf
of those who have almost lost hope. "The resurrection of Christ," therefore, "is historically
understood in the full sense only in the unity of knowing, hoping, and doing."'°
With remarkable consistency Moltmann keeps time, with change as its essence, at the
heart of the historical faith of Israel and the Church, critically exposing the claims of each
new effort to divest the Christian faith of its intimate connection with historical experience, that is, experience that takes place between a past and a future. This is at the heart
of Christian understanding, he says:
For God's promise is like a horizon which moves with us and into which we move.
Promise has fulfillment ahead of it. That is why the hoping person begins to seek for
the fulfillment of his hope, finding rest only in the reality of fulfilled promise. What
was imagined in individual terms with Abraham was Israel's collective experience in
the exodus from Egypt, an experience which was told from generation to generation.
Exodus means leaving an old reality which was endured as an imprisonment and
seeking the land of promise. If we transfer this to the experience of time, exodus
means leaving what is behind and reaching out to what lies ahead Whil. 3:13). Past
and future become distinguishable in the transition of the present. The three
Abrahamic religions-Judaism, Christianity, and Islam-are religions of history, aligned
towards the future. This is made plain in every encounter with the Asiatic religions of
external and internal equilibriun1-equilibrium in nature, as in Taoism, equilibrium in

society, as in Confucianism, and equilibrium in one's soul, as in Buddhism. 31
In this way, Moltmann offers a third alternative of reading the modem experience of
history. He intended that his readers should see that one need not resent the modem
experience of continual and radical change, attempting instead to rescue the remnants of
tradition and return to the past. Nor should one attempt to evade history as if it is finally
irrelevant to the religious consciousness, as in the theology of Rudolf Bultmann. Instead, the
thoughtful Christian should recognize in the modem experience of history the very character of history that gives rise to hope. In fact, the eschatological orientation of the gospel calls
radically into question the stabile institutions and traditions of the present and gives relief
to those who anxiously observe the shaking of every so-called foundation. The modem
experience of history does not, in other words, lead us away from the Christian gospel, but
in fact leads us to the very heart of the gospel and into the presence of the Crucified One.
Thus, in contrast to the eternal, though varied, presentation of a logos, an "eschatology
of history'' which incorporates and "revolves around the new and the future, of mission
and the front line of the present" has the strength to "take history as history, to remember
and expect it as history, and thus not to annihilate history but to keep it open." 32
HISTORY AS ANTICIPATION AND HOPE

The next step in Moltmann' s consideration of history is best understood in light of a
certain analysis of history that he has made in recent times. In answer to the question,
"What can we know about God's future, and how can we talk about it>" he pointed out
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that one might use either of two ways of talking about the future. One is the method of
extrapolation. The other is viewed as antidpation.
Extrapolation looks toward the future as a continuation of the trends and movements
of the present, "inferring the future from the data and trends of the past and present."
Trend analysts assume that "the past and the future lie along one and the same
temporal line." Moltmann raises the question as to whether such a method is really dealing with the future at all. "They are simply prolonging into the future their own present"
It is an "extrapolated and extended future'' that they have in mind; and such approaches
tend to suppress thinking about new possibilities that might break in unexpectedly, contradicting the present circumstances rather than carrying them forward in predictable
ways. For this way of viewing history, the definition of history includes only "the eternal
becoming-and-passing-away."33
Otherwise, however, one might think of history as anticipation. Anticipation allows for
the possibility-even the probability-of that which is new. The new situation might be
one of danger or opportunity, engendering fear or hope. Anticipation, however, is not
simply a passive regarding of what is to come, it is rather an active imaginative engagement with the conditions of the future. In anticipation one stands ready, one is not
deceived (Mark 13) by reassurances of continual ease or the opportunity of sin. Instead,
one watches, awaiting the Advent of a new world, one that comes from God's hand and
is not merely the old one carried into the future. 34
The reason a follower of Christ can meet the future with both anticipation and hope is
the resurrection of Christ. For the raising of Jesus from the dead is not merely a certain
datum within history, but is the promise of the utter contradiction of the conditions of sin
and death. Therefore, the resurrection means not "a possibility within the world and its
history, but a new possibility altogether for the world, for existence and for history." 35
The reason is found not in a new paradigm, but in the contradiction of paradigms
which the resurrection of the dead presents to our imaginations. Here-in regard to the
resurrection-we do not "derive general laws of world history," but we are presented
instead "the hope for the future of all world history."36 For that reason, one's engagement
with the resurrection of Christ is not then confined to a passive belief in a past event, but
it is a belief in the ultimate future in which God "quickens into life ... makes the poor rich
... lifts up the humble and raises the dead." Believing that to be the future of the present
one is empowered to live in faith. And this faith "in the resurrection is
and of the
itself a living force which raises people up and frees them from the deadly illusions of
power and possession, because their eyes are now turned towards the future of life.""
The task and the self-concept of the church can be said to flow from its understanding
of history. That is to say, it flows from an understanding of its place in the human experience and how this place is founded upon the promise of God. For the church to remain
the church means that the experience of history is constantly viewed in light of the horiwn of history. 'The glory of self-realization and the misery of self-estrangement alike,"
wrote Moltmann in the concluding words of the Theology of Hope, "arise from hopelessness in a world of lost horiwns." From this condition we discern the nature and work of
the church: "To disclose to it the horizon of the future of the crucified Christ is the task of
the Christian Church." 1'
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THE CHURCH AS THE COMMUNITY OF
OPEN FRIENDSHIP

J.

STEPHEN RHODES

The place to start an investigation of Moltmann's theology of the church is to ask
what he finds problematic about the church as we often experience it The church, he
argues, is far too often a sodetas inruroatus in se-a community that is turned in on itself
and closed to the outsider, to what is different, painful, or "other."' It is a church where
like-minded people gather together in a closed circle and those who are excluded are
left in cold isolation.' The exclusive church struggles to find vitality because it is selfabsorbed and closed to the in breaking of God's Spirit who blows where God will in
all of created life. Even when theologians think about the church, their very categories
are frequently ecclesiocentric and do not reveal the essential groundedness of all of
life-including the church's life-in the beneficent Spirit of God 3
Thus, the dominant criticism that Moltmann levels against the often fallen church
and the way it understands itself is a criticism of self-absorption. This criticism plays
out in a number of ways.
First, Moltmann rejects false conceptions of the church's koinonia or "friendship
community." The church's koinonia is too often predicated on uniformity. It is the
friendship of like with like or of "birds of a feather who flock together." Against this
model of koinonia Moltmann lifts up the recurring biblical affirmation of the value of
the stranger and wayfarer, the outcast and sinner. The church cannot be a boat of
sameness afloat in a sea of otherness. In the person of Jesus Christ, the church's
founder, we see one who embraces those who do not conform to the dominant
paradigm of what a whole person is, and we also see in Jesus a profound openness
to life in all of its differentness that contrasts sharply with the hardness, coldness, and
narrowness of many of the religious leaders of his time. Jesus reveals the true nature
of God, whose very being is characterized by the Trinitarian koinonia (Moltmann's
term is actually perichoresisJ of those who are different-God as source of being,
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Eternal Word, Holy Spirit. Thus, for Moltmann, the miraculous good news about the
lwinonia of the Trinity is that it is characterized not by the friendship of uniformity, but by
a unifying friendship that respects and includes differentness. Where for humans "three is
a crowd" and far too often a number symbolic of broken community, we discover in Cod
that three friends are better than two or one-that multiplicity and variety only enrich the
divine hoinonia of what we are invited to be a part.
Moltmann's second criticism grows out of the
namely, if the church's identity cannot
be self-determined, then neither can its purpose or mission be self-serving. In defining his purpose in writing The Church in the Power of the Spirit, his most important work on ecclesiology,
he states that the book's intention is "to point away from the pastoral church that looks after
the people, to the people's own communal church among the people."' The church must
"become a living hope in the midst of the people."' This is put more sharply in Theology of
Hope where he argues that the church is "nothing in itself, but all that it is, it is in existing for
others. It is the Church of Cod where it is a church for the world."' The goal of the church is
not to save the world by gathering the world into the church, as many advocates for
Christian mission have assumed, but, rather to bear witness to the reconciling work of Cod
already begun in the world by the risen Christ in the power of the Holy Spirit.' Moltmann
often likes to use Paul's metaphor for the church as the "firstfruits" of the new creation. The
church is not separate from the world, nor is the redemption message at its core a nonworldly message. Rather, by virtue of existing in solidarity with the "whole longing and waiting creation" in all of its "otherness," it finds hope in the coming future where the Spirit of
God makes all things new.8 Therefore, in undertaking its mission, the church does not regard
the others to whom it is sent-the poor, the sick, and the rejected, for example-as objects of
Christian outreach, but rather as subjects, or better, co-subjects in the kingdom of Cod.'
In order to understand Moltmann's conception of the doctrine of the church correctly
it is essential to understand that the primaiy- and prior consideration is always the redemptive work of the Trinitarian God in the created world. The church's purpose may be to
bear witness to this activity or to be its firstfruits, but it is clearly not an entity or category
that exists "above" or "before" the world which Cod embraces. Thus, for example, in discussing the Sabbath, Moltmann argues that we miss the whole point of the Sabbath if we
think it exists only for the church. In fact, it is impossible to enjoy it without doing so with
those outside the church, for first and foremost it is a "fundamental structure of creation
itself."'° This is why, also, for example, Moltmann goes to great lengths in the Spirit of Life
and elsewhere to overcome the false bifurcation between the Spirit of God who sustains
all life and draws it to God and the Spirit of Cod who comes to the church empowering
its mission. It is, in fact, the case that God's Spirit is one, if differentiated, and that a true
ecclesial appreciation of the Spirit will necessarily entail the continual prayer for the universal coming of the Spirit throughout all creation.''
Identifying Moltmann's ecclesiology is challenging at times precisely because of his
thoroughgoing commitment to the solidarity of the church with the world and the
church's basis in God's worldly, life-giving love. This is not because he devalues the
church, but because of his profound belief in the open friendship of God towards all creation that ought to characterize those who claim to be the firstfruits of that friendship. His
conviction about the fundamental grounding of the church in God's life in the world is
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matched by his condemnation of a church that seeks to find a place of superiority over
the world. To this third problem we now tum.
From his earliest writings, Moltmann denounces mission and ministry when they are
excuses in extending the church's "sovereignty" and the "privileges accruing from the cult
of the absolute."" The church and its officials are called to point to the hope of all
ation, not by "churchifying" the world but through suffering and action."" In other words,
the church cannot point to itself nor can it understand itself even to be the primary instrument through which God's redemptive future for the world is effected. Most assuredly,
then, the church cannot claim privileges for itself by virtue of an alleged superiority to the
world, nor can it infer an implidt superiority by its supposed removal from the world into
a spiritual or sectarian ghetto.
Nowhere does he make this point more compellingly or dramatically than in the
Crudfied God: ''The crucified Christ is a challenge to the Christian Church."" In his second
chapter on ''The Resistance of the Cross Against its Interpretations," Moltmann argues
that the church can only find life when it embraces its origin in the cross of Christ and
God and claims "its own strangeness and homelessness in its own Christian world."" The
cross is the final critique of the church's "deification of the human heart, the sacralization
of certain localities in nature, certain dates and times ... and every established holy place
which promises permanence." 16 Therefore, any attempt to place the church above the

world only removes the church further from its source of life, because the church only
exists insofar as it is cruciform. In the cross of Christ at its core it finds the fundamental
contradiction to all that deifies or elevates or removes it in relation tu the created world
around it. It is not called to success or supremacy but to cross-bearing and solidarity with
the homeless and restless whose lives describe that of the church's founder."
The frequent lack of correlation between the life of the church and that of Jesus and of
the God Jesus reveals is the core of Moltrnann' s critique of the church as we often experience it. Even though it says so, the church does not always cling closely to the affirmation
that "the church's first word is not 'church' but 'Christ'."" Over and over again Moltrnann
strives to tum the church's eyes away from itself and towards Jesus Christ and God's unfolding history with the world. The ongoing and future Missio Dei in the world is the basis for the
church's existence and identity. Mission is not a creation or property of the church; it is the
milieu out of which the church emerges as a discemable witness to its founder."
How does Moltmann resolve the obvious contradictions between the Church and
Christ? He does not do so; in fact, he accentuates them. But, in light of these contradictions, rather than surrender to fatalism or to a promethean humanism, he reminds readers
that there is always hope for the church precisely on account of the ongoing missionary
activity of God in the world that determines the church's existence in the first place.
While the church "continually realizes and compromises" God's missionary activity,
nonetheless it lives from the surplus of God's promise that continues to overcome its
failed realizations of that promise-it lives from the "added value of God's salvation."'° In
remembering what God has done and hoping for what God will do in the world (two
essential dynamics in Moltrnann's theology) the church can continue to live with confidence and joy in the face of its and the world's continuing brokenness."
If Moltmann's dominant critique of the church is an account of its tendency to close
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itself off from God and Cod's world, his dominant affirmation is of the church of open

friendship. The dedication in front of 7he Church in the Power of the Spirit illustrates this affirmation: 'To the World Council of Churches ... and oppressed Christians throughout the
world." Moltrnann' s positive ecclesiology is marked by friendship with (I) those who are
different, 1:e.• the ecumenical church. and friendship with (2) those who suffer at the hands
of others namely. the oppressed. Moreover, as the sub-title to the same book makes clear.
Moltrnann s ecclesiology is "Messianic" -marked by (3) imaginative openness to the future
that is coming in the risen Christ.
Moltrnann consistently makes the case that a Christ-based ecclesiology will embrace differences and the lack of absolute solutions to tensions in the church this side of the eschaton. In his conclusion to Theology of Hope. for example. he argues. following Hegel. that "a
thing is alive only when it contains contradiction in itself and is indeed the power of holding the contradiction in itself and enduring it." 22 The church must remain open to the destabilizing but enlivening future of the crucified Christ." Moltrnann repeatedly strives to counteract the tendency in the church to absolutize penultimate solutions to practical and doctrinal problems. Such false absolutisms invariably marginalize or exclude those who need
inclusion and serve to preserve an unjust status quo, whether within or outside of the
church. The church's mission is to pray-and enact the prayer-of the early church. "Let thy
kingdom come and this world pass away."" In a fundamental sense the church is called by
its eschatological hope in Christ to be a destabilizing influence in society and the lives of its
members. It refuses to regard any unjust status quo as unchangeable. It helps people feel
the galling pain of their chains and turns "quiet apathy into noisy protest.""
Contrary to dominant social paradigms, Moltrnann argues that a healthy human community-and by inference the church-is marked by its capacity to adapt to change, conflict and suffering, and to do so with strength and grace." Healthy community is not
marked by the absence of conflict but by how it handles such conflict. Citing the examples
of Bonhoeffer and the Taize Community. he extols a model of Christian community that
finds consolation and encouragement in the coming kingdom of God. but at the same
time does not surrender the world to self-destruction. Such a community of faith joins
with all who are working for healing and wholeness in the world while at the same time
prayerfully expressing the willingness to wait for God and Cod's activity."
However, true koinonia means more than accepting and embracing tensions and conflicts. It is about accepting and embracing each other and God. The ultimate mark of true
koinonia is friendship. Borrowing from Kant, Moltmann defines friendship as combining
affection and respect." In true friendship. there is "uncoerced respect and uncoerced
affection."" God is free to be Cod; you are free to be you; I am free to be me. Yet, in true
friendship, we are joined in care and affection for one another. Indeed, none of us are

fully ourselves without living with each other in such friendship. In explaining a German
word for hospitality, gastfrl?I; Moltrnann lifts up the necessary tension between koinonia as
sharing and koinonia as freedom:
The person who is gastfrd does not dominate any of his guests. nor is he ever without
guests. He is capable of fellowship with strangers. He lets them share his life. and is

interested in theirs. 10
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The open friendship of the new koinonia, however, needs to be more specifically
defined. It is not just a friendship that embraces differences and tensions among people; it
is a friendship that embraces those who suffer. It is not enough to say that just as God
loves the "other," so ought the church to love its "others." To Moltmann, real love and the
koinonia it engenders presupposes God's and our suffering, both as an essential quality of
our vulnerable caring and as an experienced characteristic of our life of solidarity with the
suffering of the world. Those who will not open themselves to suffering cannot love."
Indeed, it is only as the church takes suffering into itself that it can "infect people with
hope," for thereby the good news it proclaims becomes believable." People who sufferparticularly the oppressed-deeply long for the consolation that comes from the solidarity
of others with them. Over and over again Moltmann lifts up the fact that in the Exodus,
God does not merely liberate people from oppression, God remains with those who are
being liberated as their comforter and as the basis for their continued struggle." So also,
then, ought the new koinonia to stand in abiding solidarity with those who are not yet free
from suffering, whether within or outside of the community of faith.
Suffering often divides people on account of a "lifeboat" mentality. Healing or freedom
is commonly perceived as a limited commodity to be competed for by "haves" and
"have-nots." But, according to Moltmann, the church has received the messianic secret:
"Wounds are healed through wounds."" When the church takes on suffering rather than
seeking to shift it to others, we spread healing and peace to those around us and find
health in the deepest sense, even if we die in the process. 35 Such a willingness to move
towards health via suffering and death presupposes a profound eschatological faith. When

the church stands up for and with those who are suffering, it lives from the future
promised to it in Jesus Christ." It lives, finally, from a future and present joy.
The open friendship of the new koinonia is not ultimately about suffering, but about
the a-eative love that goes out from God and gathers creation and God's people to God.
In the final sense, the church exists to celebrate the superabundant love at the core of its
existence. By embracing tension and difference, conflict and suffering, the church that
lives in open friendship reaps the benefits of this embracing: vitality and the ability to feel
love and joy. It becomes a community that is imaginative, that sees beyond all unjust or
unresolved "givens."" It resists passivity." It is a community that laughs at death and hell,
that dares to taste the joy of God's freedom, that dances and is playful in the face of the
"standardiz.ations" and confusion of this world." It is not content simply to see things
restored to their former greatness, real or imagined, but works and waits for God's new
creation of the world. It is a community where "the frontier of death has been breached,"
where the future is thrown open even for the dead and the lost.'° The church of open
friendship is, in the last analysis, a koinonia of exuberant love.
Moltmann' s strong convictions about the church's call to be a koinonia of open friendship lead him to emphasize freedom and equality in community and a dynamic openness
to the Spirit of God in the way the church structures its life and worship. These emphases
are particularly striking in his understanding of Baptism, the Lord's Supper, the offices of
the church, and Sabbath worship.
Baptism for Moltmann, is a dynamic act, a bold sign of repentance, and is, in fact,
"eschatology put into practice."" It means to be equipped by the Holy Spirit for service, to
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accept Christ's missionary charge to his followers, to join the fellowship of believers and
to die with Christ and to be raised to a new future." In other words, Baptism is a sign of
freedom that has been actualized through faith in God's future. Baptism stands in sharp
contrast to structures and ideologies that presuppose resignation and passivity in the face
of the status quo. just as the church should be a contrast community, so ought baptism to
be a contrast sign-a sign of active freedom in the face of fatalism. This is why, Moltmann
believes, infant baptism runs counter to the biblical witness and messianic faith.
Infant baptism draws the eyes of the church to itself-it is a rite of initiation into
"Christian society" or even a national church." It reflects a dependency mentality about
church membership whereby members are not full participants in God's commissioning
but are unequal recipients of actions by others." Infant baptism is a sign of an unconvincing church that is too closely aligned with the status quo of the self-justifying social order.
By contrast, true baptism "points away from itself," just as the hoinonia of open friendship is turned outward towards God and God's world. 45 Baptism calls persons into adult
faith; it is a commissioning sacrament whereby persons move into active service to the
world within the framework of God's histoiy with the world.46 It is thus vocational in
nature and means that the church must change from being a "religious welfare institution
to a social body built upon firm fellowship.""
Just as baptism is "the eschatological sign of starting out," so also the Lord's Supper is
"the eschatological sign of being or the way."'" The Lord's Supper demonstrates and actualizes the same open friendship towards the world made clear in baptism, as well as the
radical sense of the equal dignity and freedom of all of God's people. No single class or
office of person has the exclusive, or exduding right to the administration of the Lord's
Supper. "Everyone whom (Christ) calls and who follows his call has the authority to break
the bread and dispense the wine."'" Any compromise of this authority, that is equally
shared by all believers, dilutes the radical gospel message of hope in Jesus Christ-that in
Christ God gives God's self for all people.
Where baptism is a sign of active friendship with God and God's world, the Lord's Supper is the sign of the openness of such friendship. It is the sacramental foretaste of the "joyful feast" when God's shalom shall fill all that is.'° It is a feast that prefigures the new creation that overcomes all that is broken in the world, and so it must be a concrete and tangible demonstration of that overcoming by being a feast of the righteous with the unrighteous. It must be a koinonia meal that accepts and justifies tax-collectors and sinners. 51
Therefore, since the Lord's Supper is "a sign of fellowship and not of division," it is "not
the place to practice church discipline.''" In fact, the inference of Moltmann' s argument is
that if the church longs, prays, and works for the liberation of the world from sinfulness,
then questions of "admissibility'' to the Lord's table and of "worthiness" and confession
ought to be asked after the sacrament and not before." As with Karl Barth, Moltmann's
view is that the good news of God's open friendship towards all, righteous or unrighteous,
generates and precedes our repentance and not the other way around. "Moral legalism"
causes "many people to excommunicate themselves from this meal,'' when, by contrast,
we ought to "start from the Lord's Supper as something done together and openly, and
try to explain the moral questions on the basis of this action and this fellowship.""
Not surprisingly, freedom, equality and eschatological openness also characterize
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Moltmann's under.;tanding of how the church should discern the gifts of God's people
and how their setvice should be rendered to God and God's world. The baptismal commissioning of every believer is foundational to any under.itanding of the church's division
of labor: all believer.; are commissioned for setvice, are given divine gifts for setvice, and
share equal responsibility and status, in community, for bearing "existential witness" to the
hope at the core of their existence." "Every member of the messianic community is a
charismatic," wherever they find themselves." "It is not the gift that is important, but its
use."" Moltmann means by this that no function or office within the community of faith
has an essential superiority to any other. No authoritarian leverage pertains to one gift nor
another. Indeed, to confer superiority on a particular gift or office is to baptize a particular
set of existential circumstances and to make a virtue of historical necessities." All believer.;
are called to exercise their gifts wherever they are and however they can in the setvice of
the new creation, whether they are male or female, slave or free, Jew or Greek. But it is
most assuredly not the case that their historical circumstances-their "accidental" naturehas superiority or inferiority. 59 The church cannot tum historical circumstances or per.;onal
aptitudes into an ontological law establishing a religious caste. The community of faith
must continually seek to discern the best deployment of its gifts to fulfill the fundamental
baptismal commissioning common to all. Thus, no church office or function of ministry is
essentially permanent, although the church may discern an individual divine call with de
facto but not de jure permanency in particular cases."'
This flexibility about church offices does not originate in utilitarian considerations,
although it reflects a keen awareness of the "situatedness" of all discipleship. Rather,
Moltmann contends, it comes from the freedom of the Holy Spirit in relation to the particular situation of the community of faith. 61 Openness to God's future necessitates flexibility on the part of the community of faith. God's future is not for an ideal world, but for
the constantly changing church and world in which we live. Therefore, calcified hierarchies like the monarchical episcopate are not viable options for the messianic community
because they foreclose the eschatological openness of God's history with God's people."
Nevertheless, neither is a democraticized under.;tanding of the distribution of God's gifts
justifiable to Moltmann for the same reason. Ultimately, the source for the church's divine
gifts and the authority governing their exercise is found in the Trinitarian God. Since community and individuality cannot be set over against each other in the Trinity, neither can
this be done with reference to the community of faith. A true under.;tanding of the life in
the Spirit of the new hoinonia affirms equality, freedom, and open friendship among all
who participate in the life of love that is the new creation.63
In sabbath wor.;hip, the church locates itself with all its pains and joys in the unfolding of
the history of the Trinitarian God with the world. The church's wor.>hip "is the experience
of the qualitative alteration of this world."" Sabbath wor.;hip is an experience of freedom.
As with the Lord's Supper it prefigures the liberation of the world from the compulsions of
work as drudgery and from social conventions that trap like with like. Far from being a
necessary but matginal function in life that lubricates the wheels of production and consumption, worship ought to be at the center of civilized life, renewing and enlivening it.65
Sabbath wor.;hip expresses "messianic freedom," not simply a "break" or "day off' from a
work-a-day world whose desensitization is perceived as an unalterable fixity."
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Worship is how the community of faith opens itself to God, and thus it is "playful," "festal," "exuberant,'' and "ecstatic."" In worship, the community of faith opens itself to the
"Wholly Other'' not only as the divine reality at the core of its existence but as the eschatological, "other" way of life that stands in contrast to the often destructive world order. True
worship is "open for spontaneous ideas and for accidents coming from outside, for surprises and strangers.""" Far from being a manifestation of religion as the opiate of the people,

true sabbath worship is an experiment in living now in an eschatological manner. By this
means, worship becomes not an alternative to reality devoid of this-worldly ethical import,
but a liturgical experiment in a practiced, alternative reality reflective of God's future."
Thus, in describing the worship and life of the messianic community of faith,
Moltrnann instantiates the fundamental themes developed in his critique of the closed
church and in his explications of true koinonia. In this effort he shows remarkable consistency in his passionate devotion to the God whose open friendship with all of creation
should and does engender open friendship in the new koinonia found in Jesus Christ.
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FROM BARTH S TRINITARIAN
1
CHRISTOLOGY TO MOLTMANN S
TRINITARIAN PNEUMATOLOGY

LAURENCE

W. Wooo

Karl Barth called for a new paradigm of the Holy Spirit shortly before his death
in I 968. He suggested that this task might be done by one of his own students. He
confessed that his Trinitarian Christology had neglected the Holy Spirit because he
had wanted to avoid falling into the subjectivism of pietism and liberalism. More
specifically, modernism (as Barth called it) threatened the church's self understand·
ing of God as Triune.' Hence Barth's theology was constructed largely as an antidote
to Schleiermacher's liberalism.
It is well known that Barth introduced into contemporary theology the significance
of the Trinity as the key to a Christian understanding of God. Barth was aware that
the prominence he was giving to the doctrine of the Trinity was "very isolated" in the
history of doctrine, but he insisted that it must be the starting point of Christian doc·
trine because God reveals Godself as Triune in the history of salvation.'
In his Church Dogmatics, Barth rejected his earlier espousal of liberal
Protestantism. He protested vigorously against its compromise with secular thinking
and its watered-down version of biblical faith, especially its negative attitude about
the Trinity as if it were an unnecessary appendage to Christian belief. Barth reinstat·
ed in a radical way the priority of a supernaturalistic concept of the Triune God
who has spoken God's Word "from above." All human efforts to prove or disprove
God's reality are ineffective. God alone is the absolute Subject of God's own revela·
lion to humanity. Jesus Christ is the absolute focal point of the self-revealing God,
and everything in Scripture is a witness either by anticipation in the Old Testament
or by recollection in the New Testament to Jesus Christ. God as Father and God as
Holy Spirit are interpreted in the light of this Christomonism.
One of Barth's last words before his death was to criticize this Trinitarian
Christology of his Church Dogmatics because he had not adequately integrated the
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doctrine of the Holy Spirit into theology.' Barth admitted his own "perplexity" on how
this task might be done. He recognized that the subjectivistic concept of experience in
Enlightenment rationalism and in Schleiermacher's liberalism was really concerned implicitly with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but Barth recognized that a fear of subjectivism
could not serve as an excuse for his failure to develop a theology of the Spirit.' The one
student of Barth who has responded to his call for a new paradigm is Jurgen Moltmann,
whose doctrine of the Holy Spirit is largely free of the subjectivism which plagued Barth.
MOLTMANNS' MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODEL OF Exl'ERIENCE

Moltmann' s pneumatology is centered in an historical understanding of theology
unlike Barth's Trinitarian Christology which was authoritarian-based in a concept of revelation "from above" without any rational or affective basis other than mere faith in God's
self-disclosure. Barth's autocratic concept of revelation created the sense that theology
after all was an irrational affair and that God was nothing more than a projection of our
human ego as Feuerbach had so persuasively charged. But with Moltmann, the revelation
of God is not a private affair, subjectively imagined to happen in a non-historical moment
of self-disclosure. Rather, the revelation of God is a real historical happening in the concrete world and can be affirmed with rational integrity.
Barth had suggested that Moltmann might be the specific person who would promote
and even independently "revise" Church Dogmatics. Barth's reading of Theology of Hope is
what encouraged Barth to think Moltmann could possibly be his intellectual and theological heir. Barth had one major problem with this expectation regarding Moltmann.
Moltmann had made eschatology the dominating principle of his theology. Barth rightly
perceived this new orientation to be a radical departure from his Church Dogmatics. Barth
hoped that Moltmann's subsequent writings would bring about a realignment with Barth's
supematuralistic model which sharply distinguished between the immanent and economic trinity. 5 This would not be forthcoming because Moltmann developed an eschatological
model of reality which disallowed the kind of dualism which Barth's supra naturalistic
model entailed. Moltmann replied in a letter to Barth that his doctrine of the immanent
trinity set over against the economic trinity was a point in Church Dogmatics where "l
always lost my breath-"' As we shall point out below, Moltmann was not denying the selfexistence of God, but he was rejecting the idea of an artificial distinction between God
and the world. Eschatology emphasizes the actual presence of God in the world, and
Moltmann believes this divine presence is not merely a chronologically future event.
Rather, this real future event is happening now. Eschatology is real history.
The title of one of his recent books, History and the Triune Cod, says it well. Moltmann
shows throughout his writings that he believes the history of salvation is rationally and existentially defensible, personally transforming, and socially revolutionary. Without this historical/objective perspective, any doctrine of the Holy Spirit would easily bog down in the
quagmire of subjectivism. Hence it would have been difficult for Barth to have developed a
new paradigm of the Holy Spirit since his Trinitarian Christo logy was already heavily
enmeshed within a subjectivism which he had ironically fought so hard and so long against.
Moltrnann's Theology of Hope ( 1964) pointed the way out of the entanglements of subjectivism by critiquing JX)Sitivism which had become the working assumptions of modem his-
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torical criticism. He also exposed existentialism and neo-orthodoxy as inadequate solutions.
Moltmann has sought to reinstate the role of personal experience as a basis for doing
theology without succumbing to the liberalism of Schleiermacher and the subjectivistic
tendencies of Pietism.' Moltmann's focus is that through the Third Person of the Trinity
believers enjoy a shared and personal experience with God. Moltmann writes: "By experience of the Spirit I mean an awareness of God in, with, and beneath the experience of
life, which gives us assurance of God's fellowship, friendship, and love."" This experience
of the Spirit includes the remembrance of Christ and the expectation of God's future.
Hence pneumatology presupposes christology and prepares the way for eschatology.'
Ever since the rise of modem philosophy and the development of modem science, the
concept of experience has been restricted to denote the way facts can be controlled and
interpreted clearly and distinctly through rational reflection. Truth claims are always the
result of one's own empirical experience. To paraphrase Kant, we create reality by our

own active thinking because there is nothing we know through experience which is not
first put there by our creative minds.'° This reduction of all truth and reality to the active
determinations of the human mind is the hallmark of modem scientific methodology. With
the elimination of any passive elements entering into our consideration of what is real, the

experimental method elevates the concepts of domination, self-consciousness, and rational
demonstrability. This modem rationalistic concept of experience means the rejection of the
primal dimensions of experience and the consequent "desolate erosion of life."'' And quite
obviously a personal experience of God is impossible, as Kant maintained.
Moltmann attacks this one-sided mOOem definition of experience as inadequate on
the grounds that self-experience is not nearly so absolute as modem thought would have
us believe. An analysis of the social pattern of inter-subjectivity demonstrates that the consciousness of the self is mediated to us through other selves as well. It is not entirely selfconstituted. Likewise, Moltmann points out that social experience is not in itself totally
self-constituted; rather, there is a relationship which exists between human beings and
their world. More specifically, we as human beings have a body within the larger framework of nature which provide the basis for our primal and tacit experiences of ourselves
and our understanding of our world which the mcxiem concept of experience ignores. 12

Moltrnann proposes a multidimensional concept of experience. He of course does not
reject modem scientific methodology, but he rather calls for broadening this base to allow
for potential experiences beyond consciousness and the self-determination of things. This

larger meaning of experience, while incorporating the element of critical analysis, assumes
a fundamental attitude of trust about our capacity to experience reality. The one-sided
hermeneutic of doubt and skepticism assumed in the modem concept of experience is
destructive of human community as well as diminishes the personal meaning of human
life. The knowledge of God is a meaningful concept only if human experience is truly
open to a dimension of reality beyond its own self-determination.
This is not to suggest that human experience has a natural capacity for grasping the reality of God, but rather to point out the passive capacity of human experience to receive what
lies beyond itself. This means that transcendence is not to be limited to se/ftranscendence as
modem thought assumes. Rather, we experience God as transcendent in, with, and beneath
each experience of the larger world. But even so, we not only experience God, but God
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experiences us. The point here is that unless we can talk about God objectively in terms of
his own experience, then any talk about our experience of God evaporates into sheer subjectivism. Moltmann makes the further point that only if we understand the world as existing within the life of God can we once again talk about those special experiences of God in
the history of salvation which form the basis of the Christian narrative."
Moltmann is a true student of Barth because he took seriously Barth's warning not to
tum pneumotology into anthropology. This can be seen in the way that Moltmann has
emphasized the distinctive personhood of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is not an extension of the human spirit. The Holy Spirit is not just a point of union between God the
Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit is not just the Father and Son working together and
relating together as a "we." Rather, the Holy Spirit is also just as distinctive in possessing personal specificity as the Father and Son." This personal specificity of the Holy Spirit has not
received adequate theological recognition in modern and contemporary theology-until
Moltmann brought it into center stage.
THE l'ERICHORETIC UNITY OF THE TRINITY

Moltmann asserts that Western Christianity has developed largely a defective soteriology because it has a defective pneumatology. The root cause of this problem is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of God. Ever since the development of the concept of the Trinity in the Western tradition, beginning with Tertullian coining of the word
mnitas and Augustine's more systematic development of una substantia, tres personae, the
unity of Cod has usurped the role which rightly belongs to the three Persons of the
Godhead. Consequently, Western Christianity has implicitly been monarchical in its view
of Cod; it has focused more on the Father of the Son, giving rise more to a duality rather
than a Trinity. And the Holy Spirit has for all practical purposes taken on the role of a
force or power than a distinct person of his own. 15

Moltmann believes that this monarchical tendency was exacerbated further by the
"unofficial" introduction of the so-called filioque clause into the Nicene Creed in the West
which finally led to the schism between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman
Catholic Church in I 054. The Nicene Creed affirmed that the Holy Spirit proceeded
from the Father, but the Western church added that the Holy Spirit proceeded from
Father and Son. The Eastern theologians argued that this downgraded the distinct personhood of the Holy Spirit by subordinating the Holy Spirit to the Son, as if the Spirit is a
mere power or effect of Christ. To say that the Son is the origin of the Spirit thus confuses the Trinitarian relationships and makes the Holy Spirit less than divine in comparison
with the Son. To say that the Son is also the origin of the Spirit is unintentionally turning
the Son into a second Father." The Father alone is the source of all reality; the Son is the
mediator of reality; and the Holy Spirit is the agent of Cod in reality. So the Father creates
through his Son by the power of the Holy Spirit. In terms of constitution, Moltmann insists
of course the Father is the eternal origin of the Son and the Spirit. So Moltmann acknowledges the "monarchy" of the Father in the eternal sense of the constitution of the
Trinitarian persons, but in terms of the actual movement of the divine persons they are
totally equal without any degree of subordination. Moltmann calls this movement "the
circulation of the divine life." 17
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Beginning with the Cappadocian Fathers, the Trinitarian relationships were defined in
terms of reciprocity and mutual interpenetration. john of Damascus in the eighth century
particularly gave a summary of the Eastern church's position on the Trinity in terms of
perichoresis." The Father exists in the Son, the Son in the Father, and both of them in the
Spirit, just as the Spirit exists in both the Father and the Son. The Trinitarian persons possess their own unique characteristics which distinguish them from each other and in the
same way it is their personal differences which bind them together in love and mutual
reciprocity. Intimacy, friendship is the defining quality of their oneness and unity. The
threeness of God is what determines the oneness of God, and the oneness of God is
defined in terms of God's threeness.
This "circulation" of the divine Persons is not a tritheism. For God is not composed of
three separate, independent beings who come together at some time later in order to
form a fellowship. Nor is this a modalism. For the three persons are not three modes of
being without eternal personal differentiations. Rather, it is the eternal "circulation" of the
divine persons in perfect love for each other and in fellowship with each other which
constitutes their experience of eternal life. This inner-Trinitarian relationship is what constitutes their oneness. This stands over against Augustine's model of God as one substance1
three persons.
Moltrnann argues in favor of the Eastern church's understanding because the Western

idea of divine substance minimizes the personal differences which exists among the three
Persons of the Trinity. Likewise Moltrnann rejects the modalism of Barth who defines
God as Absolute Subject with three eternal modes of being. What constitutes the unity of
God is not substance or modes of being, but the relational, perichoretic indwelling of the
three Persons. This divine process is what constitutes their fellowship and perfects them in
a unity of love. In this way, the pitfall of subordinationism is eliminated, and a monarchical model is avoided. The significance of Moltrnann's work in pneumatology is that he
takes this perichoretic model and deepens its meaning and application for our contemporary world. He shows that we must think of the Trinitarian persons as equals; each possesses will and understanding; each speaks to each other; each turns to each other in love
and communion. 1"
How is this perichoretic unity of the Trinity to be arrived at theologically? Moltrnann's
answer is that through salvation history we come to see that God has revealed Godself in
this fashion. What this history of salvation reveals is that God is not a distant monarch who
stands over against the world and above the world in a dominating and threatening way.
Rather, what is perceived through the history which God has with Israel and finally in Jesus
of Nazareth is a God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit This triune God is the Father of
our Lord Jesus Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit. God is Father, not only because
God is the source of all reality, but because God is the Father of Jesus Christ It is God's relationship with his Son which bestows upon God a sense of Fatherhood. Likewise, the Son's
relationship to the Father is what bestows upon him his sense of Sonship. And it is through
the power of the Holy Spirit which enables the Father and the Son to be so related and at
the same time for the Father and Son to be in the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit to be in
the Father and Son. The point of creation, reconciliation, and glorification is that men and
women and all of creation might become a part of the "circulation" of the triune God.'°
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One of the social implications of the perichoretic concept of the Trinity is just as there is
mutuality, reciprocity, and equality among the persons of the Trinity so likewise is this a
model for the world. Wolthart Pannenberg raises the issue whether Moltmann's distinction
between the divine "constitution" and divine "circulation" can be used to minimize the con-

cept of the monarchy of the Father. Pannenberg insists on the unity of the Trinitarian persons as grounded in the monarchy of the Father. This issue represents a sharp difference
between Pannenberg and Moltmann." What has to be considered in this debate between
Pannenberg and Moltmann is the practical issue that the term, monarch, has a negative
connotation for many people because it implies a tyrannical notion of domination rather
than a loving father whose desires the affection of his children. Yet, the "monarchy" of the
Father which Moltmann allows with qualifications to be a part of the divine constitution
cannot be bypassed because it is an implication of the Trinitarian revelation.
THE MODERN CONCEl'f OF PERSON

The concept of person emerged as a result of the church's attempt to define how
Jesus could be called God and man at the same time in the fourth and fifth centuries
AD. Von Rad has pointed out that the biblical concept of God who reveals Godself in
history as personal is the original source of the concept of person. "Here alone, in his
encounter with God, does mankind become great and interesting, breaking through the
enigma of his humanity to discover all the inherent potentialities of his self-conscious
existence." 22 Interestingly enough, the late neo-Marxist atheist and Czech philosopher
Vitezslav Gardavsky (a personal friend of Moltmann) has also shown that the Old
Testament revelation of Cod to Abraham as a self-conscious, transcendent being who
stands outside of nature is the original source for the emergence of the concept of person in the modern world. 23
The Greek word for person (prosopon) meant "mask" which actors in the ancient Greek
theater wore on their face as

they

confronted the audience representing a particular char-

acter. The word literally means "face, visage, countenance." It had strictly an objective

meaning without any reference to subjective self-consciousness or permanent duration.
In Latin theology, the term, person, was first used in reference to Sabellian modalismone God with three masks or roles (prosopon). In Greek theology, the Greek term hypostasis (a parallel term to prosopon) was used in developing the doctrine of the Trinity. The
term hypostasis did not carry the meaning of mask or mere appearance, but was used to
denote the individual existence of a particular nature. Whereas hypostasis was eventually
the word Greek theology chose for the Trinity, the Latin term persona was developed in
Western theology and was deepened in its meaning to describe one's particular, unique,

individual, permanent existence." By the sixth century Boethius formulated the definitive,
classical definition of personhood: "A person is an individual substance of a rational
nature." 25 In other words, a person is one who possesses unique individual existence with
intelligence and is non-interchangeable with others. 26

Using Boethius' definition of personhood, Moltmann shows that the three persons of
the Trinity are not mere modes of being. They are not simply three masks which God
wears in Cod's revelation to humanity. There are not mere roles or expressions of the

one God. Rather, the three persons of the Trinity "are individual, unique, non-inter-
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changeable subjects of the one, common divine substance, with consciousness and will.
Each of the Persons possesses the divine nature in a non-interchangeable way; each presents it in his own way."" Accordingly, there is both the divine nature which the three
persons have in common, but there is also the nature which the three persons uniquely
possess for themselves each in his own way.
The particular nature of each divine person is shaped by their relationship to one
another. For the decisive characteristic of each person is not simply an abstract oneness
which binds them together; rather, what gives each person their own unique nature as
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is the relationship which they share together in their common
bond. Being a person thus involves more than just being a unique individual possessing
rationality, but it also includes the social element of being in relationship with others."
Moltrnann shows that "relations" and "substantial individuality" are essential ingredients
for understanding the Trinity today. Unfortunately, the Western understanding of Trinity
defined "person" largely in terms of "relation" as if a person is relation. But God as Father
means more than just God is related as Father. It means that the Father has concrete existence as a person with being, not just a mode of being. The Father has his fatherhood by
relation to the Son, but this relation is not the concrete existence of the Father, but rather
this relationship presupposes his actual, distinct existence. Person and relation are reciprocal in their meaning; for to be a person presupposes relations, and relations presuppose
persons. To restrict the meaning of "persons" to "relations" is modalistic because it eliminates the enduring concrete subjective existence of the person. We have Augustine largely to thank for introducing the concept of relation into the meaning of personhood. But
even so, his explanation for describing the Holy Spirit as the relational unity of the Father
and Son implies that the Holy Spirit has no genuine personal identity of his own. This
implies the Holy Spirit is more like an impersonal force than a real person who is intimately related to the Father and Son as an equal partner. The need to recognize the distinct person of the Holy Spirit as an equal partner in the triunity of God is why the
Eastern church preferred the use of hypostasis in stead of proposopon." Unless "relation"
also includes "substantial individuality," then the Holy Spirit is not really thought of as a
divine subject along with the Father and Son.30
On the other hand, Moltrnann finds the Orthodox tradition to be weak because it
only assumes that the relations "manifesf' the three persons, as if the relations are not
essential aspects of the distinctive nature of the three persons. Moltrnann argues that the
"relations" of the three persons must be taken seriously in the sense that they are mutually
and reciprocally bonded together in fellowship and love. Personality and relationships are
inextricably connected. 3 '
This mutual reciprocity and interdependence of the triune God is the social model for
understanding the meaning of the whole of human life and creation. Moltrnann finds in
this personal model for God as Trinity the basis for social reconstruction and change in
the world. Hence his concern for human liberation1 ecological concems1 and the many
troublesome aspects of social life. Particularly he finds consolation and hope in spite of
the experience of widespread suffering in the world today because the God of Jesus is
revealed as one who suffers with us. Without God's capacity for pathos and emotional
involvement with his creation, God would not be the God of hope. And only in
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Trinitarian thinking does it makes sense to talk about the love of God and his emotional
capacity to feel with us.
In the Enlightenment period, the subjective concept of autonomy led to a focus on the
absolute, substantial idea of personhood as in Kan! s concept of the transcendental ego.
But even the concept of autonomy as used by Kant did not mean the sheer irrelevance of
feeling nor the idea of mere individualism. For the autonomy of reason meant for Kant
that a mature individual is one who was properly in touch with one's own potentiality

and inner resources for living responsibly in the world. Autonomy meant having the
courage to think for oneself as opposed to living in an immature relationship of dependency upon others. For Kant the concept of autonomy clearly included a sense of moral
responsibility to treat others with dignity and respect. This relational aspect shows that
Kant did not have in mind an individualistic experience of arbitrariness when he spoke of
the autonomous individual. 32
With Fichte and Hegel God came to be defined as Absolute Subject as opposed to
Augustine's concept of God as Substance. Karl Barth picked up this Hegelian concept of
God as Absolute Subject to define the nature of God's oneness, and he consequently substituted "modes of being' for the Trinitarian persons." Barth's concern was that the meaning of persons carries with it today the absolute concept of sheer autonomous individuality
and self-consciousness without reference to being-in-relationship with other persons. 34 Barth
thus thinks that the modem concept of personality was not included previously in the premodem world." Hence Barth called for a new way of framing the doctrine of the Trinity
which would not be in conflict with the meaning of personhood as it is used today.
Barth thus featured the oneness of God who in a threefold manner repeats himself in
the mode of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. God's oneness is defined as a Person with selfconsciousness which is reflected from within itself as a threefold "divine repetition."" In
fact, Barth's fear of tritheism is so great that he studiously avoids any possibility of ascribing personality to the Trinity distinctions. For Barth any idea of individual conscious existence given to the three distinctions within God "is scarcely possible without tritheism.""
ls Barth right that the term, person, can no longer be used in reference to the
Trinitarian distinctions because the modem usage is allegedly different? And is it true
that only in the modem period has the concept of self-consciousness been applied to
the concept of personhood 138 Moltmann disputes the claim that the word, person, has
undergone such a radical difference in meaning in the modem period. He also disputes the claim that self-consciousness is a modem addition to its meaning as we!J.'19

Moltmann surely seems right in his assessment over against Barth. While it is true that
Augustine's concept of the relational concept of person did minimize the element of substantial individuality (hypostasis) and hence his tendency toward modalism, yet Boethius'
definition of personhood as a rational individual carried with it the twin ideas of individual
existence and self-consciousness.
Moltmann is right to call attention to the centrality of the divine persons for a genuine Christian theological understanding of the one God. With prophetic zeal, he has
argued for a Trinitarian conception of God as the basis for resolving the personal,

social, and ecological problems in the world today. For the way out of a repressive
cultural individualism and its social irresponsibility is a return to Trinitarian thinking.

From Barth's Trinitwian Orristology to Mo/tmann'.s Trinitwian Pneumatology

59

Trinitarian thinking opposes "domination" and "exploitation" and is the key to the
meaning of freedom and love.
TRJNITARJANISM AS A PANENTHEISM

Some suggest that Moltmann identifies God with the natural process.'° This is erroneous because Moltmann certainly does not identify God with the fmite world. No one
writing in the area of theology has developed more clearly the nature of God as Creator
ex nihi/o. Quite literally for Moltmann, God spoke the temporal world into being through
his Word in the power of the Spirit. God in no way is to be identified ontologically with
the world in a pantheistic sense. But neither is God's relationship to be defined in terms of
deism, as if God stands above the world in another realm separate from this realm.
Moltmann defmes God's transcendence in terms of the future, a concept first suggested
by Johannes Metz." He stands ahead of us and is certainly different in his very essence
from the world.
Moltmann's use of "panentheism" is a terminological substitution for monotheism.
Pannenberg does not agree with Moltmann's decision not to use the term, monotheism,
but he defends Moltmann against the misunderstanding of his critics who accuse him of
abandoning the historic Christian view of God. Pannenberg, in particular, defends
Moltmann against the charge of tritheism." Both Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg are
in essential agreement concerning the new focus and deepened understanding of the sig-

nificance of the Holy Spirit.
Moltmann's choice of panentheism" is related to his concern to show that God is the
source of all reality, the agent in all reality, and the power active in all reality. This is why
he decides against the term monotheism because it fails to convey the dynamic involvement of God in Creation and it specifically obscures the Trinitarian nature of God's
essence. Some who apparently have only given a cursory reading of Moltmann's writings
think that his "panentheism" identifies God's essence with the world. I once mentioned to
Moltmann that some of his American critics accuse him of being a humanist or possibly a
pantheist to which he replied with an expression of surprise and disbelief.
Roger Olsen and Stanley Grenz reflect this misunderstanding of Moltmann' s view of
God's relationship to the world." They even think that Moltmann denies God's eternal
Triune existence because Moltmann says that the immanent Trinity is the economic
Trinity. They failed to see that Moltmann is only taking seriously the revelation of God in
history and that what God is in himself is revealed in history and what the Son of God
experiences in our history also is incorporated into God's experience of Godself. Of
course only the Son of God, for example, suffered on the Cross (Moltmann is not a patripassionist!), but his sufferings were experienced by the Father as the loss of his Son. In
other words, Jesus' death was felt by the Father who loves His Son and who enters affectionately into the life of the Son through the Spirit. Moltmann frankly recognizes that his
statement that the immanent Trinity is also the economic Trinity is open to misunderstanding "because it then sounds like the dissolution of the one in the other," but he clearly explains his meaning that there is no divorce between God and history.
Olsen even questions whether Moltmann is an "Evangelical ally" because of "hints of
panentheism."" If any theologian has ever consistently maintained God's divine otherness
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from the created order, it is Moltmann. He explicitly rejects the process theology of
Schubert Ogden and John Cobb with their identification of God with the world and its
rejection of a traditional doctrine of the Trinity based on revelation.'" Moltrnann's critique
of Paul Tillich's "panentheism" strikes at the root concern of Olsen. Moltmann rejects
Tillich's inclusion of God's essence within the created world." Moltmann clearly affirms
God's involvement with the world, but it is an involvement based on God's decision of
love. It is not an ontologically pantheistic involvement!48 M:Jltmann is no more pantheistically inclined than Peter who speaks of our being made "partakers of divine nature" (2 Pet
1:4) or Paul who speaks of everything existing in Christ (Col. 1: 17). Moltrnann clearly distinguishes between an emphasis on the nearness of God to his creation and a pantheistic
identification of God with the world." Moltrnann rejects Whitehead's identification of God
with "a unified, world process" because this means "God is turned into the comprehensive
ordering factor in the flux of happenin&" 50 Over against all other forms of panentheism,
Moltrnann insists on "the fundamental distinction between creation and Creator."5' Over
against the one-one-sided "monotheistic'' divorce between God and the world, Moltrnann
insists on a Trinitarian view of Creation. 52 The panentheism of Cobb, Ogden, and
Whitehead results in a "divinization of the world," 53 whereas traditional "monotheism" is
monarchical in tendency, and its extreme de-divinization of the world has resulted in a
godless view of nature. Trinitarian theology preserves God's essential distinction from the
world, while at the same time the world God has created exists in God." Moltrnann's theology of creation ex nihilo is clearly expressed in his own words: 'The World was created

neither out of pre-existent matter, nor out of the divine Being itself. It was called into existence by the free will of God."" Moltrnann's shows that the free will of God does not
mean arbitrariness, but rather God's freedom is rooted in God's love. 50 Hence the divine
love of the Trinitarian persons is the panentheistic basis for a theology of creation.
The choice of the term panentheism is based on its ability to express the close proximity of the Creator with his creation-" everything is in God and God is in everything." The
term monotheism is disadvantaged by its inability to be so comprehensive in its designation of God's relationship to the world. There is not the slightest trace of pantheism to be
found in Moltmann's panentheism. Barth has shown that the safest protection against
atheism and pantheism is the doctrine of the Trinity." Surely Moltrnann's unequivocal
affirmation of the Trinity, along with the doctrine of creatio ex nihi/o, leaves no room for
misunderstanding his theology as a pantheism or humanism.
Goo
Some critics have suggested that Moltmann' s understanding of the Trinity reduces
God to the finite historical process. This is a miscontrual of Moltmann' s concept of history. Moltmann believes that history needs to be redefined and enlarged in its meaning from the positivistic view of history which has dominated contemporary thought.
History is not simply the realm of the finite, as if God stands above history and his
revelation has to be inserted vertically from above. Rather, reality is history' This is so
because history is the sphere of the personal and the history of salvation reveals that
the ultimate reality of God is personal. Hence it is appropriate to speak of the history
of humanity, but it is also appropriate to speak of the history of God. God is not a life-
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less, static, monarch devoid of movement and relationship. Rather, God is one essence
with three distinct, interrelated subjects who possess will, feeling, and understanding.
These three hypostases are beings-in-relationship. Their reality is also historical because
of their personal involvement in the life of each other. Their Trinitarian history is not a
finite process. It does include the concept of process in terms of the divine procession
of the Spirit from the Father of the Son, as Origen maintained. The mistake of
American process theology is that it does not make the theological distinction
between the eternal procession of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit and the temporal, natural processes of nature and finite time. When critics of Moltmann realize this
enlarged and more biblically derived meaning of history, then their objections to his
speaking of the history of God will be alleviated. Interestingly enough, Moltmann
defends Joachim of Fiore against the heretical charge that he reduced the Trinity to
world history. 58

This historical understanding of reality has its origin in Hegel's philosophy of history. just
as Aristotle had defined reality as substance, so Hegel defined the comprehensive whole of
reality as history. Just as substance for Aristotle was not a category among other categories
of reality but was reality itself, so history is not a category of reality among other categories
but is reality itself. Hegel's historical interpretation of reality corresponds to the biblical
emphasis that the decisive meaning of revelation is the personal disclosure of God in history. History is the sphere of the personal and hence the very essence of reality itself. To be
sure, Hegel's philosophy of history and his articulation of the nature of God seemed to get
lost in his use of dialectical abstractions. Moltrnann also believes that Hegel's concept of the
Trinity is modalistic. Nevertheless, his highlighting the nature of reality as historical constitutes his greatest contribution. Any theology which is going to address the contemporary
mind today in a persuasive manner can hardly avoid acknowledging the rise of the modem historical consciousness. Moltrnann (and Pannenberg) are the influential thinkers in the
contemporary world largely because of the effectiveness of presenting a historical understanding of reality in contrast to the nonhistorical, substantialist thinking of classical thought
derived from Aristotle. To be sure, the category of substance is not simply dropped out of
their vocabulary, but it is rather re-conceptualized in historical terms.
Moltrnann emphasizes that this coming of Christ is something that is a real happening
in time; unlike some theologians who want to demythologize the advent of Christ or reinterpret it in a supratemporal and nonhistorical manner, Moltrnann preserves the biblical
focus on a real, temporal eschatological happening. He writes:
But if Christ's parousia is equated with God's eternity, then there is no moment at
which it can enter time. There is then no future end of time-nothing but the limitation of all the times of human history through Gods eternal moment But this puts an
end to all the real and futurist expectation of the parousia which echoes in the early
Christian 'maranatha-come soon!', and transforms eschatology into mysticism." 59
Moltrnann criticizes Barth because he interprets the advent of Christ as if it were only
the final presentation of the salvation perfected in Christ's death on the Cross. But if the
real future time of Christ's coming "can do no more than disclose the perfect tense of sat-
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vation," Moltmann argues that "the New Testament's futurist assertions about salvation

are meaningless." 60
No theologian in recent times has had a stronger emphasis on the real, temporal,
future happening of the coming of Christ to bring about the end of time and the begin·
ning of eternity for creation than Moltmann. Moltmann seeks to protect the understand·
ing of the parousia of Christ from being interpreted either as merely temporized or merely etemalized. He complains that the "Christian expectation of the parousia was also sti·
fled by the theologians who declared that the so-called delay of the parousia was a ficti·
tious problem which had nothing to do with true faith, since faith experiences and
expects God's grace every moment"" This minimizing of the future expectation of the
coming of Christ due to the supposed embarrassment of Christ's delay was the price the
church paid for its integration into the Roman Empire which had the effect of turning
Christianity into a civil religion.62 Moltmann notes that it is due in large part to the devel·
opment of the eschatologically oriented theology in recent years which has helped the
church once again to restore the parousia of Christ to its rightful position within the
framework of Christian faith.°'
The main reason why Moltmann has been able to speak more biblically, forthrightly,
and convincingly about the transcendent realities of the parousia, heaven, the Trinity, the
bodily resurrection of Jesus from the dead, his deity, and the personal ministry of the Holy
Spirit in human life and in creation is because he has taken seriously the modem historicization of reality." The extreme supranaturalistic ontology of Barth which radicalized
God's being above the world in a dualistic fashion leaves one with the feeling that Christian
belief is dogmatically handed down from God above in an irrationalist and authoritarian
manner. To be sure, Barth's theology presuppposed a real (as opposed to a demythologized) history of salvation, but his dualistic view of God and the world worked against his
evangelical exegesis and actually moves in the direction of thinking of this world in secular·
istic terms. lt is significant that the "Death of God" theologians of the 1960s were largely
Barth's students who specifically said that their secular interpretation of the gospel was "ini·
tiated with Barth."" Other students of Barth such as Moltmann and Pannenberg embraced
his biblically based theology and its focus on the history of salvation while rejecting his
dualistic, supranaturalistic bifurcation of God and the world. Moltmann's Theology of Hope
addressed the same concern of secularism reflected in "Death of God" theologians, stu·
dents who had taken seriously Barth's idea of God's absence and total otherness from the
world. The main difference between Moltmann and the secular theologians was that
Moltmann appropriated Barth's style of evangelical exegesis of Scripture and his corresponding theology of salvation history, but Moltrnann developed a Trinitarian view of his·
tory which preserved God's transcendence for the world instead of a dualism of God over
against the world. ln this way, Moltrnann was able to take the central theological distinc·
rives of Barth and develop them in a more consistent fashion-both logically and biblically.
Hence Moltmann' s Trinitarian pneumatology is fundamentally a theological refinement
and further development of Barth's Trinitarian Christology.
Barth's "irrationalist" understanding of faith cannot but create a skeptical feeling that
faith really does not have a basis beyond its own imagination after all. His dualistic image
of God occupying space above the world as a divine monarch makes it impossible to
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affirm the history of salvation in the Bible in which God is intimately related to his people
as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. As opposed to the deistic tendencies of a supranaturalistic
ontology, Moltmann's Trinitarian history of salvation and his eschatologically oriented theology with its focus on the immediacy of God's Holy Spirit in the world today have contributed to a revitalization of the biblical understanding of God which serves as the basis
for bringing about social change, ecological responsibility, and personal transformation in
the lives of human beings starving spiritually, emotionally, and physically from deprivation,
abuse, domination, and discrimination. Only as human beings are brought into a saving
relationship with the Father of Jesus Christ through the fellowship of the Holy Spirit is
there salvation for individuals as well as the world as a whole. Moltmann' s focus on the
social implications of a Trinitarian doctrine of God and a corresponding belief that a relationship with God commits the believer to take an attitude of moral responsibility for the
whole of creation is a fitting reminder to the Christian community that we really do not
take seriously the gospel if we try to privatize the meaning of faith in a mystical retreat
from the world. For the biblical revelation is most adequately understood in terms of reality as history, not in a dualistic split between God and the world as if reality could be compartmentalized into religious ghettos.
Informed by the Trinitarian theology of the early Greek Fathers and Eastern
Orthodoxy, Moltmann transforms the Trinitarian Christology of Batth into a Trinitarian
Pneumatology. If God is thought of primarily in terms of Father and Son, there is no
return, no reciprocity, no intimacy. There is no friendship and no emotional warmth. This

is the weakness of the Westemized view of God. This was the weakness of Augustine
and Calvin. 66 God was primarily understood in terms of his abstract oneness defined with
a modalistic tendency-with the Holy Spirit being hardly more than the "relation"
between Father and Son. But the distinct Person of the Holy Spirit who is co-equal with
the Father and Son means there is life and process in God-the divine procession as the
Eastern Fathers explained. The Holy Spirit is the power and agent, through him the Father
knows his Son. This means God is really present to Godself through the divine circulation.
This means that God is affectionate; God is loving.
This allows Moltmann to go beyond Barth by developing the emotional and passionate nature of God. The Medieval theologians, in particular, debated whether the concept
of wisdom or will was the fundamental attribute of God. Moltmann highlights the feeling
capacity in God." God suffers; God enjoys and delights in God's creation. The Trinitarian
Persons really and truly experience each other in love. Though there is no deficiency of
being in God, God shares Godself truly and intimately with the world out of the superabundance of God being and love.68 God enters into friendship with us as God's creatures, and God's love is really poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who
empowers us to love each other and the whole of God's creation. This love truly experienced in the very depths of our being is transforming. God's experience of us is also
meaningful to God.
Though a Reformed scholar, Moltmann specifically does not accept the view that the
Holy Spirit is to be interpreted primarily in terms of the eschaton. Barth, his teacher,
developed an emphasis on the confirming, sanctifying, perfecting, and transforming power
of the Holy Spirit. Barth affirmed that through repeated experiences of the outpouring of
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the Spirit, the believer is already in the process of realizing moments of spiritual fullness
and sanctifying grace until the totality of righteousness is realized in glorification-"
Comparable to Barth's theology of the progressive development of the Christian life
from its beginning in justifying faith (the Easter event) to its sanctification through the
Spirit (Pentecost),'° Moltmann develops a theology of the threefold kingdom of God
derived from Joachim of Fiore but also found in early Cappodocian fathers." Moltmann
delineates three different stages of God's self-revelation-the kingdom of the Father, the
Son, and the Spirit. These three stages of God's revelation are not three different kingdoms but a progressive development of the one kingdom of God. In the kingdom of the
Father, we surrender to his sovereignty, recognize his lordship over creation, and become
his glad servants. In the kingdom of the Son, we are adopted into God's family and
become God's children. Outwardly we are still God's servants, but inwardly we share in
the intimacy of his family through our joint heirship with Jesus Christ, God's Son. In the
kingdom of the Spirit, our relationship to God takes on further meaning as we become
God's friends. This third stage of the kingdom means that we have a direct relationship to
God; it is now consummated in the truest sense of the term. For God dwells within us
through the Spirit. This means that we have true friendship with God at this deepest level.
This is why Jesus said to his disciples, "No longer do I call you servants . . . but I have
called you friends" (john 15: 15). Jesus promised his disciples this kind of friendship
because they would receive the fullness of the Holy Spirit.
Moltmann reminds us that these stages of our relationship to God as servants, as children, and as friends do not mean that each stage can be isolated as if we could be God's
servant without being his children or friends. This means we cannot simply date these
stages of salvation history in a mere chronological way, though that would certainly seem
to be involved as well. What distinguishes these stages is the focus of each one. The focus
of the kingdom of the Father is not the same as those of the kingdom of the Son and
kingdom of the Spirit. The kingdom of the Father focuses on our being his servants, but
even in this stage we are his children and friends in an embryonic sense. The possibilities
implicit in the kingdoms of the Son and the Spirit were already tacitly available in the
kingdom of the Father. For the kingdom of the Father established the trend which was
unfolded in the kingdoms of the Son and of the Spirit. This means the kingdom of the
Son embraces the kingdom of the Father and the kingdom of the Spirit embraces the
kingdom of the Father and Son. Moltmann intends for his interpretation of the successive
yet inclusive development of each Kingdom embracing each other to avoid the modalistic
tendency in Joachim's emphasis on the chronologically successive stages."
Moltmann's theological analysis of a perichoretic concept of unity offers insight into
how modalism and tritheism can be avoided. He shows that a salvation-historical
approach means that salvation is interpreted in a Trinitarian way so that the distinction
among the persons of the Trinity is a unity in the sense that the Trinitarian persons are
"at one" but not simply "one." Moltmann links the perichoretic concept of the unity of
the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit soteriologically to an integrating concept of
unity. This means that we are brought into union with God, not in an external and formal manner, but in terms of an authentic relationship, that is, we really "participate in

God's eternal love and God's eternal song of praise." Moltmann describes this relation-
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ship as a "unity of the mutual indwelling of the Father in the Son and the Son in the
Father, and of the Spirit in the Father and the Son.""
Taking his cue from Barth's theology of the Holy Spirit (which bears many similarities
to High Anglican and Wesleyan views), Moltmann offers a breadth of categories which
advance beyond his own Reformed tradition. I am referring primarily to Moltrnann' s multidimenional concept of experience, his understanding of reality as history, his relational
understanding of persons, his panentheistic concept of God's relation to the world, his
perichoretic interpretation of the Trinity, his concept of the social and ecological implications of the doctrine of the Trinity, his concept of eschatology, and his concept of "the
reciprocal perichoresis of God and ourselves."
This latter concept provides a basis for understanding the intimacy of God to the
world. Moltmann shows that this "reciprocal perichoresis of God and ourselves" is "much
more intimate communion than the community between Creator and creature. It is the
communion of reciprocal indwelling In the Holy Spirit the eternal God participates in our
transitory life, and we participate in the eternal life of God. This reciprocal community is
an immense, outflowing source of energy."" The evidence of the "vitalizing energies" of
the Spirit is to make "existence shine." He writes: "In pictures, earlier generations liked to
depict this shining power of being in the form of a halo. What they were trying to say was
that the life that is charismatically possessed and sanctified again becomes the image of
God, and is illuminated by the divine glory ... which it reflects.""
CONCLUDING

REMAru<s

The twenty-first century may become known as the Age of the Spirit. If so,
Moltmann's Trinitarian pneumatology with its ecumenical orientation could help in preserving the church from an abstract pantheism, religious fanaticism, and formalistic concepts of the God which are sterile and unrelated to the needs of a people impoverished
emotionally and socially through living in a dysfunctional world. This would mean that
the reduction of the Holy Spirit to the human spirit in secularistic humanism, along with
the subjectivistic methodology of "modernism" which Barth refuted, would need to be
resisted. Perhaps a new offensive in support of the coming kingdom of God could be
mounted with an experiential theology which is based in Scripture, consistent with the
Trinitarian pneumatology of the early church Fathers, emotionally healthy, socially responsible, and intellectually rigorous and compelling.
Moltrnann's Trinitarian pneumatology is a call for the church to be disciplined and responsible in its life and thinking and to develop a comprehensive, holistic theology. Pastorally,
Moltrnann affirms the affectional nature of God who really reaches out to the world through
the power of the Spirit This, for the Christian, means the willingness to embrace the pain of
the world. Moltrnann wrote The Theology of Hope when the "death of God'' theology was
prominent His theological reflections were like a breath of fresh air sweeping away the stench
of despair. As the church now faces the twenty-first century, Moltrnann has advanced the
optimism of grace, believing the church can be a transforming agent in the world through its
identification with a suffering and dysfunctional world. Will the church receive the power of
the Holy Spirit to enable it to fulfill its commission to preach the gospel, to love one's neighbor
as oneself, to help the oppressed, to heal the sick, to feed the poor, to give water to the thirsty,
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and to clothe the naked? Jesus offered the disciples the Holy Spirit as "the promise of the
Father" to empower them to be faithful. "Come, 0 Holy Spirit Come."
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1

ON BEING HUMAN: MOLTMANN S
ANTHROPOLOGY OF HOPE

G.

CLARKE CHAPMAN

Over the years Moltmann' s vision of human selfhood has unfolded in the context
of his overall theology. Accordingly there are shifts of emphasis, depending upon the
decade of his work. It seems best to summarize his thought on the two sides of a
watershed which occurred, he states, in the late 1970s. This was the time in which he
began sketching his Systematic Contributions series and in which he experienced a "theological turning point"' resulting from a 1978 conference in Mexico City with liberation theologians. That date may serve as a rough marker for accentuating a shift
already underway, a relaxing of his earlier political theology utilizing some Marxist
categories and instead a new celebration of trinitarian thought. The same shift is also

discemable in his emerging doctrine of what it means to be human.

The writings of the early Moltmann, that is, those prior to 1978, reflect the exhilaration and intellectual context of his ground-breaking Theology of Hope. At that time
his views of humankind and society were affected by many influences, including
dialectical theology, the biblical theology of von Rad and Kasemann, the "warm
stream" of revisionist Marxism (especially Ernst Bloch), the 1960s Christian-Marxist
dialogues, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School of ideology critique. Looking
back on this period, he wrote, "l myself came from the Critical Theory to the justiceand-theoclicy question as common for theology and socialist philosophy and from
there to the burning Auschwitz-question."' The latent [ewish messianism of Bloch and
other Euro-Marxists increasingly attracted him to other [ewish writers (e.g., Franz
Rosenzweig) and to Christian-[ewish dialogues. Interest in these and other inter-group
dialogues during these exciting years no doubt helped to prompt an early focus on
theological anthropology.' Hope must set the context, he insists, for the irreducible
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ambiguity of human selfhood. For this theme of ambiguity he is partly indebted to a number of European philosophical anthropologists, such as Helmut Plessner and Arnold
Gehlen. For instance he often cites Plessner, who described humanity as the "ex"entric"
being, an ellipse with two foci, a self-transcendence that both has and is a body.'
Theological anthropology may begin by asking how humans come to a knowledge of
themselves. Here Moltrnann manifests the influence of Calvin and Barth: there is a reciprocal relationship between the knowledge of humankind and the knowledge of God. To
themselves, humans are an incessant question-mark, but in God we see "the worth
(Wiirde) of the question-able (frag-wiirdig) being which we all are." 5 Moses at the burning
bush asked "Who am I. .. ?" and received no direct reply at all, but instead the promise "I
will be with you" (Exod. 3: I 1-12) and ultimately the self-giving of Immanuel, "God with
us."' From here, and continuing through the coming of the Son of Man, we see the Bible
has no set anthropology, and ascribes no fixed attributes or prerogatives to human
beings as such, but instead speaks of men and women only in the restless, unfolding history of their relationship to God.'
As a historical and thereby unfinished being, the human being is really not definable at
all. "The essence of mankind is hidden and has not yet appeared. 'Mankind' -the realized
generic concept-is becoming, is still in process, has not yet acquired a fixed 'nature'." 8 It is
not simply that God is hidden (Deus absconditus), but that God is the key to humanity's
own self-mystery (Homo absconditus).' The Old Testament prohibition of images implies a
warning against attempts to anticipate a clarity that can be possible only at the eschaton;
to venture definitions of humanity's essence here and now would only betray persons
into fixated norms and manipulation. 10 The history of Marxism, for instance, would be an
illustration of the dangers entailed by a unifonn model of "true humanity'' which is then
imposed upon hapless individuals and societies.
Far easier to define, however, is our present inhumanity! "What true humanity is
can be comprehended in a positive affirmation only with extreme difficulty. On the
other hand, what inhumanity is-from Nero to Hitler and from the hell of Auschwitz
to the hells of our own day-can be designated with moderate precision from our
experience."" Here is a clear example of Moltmann's fondness for a category borrowed from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, the negation of the negative.
Here it means that what we humans hold in common is not our positive attributes,
our alleged virtue or capacities. Rather, the Gospel addresses us solely on the presupposition of our common inhumanity-whether Jew or Greek, slave or free.
"Throughout all periods of history there is a solidarity of afflicted men in their common lack of freedom and glory ... the partnership of deprivation," which can also be
called the "history of the world's suffering.""
This universal inhumanity is the reason why, since his The Crudfied God, Moltmann has
insisted that the knowledge of God is bound to the cross. We are a fallen race, no longer
Mensch ("human being") but Unmensch ("Inhuman being"), unable to know God directly,
naturally. Instead, we persistently misuse the available knowledge of God for our own selfdeification. So any theologies of glory must be countered, as Luther said, by a "theology of
the cross." Only the cross takes seriously the "Inhuman being's" perverted interest and misuse of the knowledge of God. The cross not only disclosed God in the unexpected fonn of
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despised and brutalized humanity, but it continues to be a crucifying knowledge-one that
smashes all the means of human self-exaltation, and liberates the homo incurvatus in se into a
new openness to God and neighbor. It is in this seeming contradiction, God in the broken
form of the crucified Jesus, that there is the opened possibility for us inhuman beings again
to become truly human, beside God.
From the beginning, Moltmann has emphasized that so-called "human nature" must
be posited within the wider vista of an unfolding historical process. He thereby
renounced the traditional individualism of all forms of "substance" or existentialist
thinking. 'The world is not yet finished, but is understood as engaged in a history. It is
therefore the world of possibilities, ... an age which stands within the horizon of a new
future." 11 We too are unfinished women and men, poised to become what we are. Our
restless self-questioning is not derived from some innate human property, an inherent
cor inquietum or an immanental "openness to the world" within us, but instead arises
from the charge and commission of God, the promissio inquieta, the eschatological
"openness to the world ahead of us" which then beckons and disturbs the human consciousness." Quoting Ortega y Gasset, "Man has no nature; he has only history,"
Moltmann goes on to add, "'Human nature,' or that which makes men men, is not
given at the beginning of their history and does not exist as idea behind the multiplicity
of man's appearances. If it exists at all, it stands at the goal and end of history and its
conflicts." 15 Humans are unfinished, non-established creatures, living in an "ex-centric"

position. As Bloch and Plessner pointed out, we are simultaneously within history and
yet above it, like swimmers whose heads strain to rise from the water to take our bearings. Hope, therefore, provides the orientation needed. Any attempt to define "the
human" must be done through hope.
Man, who is encountered by God's revelation in promise, is identified and finds
himself; at the same time, however, he is differentiated and goes searching for his
true life which is concealed in Christ (Col. 3:3). He finds himself, but only in hope,
for he is not yet excluded from death, he is not yet risen ... He comes into harmony with himself-in spe but not in re."
"He is still future to 'himself and is promised to himself. His future depends utterly and
entirely on the outcome of the risen Lord's course."" Believers can only confess that they
are riddles to themselves, examples of a homo absconditus, standing "ahead" of themselves
in hope. Indeed, history itself is propelled by the disharmony between hope and experience. So believers risk their present provisional identity by sacrifice, expending themselves
for the new possibilities opened up ahead. But they venture this risk, even change the
world, because of their memory of the resurrection of the Crucified and Rejected One,
who represents "the 'impossible possibility' of hope in this world.""
Consequently, for Moltmann's early writings, all the strands of human characteristics
are drawn to a Christological focus. This is especially so since The Oudfted God The cross
confi-onts our happy idolatries, and the resurrection sets in motion our potential transformation. Jesus is described as the Son of Man (the early Moltmann' s favorite Christological
title), the truly human person set amidst our inhumanity.
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The crucified Lord embodies the new humanity which responds to Cod in the cir-

cumstances of inhumanity which oppose God. He incorporates home in the circumstances of alienation, and freedom in the midst of the chains of slavery. But it is
just through this that men are empowered to alter these relationships, to make the
world more homelike, and to abolish internal and external slavery."
Here the vision in Daniel 7 is recalled, in which the Son of Man figure represents and is
the vanguard of our vocation to rule the world in a humane manner, in contrast to the

"bestial" empires of oppression. Arriving from heaven rather than emerging from the sea,
the Son of Man enters history as somethif"ll truly new. And surrounding himself with the
guilty, the exiles, the sick, and lowly, "the Son of Man is he who identifies with those who
are below the mean of humanness, in order to call them human."20

Here then is disclosed the key to the human self. It is the resurrection power of the
exalted Son of Man that replaces what most anthropologies seek to uncover as the quintessence, the basic continuity for human nature. Only the faithfulness of God constitutes,
ever anew, what we term human identity. A person's '"essence,' and that means his identity and continuity, is determined by the call of God, by his being called to a partnership
in the covenant, by the event of justification."" Because of this creative faithfulness of
Cod, a human being cannot be analyzed into a mere conglomerate of reactions and func-

tions, but he/she takes courage and is held open and receptive amidst the flowing relativities of history. "In the hidden faithfulness of the Spirit, man is directed ahead of himself;
he acquires future-not an automatic future but rather a historical future .... He acquires

continuity in the midst of changing conditions in as far as he acquires future." 22 Put differently, although one's humanness (hominitas! be a gifr which is already a fact, one's humanity (humonitas) remains a task laid before each of us." Such is humankind's continuity, both
present and future, which is received from God.
But what contents may we readers assign to this humanitas, this vision which is to be
attained? The picture is unclear because, over the years, Moltmann consistently has mis-

trusted definitions, the verbal act of "setting limits." "Definitions are acts of domination,""
he insists, which prejudge and fossilize what is new, vital, and spontaneous. Such objectification he considers philosophically a lapse into essentialism, and politically an invitation to

despotism. While pedants and tyrants make use of definitions to restrict what is permitted,
by contrast God's new creation-struggling even now to be born-will participate in God's
limitless glory. In principle, therefore, Moltmann scorns traditional logic and empirical precision. So he resists venturing any detailed portrait of the new humanity. Nevertheless,
readers may discern some elements of his vision of humanitas.
One of these components reflects goals familiar since the eighteenth-century
Enlightenment: material abundance, human dignity, self-determination, and purposefulness in life. 25 Another ingredient is the biblical hope for universalism, a unity that sur-

mounts all economic, social, or racial distinctions." Such unity, although necessarily preceded by the apparent partisanship of God who sides with the oppressed in struggling for
justice, is prefigured by a love of enemies. That love already begins to burst asunder our
factional rigidities (e.g., Martin Luther King Jr.). Even now, the church, by its compassionate gathering together of the diverse and the unlike (rather than the "birds of a feather''
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typical of other organizations), must become the Church of the "Others," acting as the
representative and messianic vanguard of this new humanity."
A final component of the future vision is humanity's glorification to become "like God,"
and "participate in God's infinite creativity."28 What such glorification may mean, of course, is
eschatologically undefinable (see 1 John 3 :2). But it will not be some apotheosis that dissolves human creaturehood into the Godhead, or mimics Marxism's "total man." On the
other hand we can say something about the future: it will include a gathering of individuals
by the general resurrection, a transformation that goes beyond mere restoration of primal
creaturehood, and both a freedom from death and a freedom for participation in God's
infinity." In Moltmann's later writings, as we shall see, he develops such suggestions further.
Moltmann' s analysis of sin derives from this grand hope; indeed, until we catch this
vision we are unable even to recognize fully our fallen condition. His references to sin are
scattered among the early writings; however, in every case sin is linked to hopelessness.
Although derived from anxiety, hopelessness emerges in one of two overt forms: either
praesumptio, pride, which might be called "the premature, self-willed anticipation of the
fulfillment of what we hope for from God," or desperatio, despair and inertia, "the premature, arbitrary anticipation of the non-fulfillment of what we hope for from God."'° The
contrast could be symbolized by the figures of Prometheus (especially popular in the
teenth century) and Sisyphus (more typical of twentieth-century ennuil.
Praesumptio is expressed in several ways. An obvious manifestation is the self-deification
of humans (Vergottung) that corresponds often with the modern "un-deification"
<Entgotterung) of heaven-as pursued by secular idealism or by the moral earnestness of
protest-atheism." Many current ideologies have this effect, from Marxism's "total man" to
romantic conservatism's nostalgia for organic communities, from the liberal's individualistic
idealism to the militant' s praise of brute force and exertion of will. 32 By demanding a level
of performance impossible to attain, however, they all result in the grim joylessness so typical of modern times. Another manifestation is the "works-righteousness" of the Western
work ethic. Here Moltrnann has been particularly critical of Marxism which, despite its
reproach of the West as a society of "having" instead of "being," ended up with a more
extreme form of that same malady." Framed differently, Moltmann also describes praesumptio as idolatry, a perversion of our vocation of God's image. That is, the inhuman being
inverts the dialectic of trust and control. In trusting things or his own works, although
they are not trustworthy but only controllable, he mistrusts God whom he cannot
control but only trust.... The creation which he is to use and rule becomes the object
of his trust God becomes the object of his mistrust and his exercise of control."
The second major category of hopelessness is desperatio, a resignation, timidity, and
weariness that prompt humans to forsake in a more passive manner what God expects of
us. Apathy is the result; it is a pervasive sickness of our era, the fear of the pain and risk
which love necessarily entails. In vain women and men try to flee what is actually an
ducible dialectic of human existence: "we live (/eben) because and in so far as we love
(/ieben)-and we suffer Oeiden) and die because and in so far as we love. In this way we
experience life and death in love."" The price of shrinking from this sensitivity, however,
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is to lose the ability to love, to fall prey to a range of psychosomatic illnesses, and to experience in fact a preliminary form of spiritual death. Hope, then, is the remedy for both
pride and resignation.
Leaving the topic of sin, let us return to the theme of the inevitable ambiguities of our
earthly human selfhood. We have noted that the human being is a being in historical
process, the presently fallen Unmensch who is on the way to becoming Mensch, who struggles to tum the gift of lwminitas into the promised humanitas. But Moltmann early posed an
additional polarity, one which is less temporal: we are both creature and image of God.
First, the human is a creation of God, one among the many other fellow-creatures.
Like them we were called into existence out of nothing and chaos, and like them we face
annihilation again. 1" This solidarity with the contingent natural world has a critical function, for it shows that neither humans nor nature are divine, nor should either be demonized as evil. Of course, important ecological consequences must follow from an awareness of solidarity with our fellow creatures <Mitgeschopfe). And on the personal level, it can
begin to reverse the problem of alienation from the physical body-a problem to which
the later Moltmann will return. For in ¥/estem society categories of "possessing" have
become so dominant that we both despoil the natural world around us and speak of
"having" a body instead of "being" a body.F Hope, however, should bring us mortals a
sense of oneness with all that has been created.
The other side, however, of humanity's eccentric position in creation is our specified
placement and calling as the image of God. That which differentiates us from other creatures is not some
ur
a.ltribute, but our total personhood. It is precisely in our
web of relationships that we have the vocation to represent God in and for God's creation.

That commission also has its critical function, for it must refute the ancient mystique of all
nature as potential imagery for God. Such a mediary function, as early Israel insisted, belongs
only to human beings-and furthermore, that function is not restricted to royalty, but resides
(democratically') in humanity as such. So every human being is God's viceroy, representative
in and to the world, and also humans must develop a far more responsible use of power
over the world-these are the positive corollaries of the Second Commandment. 18
As creature yet as imago Dei; again the human being occupies a dialectical eccentric
position. We "are" a body in addition to "having" a body; we are identified with our

empirical environment, yet we transcend it. 39 Prior to the eschaton the human cannot yet
be self-identical, as are the animals which have their being in a species. "What its species is
for the animal, history, the open uncompletable history of the humanization, democratiza-

tion, and socialization of man ... is for man." 40 To ignore this eccentric position, this bipolar status of humanity, would be to risk apathy or else the totalitarian homogeneity of the

"new man" in various modem ideologies.
The human being is thus bipolar. But in a world of utilitarian values and interlocking
technology, it is especially important to emphasize not just our finitude, but our prelimi-

nary freedom. This transcendent dimension of the human creature is promise and foretaste of our eschatological identity. In contrast to all ideological reductionisms, the human
already has a share in the endless freedom of the Creator over against all finite objects

and circumstances. This measure of participation in divine freedom is safeguarded by the
Second Commandment and by the offense of the cross. So humanity combines earnest-
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ness and mirth, a painful longing for the consummation of creation blended with a playful
celebration of God's good pleasure here and now. In this continuing dialectic, we humans
suffer and yet prefigure with joy our eschatological destiny."
II
Since 1980 Moltmann has been publishing a new series of major theological works, subtitled "Systematic Contributions to Theology." This series marks the most discemable shift in
his thinking. It consolidates the newer trends of his thinking, a "messianic theology," while
bringing to maturity many of the older ones. In this later phrase theological anthropology is
now seldom singled out for the sustained attention it once had-with some exceptions, such
as sections of God in Creation (1985) and his essays on human rights. Indirectly, however,
anthropology continues to be addressed. Indeed, the later Moltrnann has become a champion of human experience as a genuine source of knowledge of God-albeit in a dialectical
way, of course, that avoids the reductionist pitfalls of Protestant liberalism.
Some of the changes in Moltmann's more recent work are largely a matter of emphasis. Progressive Marxist categories and thinkers, for instance, have receded in his analyses.
There is far less attention to the Unmensch or to an analysis of sin than he gave thirty
years ago. Instead there is a celebration of human potential and bodily existence, sometimes in hyperbolic language. Does this mean that "hope," in the later Moltmann, has
become tainted with secular humanism and the self-help movements of today's pop culture? Not really. While recognizing the risks, he nevertheless cautions pious critics against
denouncing "self-actualization" as irreligious egotism. They should ask instead which "self
is meant! If it refers to one's essence, then self-actualization is no secular egotism but is
intrinsic to the biblical command, "Love your neighbor as yourself.''" Genuine love
bestows self-actualization in both directions. Moltmann also demonstrates that his grounding in biblical theology is unchanged, for he insists that the fullness of life conferred by
God's Spirit is not done for moral or egotistical grounds, "for the sake of a personal fulfillment,'' but is granted for the sake of God's righteousness."
Several newer motifs are also discemable. The flowering of Moltmann' s trinitarian
thought, certainly, has deeply affected his portrayal of men and women. Another influence has been his work with the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of
Churches which, overshadowing his earlier dialogues with non-Christian partners, gives a

more ecumenical, intra-Christian context for his "systematic contributions." Concern for
eco-justice and harmony with the earth," rather than the early political theology, has
come to shape his analyses of human selfhood. In general, however, there is no major
shift in direction of Moltmann's vision of being human, and most of those motifs noted in
his earlier anthropology continue.
For instance, the familiar polarity of the human being as creature and as imago Dei now
receives important elaboration in the Gifford Lectures of 1984-85. While modernity is
fond of emphasizing how people "differ'' from the animals, Moltmann instead chooses to
begin with how humans are bonded to other creatures: "the human being as 'a creature
in the fellowship of creation'," as a microcosm of the creation, an imago mundi." In the
temporal sequence of the Old Testament narrative, humans are God's last creation before
the sabbath, and they stand before God as representatives of the macrocosm, interceding
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on its behalf. But in the history of redemption the sequence is reversed: humans are created first. after Christ. and it is the new heavens and earth that come at the end. the ultimate sabbath. In their double role as creatures. then, humans are "priestly by nature, and
stand before God on behalf of the earth and before the earth on behalf of God.""
The other half of this initial polarity, humanity as imago Dei, however, Moltmann has
revised in a successive, trinitarian fashion. He now explains that, while humans were originally designated as imago Dei: their messianic calling is to be imago Christi and their eschatological glorification will be gloria Dei." For the first of these three stages, the curious
grammatical mixture of singular and plural in Genesis I :26f. ("Let us make human beings
in our image ... ") suggests that God is no undifferentiated monad, but finds correspondence in human community and its sexual differentiation. So we humans are preeminently social beings, not just individuals who later join together. The much-debated "likeness
to God" of the first man and woman is not a fixed "characteristic" setting us apart from
the animals (such as soul or upright posture), but is our entire existence in its relationship
to God. In short, it is the complexity of our relationships, both horizontal and vertical, so
to speak, that constitutes our humanness. 48
The Genesis story then continues (I :28f.l with the commonly misunderstood commission to I) rule over animals, and 2) "subdue the earth." The mandate, however, is not to
be understood as a restatement of the imago, but as an addition which must presuppose
that right relationship with God. Only once we become God's "image" are we authorized
to "rule," and even then only as (vegetarianl) tenants, stewards of God's garden.
But this is only the beginning. Moltmann remains true to his early mistrust of definitions. Definitions, he says, belong only to the future (and he goes on to quote Gregory of
Nyssa: "Concepts create idols. Only wonder understands"'°). Meanwhile our present likeness to God is undefinable, being both indicative and imperative, both gift and task. That
is, we are still in the process of becoming human. "The true likeness to God is to be
found, not at the beginning of God's history with mankind, but at its end; and as goal it is
present in that beginning and during every moment of that history."'0 In the New
Testament the phrase "likeness to God" is applied not to humans, but instead to Jesus, as
God's true image, and we in tum are called to be imago Christi (Rom. 8:290. The command in Genesis to "rule," then. can only be fulfilled by "ruling with Christ,'" and not by
technological or governmental coercions. "Under the conditions of history and in the circumstances of sin and death, the sovereignty of the crucified and risen Messiah Jesus is
the only true dominium terrae. It is to 'the Lamb' that rule over the world belongs.""
The final of the three stages will be our eschatological glorification as gloria Dei. In the
Great Sabbath of the end-time humanity will see God face to face. Then truly we will
conform (that is, be "like in form") to the triune splendor. Accepting the label "panentheism" for his vision, Moltmann says that somehow we will participate in and with God" s
nature. The oneness of Jesus with the Father (john I 0:30) will be replicated in the oneness of the disciples in their fellowship with one another and with God (john 17:21 ). "It is
a fellowship with God and, beyond that, a fellowship in God. But that presupposes that the
triunity is open ... [for] the whole creation .... So the unity of the Trinity is not merely a
theological term; at heart it is a soteriological one as well.""
Meanwhile, however, in the present time we live as fallen creatures. Does that sinful
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condition call into question our status (dialectical though it be) as God's image? Here
Moltmann rejects traditional answers, the patristic distinction between the sinner's imago
Dei and similitudo Dei that safeguards the former at the cost of the latter. Indeed, as we
have seen, he renounces any categories of "substance." Instead, humans are constituted by
their standing given by God's history. "The presence of God makes the human being
undeprivably and inescapably God's image.... The dignity of human beings is unforfeitable, ... thanks to the abiding presence of God"" It is only our relationship to God, not
the reverse, which sin can pervert. In this way (echoing Luther's famous phrase), the
human being can be entirely a sinner and yet entirely God's image.
Humanity's likeness to God, says Moltrnann, should be construed in social terms (paralleling Eastern Orthodoxy's doctrine of Trinity), rather than in psychological terms (the
Western trinitarian tradition, since Augustine). This would avoid the time-honored pitfalls
of defining the imago Dei as the intellectual, sexless soul which dominates the body in the
same way that God is pictured as dominating the created world." For centuries the
Western church has been all too fond of reducing key theological concepts to a "doctrine
of sovereignty," emulating the dualism of some cosmic autocrat coercing his property into
line. Visualizing such monarchial theism in the heavens, however, can only lead to social
hierarchies, class oppression, and ecological plundering on earth. Such practical consequences in society seem to have been one of Moltmann's initial motivations in turning to
a careful construction of a more social doctrine of Trinity. Such a reformulation of Godlanguage must accordingly have an impact on our conceptualization of God's image in
humanity. Moltmann is indebted to Eastern Orthodox theologians, who
started from the essential fellowship of the Trinity (perichoresis) and found the
imago Dei in the primal human community. We have taken up these ideas as a basis
for a pronouncedly social doctrine of human likeness to God in a theology of the
open Trinity. Instead of starting from a closed and self-contained Trinity which manifests itself outwardly without differentiation, we have taken as our premise an open
Trinity which manifests itself outwardly in differentiated form."
Since the triune God is thrown open to us and all the world, seeking not domination
but fellowship with the beloved creation, then it is in our very multiplicity of relationships,
our communities, that we humans best manifest our likeness to God. Reflecting not just
God's outward rule but God's inward nature, we are imago Trinitatis. After all, God created us with bodies and as sexually differentiated persons who produce children. So
the anthropological triangle determines the existence of every human being: everyone is a man or a woman, and the child of his or her parents. The relation between
man and wife signifies the inextinguishable sociality of human beings, while the relation between parents and children denotes the equally unalterable generativity of
human beings. The first is the simultaneous community of the sexes in space; the
second the community of the generations in time. If the whole human being is designated the image of God, then true human community-the community of the
sexes and the community of the generations-has the same designation. 56
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Readers will note that Moltmann' s former emphasis on a Christological redefinition of
humanity has now been replaced by social trinitarianism, a perichoretic effulgence. Yet
within this new development Moltmann retains a certain Christocentrisrn. In contrast to
the Western tradition since Augustine, he states that humans are fashioned not by the
entire Trinity but by just one of the personae. The Son alone became human and embodied God's image on earth, and it is through the Son that we obtain access to the Father.
'This is to say that lit isl through the Son the divine Trinity throws itself open for human

beings." 57
There remain several sub-topics within theological anthropology to which Moltmann
in more recent years has devoted particular attention, and we will now consider them.
These sub-topics include human rights, human freedom, and the relationship of body and
soul.
Human rights, as a theme, has come to be one of the most practical extensions of
Moltrnann's formulations of the divine likeness in humanity. Beginning in the early 1970s,
this concern grew in part from his world travels, his participation in World Council of
Churches' discussions of human rights, and his leadership in the World Alliance of
Reformed Churches on that subject Indeed, the theme of human rights seems a metamorphosis of his earlier passion for political theology, which likewise was grounded in an
anthropology of hope. In criticizing totalitarian political theory he states,
ffihe Leviathan conception of the state presupposes a negative anthropology, in
order to legitimate a positive theology of power, of authority and sovereignty....
By contrast, the covenantal conception of the state presupposes a positive anthropology, in order to legitimate a critical theology of power and the control of power

by democratic institutions.' 8
Because constitutional theoty holds the state is not just a consequence of human sin and
alienation, but is rooted in human nature as such, therefore human rights must be safeguarded. That means a desacralization of political power, so that it may be held accountable to the citizenry it represents.
The foundation of human rights, however, is found neither in the state nor in some

particular human attribute. The foundation is in human dignity. So all rights finally are
rooted in Gods right, the divine claim over the creation that precedes any human claims.
This right has emerged in the course of God's redemptive history with Israel and
Christianity, awakening among us unfinished mortals the pain as well as the impassioned
commitment necessary for human liberation. Therefore it is from this quite particular origin, the biblical traditions, that the more universal ground of human rights arose." "In the
designation of the human being to be the image of God, the right of God to all human
beings is expressed. The human rights to hfe, freedom, community, and self-determination
mirror God's right to the human being because the human being is destined to be God's
image in all conditions and relationships of life.""'
It is in the future, then, that human rights are grounded, because in the future our
God-given identity will be completed and our deadly inhumanity overcome. "Human
rights mirror the claim of the coming God and of his future upon human beings."" These
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rights derive from the full range of our multiple relationships as God's image, and so they
include not only a right to rule over the earth but the right and duty to be in community
with the non-human creation. And those rights do involve responsibilities as well; in overcoming "an egoism of the generations" we must keep faith with nature and with future
generations. Because various societies develop human rights in a one-sided, partisan direction (the West exalting individual political rights, for instance, and the East favoring collective economic rights), Christianity should defend the indivisibility, the intrinsic interrelatedness of all such rights. A "just balance of concerns" can be maintained, even while advancing the overall level of rights, and thereby "the unity of human rights should act as a
pointer to the future of a universal established community of all people and nations."62
Human freedom is another theme discussed worldwide, but to which Christian theology should contribute. The secular concept of freedom had its primordial beginnings in
power over nature and early humanity's first steps in transcending the realm of compulsion and necessity. Such negative notions developed, under Western liberalism, into political definitions of freedom as sovereignty over "the other." Another secular view of freedom was striving for community, for actualizing the Good, which has become partly
reflected in how socialist societies defined freedom. Christianity embraces both earlier
modes of viewing freedom, but also presses beyond them in (unsurprisingly) a trinitarian

comprehensiveness. That is, freedom must also include creative initiative, a messianic
dream of the new, of unprecedented possibilities. "Freedom as the lordship of man over
objects and subject is a function of property. Freedom as community between people is a
social function. Freedom as a passion for the future is a creative function. We might sum
it up by saying that the first means having, the second being, and the third becoming.""
Moreover, these functions of freedom have evolved cumulatively, in a three-fold pattern reflecting Joachim of Fiore' s medieval doctrine of the successive kingdom of God on
earth, first as Father, then as Son, and finally as Holy Spirit The millennialism implied in
Joachim's schema provides Moltrnann' s own trinitarian eschatology with a welcome historical precedent. The resulting "strata in the concept of freedom"" point us toward the
promise of the future. In the kingdom of the Father we are the Creator's property and
servants, in the kingdom of the Son we are made children of the Father, and in the kingdom of the Spirit we advance to become God's friends, addressing God boldly in prayer.
These distinctions demonstrate that, like the concept of human rights, "freedom itself is
indivisible and all-comprehensive. That is why every partial freedom presses forward to
total freedom and to the freedom of the whole creation."" Again, capping this analysis,
the culminating glory is anticipated. "When God is known face to face, the freedom of
God's servants, his children and his friends finally finds its fulfillment in God himself. Then
freedom means the unhindered participation in the eternal life of the triune God himself,
and in his inexhaustible fullness and glory."66
Moltmann' s later writings on being human are also more concerned with wholistic
reformulations of body and soul. At one level, this tum seems prompted by social concerns: his discussions with feminist theology'' and concern for our planet's ecology. Since
humanity can neither retreat from modernity nor allow it to continue its present reckless
course, we must try instead to "reinvent modernity." And this means, among other things,
"a new non-androcentric and non-anthropocentric anthropology [which] will set free the bod-
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iliness and sensuousness of human existence ... ··GS But at a deeper, more theological level
Moltmann's wholistic thought grows out of the flowering of his pneumatology, the vitality
and integrity of the Spirit of Life which so infuses his recent work.
We will note here especially the latest two volumes of his Systematic Contributions,
dealing with the Spirit and (in a return to his original theme) eschatology. These volumes
are notable for displaying the theme of bodiliness as well as his new methodological
reliance on human experience. "By experience of the Spirit," he says, "I mean an awareness of God in, with, and beneath the experience of life, which gives us assurance of
God's fellowship, friendship, and love."" So bodily life and death are not just biological
facts, but are to be analyzed as fundamental experiences.'° And no analysis of death and
eschatology should detract from the present moment, but should ever enrich and deepen
the living of life here and now.
Increasingly, then, we find Moltmann's focus to be on human wholeness-a wholeness
which is embraced by the Spirit of Life (his preferred phrase for the Holy Spirit>'' and the
hope of the resurrection. Before God we stand in our comprehensiveness-in all the temporal stages of our life, in our individuality as well as our sociality, in the living interplay of
erotic love, in open friendship with people who are diverse, in the bonds of past and successive generations, and in our relatedness to the natural world we also transcend. 72
Sexual differentiation, for example, is intrinsic to our divine likeness, for God created not
just one individual but a triadic family: Adam, Eve, and Seth.
lTJhe anthropological triangle determines the existence of every human bemg: everyone is a man or a woman, and the child of his or her parents. The relation between
man and wife signifies the inextinguishable sociality of human beings, while the relation between parents and children denotes the equally unalterable generativity of
human beings. The first is the simultaneous community of the sexes in space; the
second the community of the generations in time. If the whole human being is designated the image of God, then true human community-the community of the sexes
and the community of the generations-has the same designation."

It is these manifold dimensions which, as we have seen, attest our trinitarian likeness to
God, a mutual perichoresis that awaits future completion. And most broadly, Moltmann's
hope has come to be undergirded by "a panentheistic vision of the world in God, and
God in the world.""
The relationship of body and soul, therefore, must be redefined accorclingly. An unbiblical dualism has long separated the two. As we noted, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
identified the imago Dei with the intellect, a sexless soul, ruling as "sovereign" over the
body just as a monarchial God must govern a passive world. So the future life was pictured as an immortality of the soul. Apart from bodily life, however, the soul begins
implicitly to displace the function of God, acquiring the divine quality of impervious selfunity. Plato, Descartes, Fichte, Barth-each in his own way contributed to a false spiritualization that reduced the human body (and thereby women as well as the world of
nature) to mere instrumental status.75 Another consequence of this dualism is the ancient
(and now revived) doctrine of transmigration of souls. Ideas of reincarnation, to be sure,
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have the advantage of promoting empathy with sequential generations, but they also subvert any sense of personal identity amid a bewildering succession of life-forms. Moreover,
the accompanying doctrine of Karma, with its iron chain of deeds-and-results, mandates a
pitiless retribution that is quite incompatible with a principle of grace."
The wholeness of body and soul, then, is important. And it is best defended by a doctrine of the Spirit as well as of Resurrection. Broadly defined, spirit means "the forms of
organization and communication of all open systems of matter and life"n; as such, spirit is
not at all antithetical to the body. Since persons are the high example of a living open system, a person's spirit is "the anticipatory structure of his whole physical, mental, and spiritual existence"" Furthermore, spirit is the communication between persons that enriches
life, and is the loving affirmation that risks pain because of its passionate embrace of life."
So there is no need for a distinguishable "soul" enduring timelessly, but rather there is the
undying Spirit of life as an entirety, the undying relationship which God has with humanity and humanity has with God.80 That vitality surges throughout the creation and infuses
us with the love of life. And we experience God in quite sensual ways, such as the laying
on of hands, embracing, the holy kiss, and the shared meal." So the body has its own dignity; it is no preliminary encasement of human identity, but constitutes the temple of the
Spirit (I Cor. 6:13ff.). Indeed "embodiment is the end of all God's works,"" the convergence of spirit and flesh which will be transfigured in the cosmic redemption.
But the body has its limits. What then of death7 ls it a natural part of the creation, or is
it primordially unnatural, a punishment injected only after human sin?" Certainly
Moltmann rejects the latter alternative. Reversing the claim that death is "the wages of sin"
(Rom. 6:23), he sees sin instead as "the wages" that result from death-that is, the anxious
arrogance, the violence prompted first by a consciousness that we are mortal. Death is
not a punishment-either for Adam's sin or our own. Instead we die a "natural death." But
neither does Moltmann accept the former alternative, death as a natural part of creation,
for he defines "nature" as "no longer what is primal and not yet what is final""' It is that
time of creation comparable to winter-temporarily real but awaiting the fruitful splendor
of springtime. So death is "natural" only as an aspect of the present stage of the unfulftlled
creation, and our deaths mark our solidarity with its groaning as the creation awaits glorification (Rom. 8: I 9ffJ Once again, our creatureliness binds us humans to all forms of life
on our planet, as we wait together in hope.

Meanwhile, we live bodily lives, whether healthy or not. The concept of health should
be redefined, says Moltmann, for the modem world coddles an impossible ideal: health as
complete physical, social, and mental wellbeing. So defined, the ideal becomes an idol, a
morbid preoccupation that isolates the sick from industrialized society, marginalizes the
handicapped, and threatens to bring a crisis of basic confidence in life every time we fall
ill. It is far better instead to define health as an attitude, quite independent of our fluctuating bodily conditions. "Health is not the absence of malfunctions. Health is the strength to
live with them."85 It is "the strength to be human," throughout our living and our dying.
Will death then ultimately be destroyed (I Cor. I 5:26; Rev. 20: 14; 19:20>? The later
Moltrnann has become less fond of biblical apocalyptic language and so he hesitates at
this point. Rather than resting content with a flat negation of the negative, he prefers now
to underline "a new position of being" that has been opened up and prefigured by the
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transfiguration of Jesus' crucified body. So it is better to say that death will then no longer
be able to exist because with the resurrection of the dead, the creaturely world will
receive imperishable life from the divine life. Then will begin our great metamorphosis,
our enduring presence in God's presence."'
This is Moltrnann's legacy in theological anthropology thus far. It is a vision of being
human, as images of the Trinity who await their fulfillment, but who meanwhile exercise
human rights and freedom in their bodily life. It is a constructive and timely legacy, which
now will be best served by further discussion.
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Is the world too to learn to die tranquilly, or are there hopes for the world which
must be answered in personal and socio-political terms?
- Jurgen Moltmann
1he Crudfied God
ITlhe Easter appearances of the risen Christ are not covered by the theological
answer that he is the presence of the eternal, but require the development of a new
eschatology. The resurrection has seen into motion an eschatologically determined
process of history, whose goal is the annihilation of death.
- Jurgen Moltmann
Theology of Hope'
INTRODUCTION

One of the characteristics that distinguishes political and liberation theologies from
the modem theological paradigm is the tum from epistemology to suffering as the
central issue of our time. Jurgen Moltmann is one of the first twentieth-century theologians to grapple with this task. The publication of his first foray into Christology,
1he Crudfied God, demonstrated the stakes of such a tum for Christianity in the aftermath of European destruction and the Jewish Holocaust. And it has produced a
firestorm of controversy which perdures in some forms even today. This essay will
examine Moltmann's understanding of Christ in light of his struggle with human and
planetary suffering. It will begin by treating the methodological, soteriological, and
political importance of Christ as the "Crucified God'' in Moltmann's thought by outlining his stringent critique of the sacrifice of meaning, feeling, and communal responsibility from the public realm in church and society. It will illustrate his claims regard-
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ing the church's solidarity with the poor and oppressed. The essay will conclude by offering
a critique of Moltmann' s position from a feminist-liberationist perspective, which argues
that the idea of the "Crucified God," however radical in its identification of God with
human suffering, contains a fundamental conflict which allows it to serve primarily as a
transition piece to a new paradigm of political and liberation theologies.'
THE SUFFERING CHRIST AND HUMAN SUFFERING

Moltmann' s central theological questions self-confessedly emerge from his experiences
as a German prisoner-of-war during World War II (what he calls the "concentration camp
years," in Britain, [Volf 1986:5]) and less explicitly stated, from his position as a European
theologian addressing the church's ongoing crisis of the meaning and identity in modernity, particularly as this manifested itself in Christianity's inability to resist fascism and in the
student protest movements of the 1960s (his earlier work), and more recently, his concern with issues of global ecology.
In The Crucified God, Moltmann identifies two key theological issues: a crisis of relevance
for a church faced with anomie and despair and a retreat to a Christian "ghetto," and a crisis of identity for a church that has succumbed to cultural accommodation on the one
hand and the possibility of usurpation by contemporary movements for political change on
the other. Moltmann struggles with the crisis of relevance via his discussion of the apathetic
God of classical Christian theology (and its human corollary, apathy and meaninglessness
in the middle-class) and the "revolution in the concept of God" which his crucified God-inChrist demands. Moltmann' s crisis of relevance is coupled with his claims to a crisis of identity for the church. Concerned about the assimilation of the church to the issues of the
bourgeois subject-in-despair (cultural accommodation) or in-denial (the retreat of the
church to a so-called Christian ghetto), yet unwilling to relinquish Christianity as a distinctive entity, Moltrnann again looks to the cross to provide a principle of differentiation. 'The
cross of Christ became for me the 'basis and the censure of Christian theology'" [Conyers
1988:210, citing Moltmannl. More recently, in The Way of Jesus Christ, Moltmann continues and nuances these concerns, while emphasizing more fully his earlier theme of the suffering of God-in-Christ as identification and solidarity with the poor. Thus, while keeping in
the forefront the suffering subject of contemporary human history, Moltmann's project
functions as a severe critique of the failings of modernity and of modern theology's
individualistic, privatistic responses to it-its loss of its prophetic voice, its marginalization of
issues of difference, its tendency toward despair, its apathetic God.
Along with other German theologians such as Johann Baptist Metz, Moltmann develops his critique of the privatization of religion in modernity and of the apathy and selfabsorption of the bourgeois theological subject into what Metz has coined "political theology." This theology arose in Europe in the 1960s in response to the Christian-Marxist dialogue of the time [Conyers 1988:217, citing Moltmannl. Such a theology was not an
attempt to "politicize" theological discourse, but to describe contemporary life as political
(that is, concerned with concrete, historical human social arrangements and with the
power to constitute such) and to reconfigure Christianity in the midst of and as a protest
against massive public suffering [Chopp, 1986: I011. Thus, the term "political" in political
theology referred not to a theme, but to a milieu in which theologians such as Moltmann
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and Metz claimed that all theological discourse took place. In discussing his involvement
in the Christian-Marxist dialogue, Moltmann says that he learned to ask,
... whether a religion or a religious community functions to provide comfort through
the hope of a better afterlife, to justify unjust forms, or to stimulate the spirit of justice
through which unjust forms are changed. CVolf 1986: 10-11, citing MoltmannI
Thus, through his development of a political theology, Moltmann attempts to retrieve the
material (that is, social, political, and economic) concerns abandoned by his theological
forebears, Barth and Bultmann. Moltmann's project, then, offers much promise for a repositioning of the primary questions of contemporary theology via the perspective of those
who have suffered so much on the margins of modem historical practice.
Moltmann's second issue in the crisis of identity is the issue of Christian clifferentiationrequired in order to avoid absorption again into bourgeois sensibilities or a complete loss of religious identity through work on behalf of the marginalized other that denies any Christian basis.
The crisis of the church in present-day society is not merely the critical choice
between assimilation or retreat into the ghetto, but the crisis of its own existence as
the church of the crucified Christ ... [Flor only by Christ is it possible to tell what is
a Christian church and what is not [Moltrnann I 974:2-3I
The task for the church as Moltmann conceives it in ill; political theology is to enter the
social realm, but not to lose its identity as the Christian church [Moltmann 1974: l 3I. His
identification of the suffering Jesus on the cross with the death of God works for Moltmann
to provide the basis for the move into the social-political realm-that is, the identification of
the bourgeois church with the suffering subjects on the margin of history. And the cross again
functions, in this second scenario, to provide Moltrnann with the philosophical criterion he
requires in order to differentiate that which is "Christian" from that which is not [Moltrnann
l 974:7I. The worship of the crucified Christ distinguishes Christianity from all other religions,
claims Moltrnann, and it provides a point of pure criticism from which to judge what are and
are not appropriate manifestations of the communal essence and identity.
Moltrnann also wishes to oppose modernity's restriction of church and theology to the
private realm and its limitation of theological knowledge to various forms of historicism,
essentialism, the empty formalism of existentialist Christianity and to resist modernity's
slide into a sense of fated apathy. To do so, Moltmann offers his reconstruction of
Christian eschatology.

In actual fact ... eschatology means the doctrine of the Christian hope, which
embraces both the object hoped for and also the hope inspired by it From first to
last, and not merely in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward
looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and transforming the
present. The eschatological is not one element of Christianity, but it is the medium of
Christian faith as such, the key in which everything in it is set, the glow that suffuses
everything here in the dawn of an expected new day. [Moltmann 1967: 161

88

Feske

Moltmann explicitly repudiates modern theology's attempts to derive a meaningful unity
to history based on the derivation of an essentialist core to or an argument about the historicity of all human experience. What connects present and past, for Christians, says
Moltmann, is instead "the problem of the future" lMo!tmann 1967: 1891. And, according
to Moltmann, this is Christianity's distinctive contribution to a jaded and cynical world:
"the hope that it engenders in the midst of the ambiguous and even hopeless circumstances that plague human existence ... " !Runyon 1979: I OP
For Moltmann, this eschatology takes the form of divine promises, promises which move
toward the present from God's future, in order to transform it in the light of that future.
Christian eschatology, he writes, "is the language of promises. It understands history as the
reality instituted by promise" !Moltmann 1967:2241. Moltmann's emphasis on this hopeful
eschatologica! future provides a horizon of openness and the possibility of transformation to
the historical wreckage of modernity and the church's often apathetic responses to it Such a
focus on the possible future could be argued to be some sort of utopian fantasy. But
Moltmann staunchly defends the practical nature of his promissory proposal. "mo settle for
what is now 'real','' he writes, "is to be tied to what is passing away and soon will be no
more. Far from being unrealistic, a hopefU/ approach 'alone takes seriously the possibilities
with which all reality is fraught"' !Runyon 1979: I0, citing Moltmann 1967:251. Moltrnann
suggests that rather than being "realistic," to perceive and act out of history understood as a
closed and tragic circle is a denial of the "realism" of God's promised future and the on-going
process of re-creation.
Thus hopes and anticipations of the future are not a transfiguring glow superimposed
upon a darkened existence, but are realistic ways of perceiving the scope of our real
possibilities, and as such they set everything in motion and keep it in a state of change.
Hope and the kind of thinking that goes with it consequently cannot submit to the
reproach of being utopian, for they do not strive after things that have 'no place', but
after things that have 'no place as yet' but can acquire one. !Moltmann 1967:251
In a direct confrontation with the empirical tradition in theology, Moltmann retorts that
positivistic realism also proves to be illusory, so long as the world is not a fixed body
of facts but a network of paths and processes, so long as the world does not only run
according to laws but these laws themselves are flexible, so long as it is a realm in
which necessity means the possible, but not the unalterable. !Moltmann 1967:251
This explication of the Christian eschatological future as one which is not determined nor
fixed by past experience and traditions but itself provides the impetus for flexibility and
transformation offers the possibility for rethinking the kind of closed, sacrificial frameworks that have characterized so much of Christological discourse. Indeed, the open horiwn which Moltmann's eschatology offers can be seen clearly in his use of it to shape his
Christologica! position.
Moltmann describes this eschatological future as "already present in the promises of
Christ" !Mo!tmann 1967: 1391. Moltmann develops his Christ figure as the already-present
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and continually open hope of the future through the use of three traditional themes: the
kingdom of God as promise, the Resurrection as new creation, and the Trinity as both
open and as relational. As Moltmann explains it, Jesus did more than simply proclaim the
realm of God as a promised future. 'The events which took place around Jesus and at his
word speak on his behalf, for they are the signs of the messianic age" [Moltmann
1974:981. Moltmann appeals particularly here to Jesus' ministry with the poor, the sick,
and the oppressed, filling out the formal eschatological promise he proclaims with a materiality of solidarity with those on the social margins. Eschatology here, then, becomes a "creative expectation" which both critiques and transforms present affairs in conformity with
the materiality of this material promise !Moltrnann 1967:3351. Likewise, Moltmann interprets Christ's resurrection not as an ethereal event, disconnected from human history, but
as the "future of the very earth on which !Christ's] cross stands" [Moltrnann 1967:211.
Moltrnann' s proclaimed eschatological promise, then, is not some future event to which
we in the present move, but a manifestation of practical hope which comes from God's
future toward us, drawing us forward and transforming the present reality in its image.
'Easter' was a prelude to, and a real anticipation of, God's qualitatively new future
and the new creation in the midst of the history of the world's suffering ... For
the Easter hope shines not only forwards into the unknown newness of the history which it opens up, but also backwards over the graveyards of history ...
!Moltmann 1974:1631
Moltmann' s use of the Resurrection, as the resurrection of the crudfted one, then, functions
not only as a description of the actuality of a promised future from God for those who
live now in the shadow of the end of modernity. It is also a ground for the dangerous
remembrance of those who have been sacrificed and a recognition of the claim that they
make upon the future of theology and the future of the earth.
The third image that Moltmann uses to interpret the openendedness of his radical
eschatology in that of the Trinity. According to Rebecca Chopp, in Moltmann,
The Trinity is the open symbol of the possibility of new creation, for in the context
of the suffering in God-the suffering of the grieving Father, the suffering of the
abandoned Son-the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son to anticipate and
bring about a new creation. !Chopp 1986: 11 OJ
Chopp I 19891 goes on to describe Moltmann as offering a "narratology" of God in which
the Trinity is central and is posited as "relational and open."
What is helpful about Moltmann's analysis is the relation of suffering and openness,
for suffering does not create openness nor openness depend on suffering, but rather
what happens with suffering, including the memories of those who have suffered
history, is an open possibility in the trinitarian history of God. [Chopp 1989:331
What Moltmann's eschatology and his use of it as an interpretive tool for his Christology
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does, then, is to offer an open and materially anticipatory horizon which comes to us
from the future for the transformation of present social arrangements. As Chopp suggests,
for Moltmann, God's essential nature is the future, which comes to the present and transforms it, calling us to a life of hope in a history that is constituted by God's promises.
Through his critique of the empty formalism of Bu!tmannian existentialism and of the calculated neutrality of neo-orthodoxy and via his claims regarding the bourgeois church's necessary identity with those who are "other;· Moltrnann offers the possibility of reconfiguring the
modem theological project He addresses this concern in two interrelated ways: I l through his
attention to the oppressed other as the primary focus of Jesus' earthly ministry and as a necessary constituent of a revitalized European church, and 2) through his interpretation of the
cross as a symbol of interruptive suffering for a church become apathetic and complacent
Mo!trnann draws both on his negative dialectics and a socio-political reading of the
ministry of the historical Jesus to make his claim about the material subject of Christianity
in our time. The Christian principle of fellowship is fellowship with those who are different, he writes in The Crucified Cod.
Thus to save all men, and in accordance with the contradiction of the cross, the

church of the crucified Christ must take sides in the concrete social and political
conflicts going on about it and in which it is involved, and must be prepared to
join and form parties. It must not ally itself with the existing parties, but in a partisan fashion intervene on behalf of betrayed humanity and suppressed freedom.
[Moltmann 1974:531
This "betrayed humanity"' Moltmann identifies as the ··church of the crucified" one
[Moltmann 197 4:521. That is, he interprets as necessary to the identification of the church
of Christ, a solidarity with those to whom Jesus directed much of his earthly ministry-that
is, to his own people, the Jewish community, and in particular, those on the margins of that
Jewish society. Jn this way, Moltmann criticizes the church's complicity in the historical and
ongoing rejection and persecution of the Jewish people in predominantly Christian arenas,
and its modem tum to the private and inward religious experience of the bourgeois believer, to the exclusion of concerns for society's social, political, and economic periphery.
It was important to me to depict the Church's identity in the relation of the Church
to Israel and not apart from it. It was also important to me to show the identity of
the Church of Christ with constant attention to the 'People of Jesus-that is, with
attention to the poor, the oppressed, the sick and handicapped. [Conyers
1988:214, citing Moltmannl
And in his more recent writings, he extends this latter emphasis to the earth itself as a
marginalized subject in an anthropocentric world.
Today a cosmic Christology has to confront Christ the redeemer with a nature
which human beings have plunged into chaos, infected with poisonous waste and
condemned to universal death; for it is only this Christ who can save men and
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women from their despair and preserve nature from annihilation. [Moltmann,

1990:2751
Addressing himself to his own bourgeois church, Moltmann thus extrapolates that this historical attention allows that "it is right to follow Jesus at the present time in the specific
activities of love, suffering, and revolt'' [Moltmann 1974:63].
Central to Molttnann's use of the cross, then, are his claims that the death of Jesus was
neither an accident, nor a mistake, but a political execution provoked by his disruption of a
sacrificial social order IMoltmann 1974: 12 71. Against Bultmann, he writes that Jesus' crucifixion was not a "misconstrual" of a "religious" matter as a "political" one. Rather, he says,
How could public ministry in so tense a political situation between Roman occupying forces and popular uprising, such as existed in Palestine at that time, have
remained without political effects? In the Judaism of that period, the political and
the religious situations were inseparable. !Molttnann 1974: 13 71
Writing that Jesus' message and his public activity were "political in the extreme"
IMoltmann 1974:1441, Molttnann says that because Jesus' ministry was effective, it "produced reactions which took effect themselves .. . [provoking] tangible political unrest"
IMoltmann 1974:137,1431. What he argues, then, is not that Jesus was a political messiah, leading armed revolt against the Roman occupying powers, but-consistent with his
broadening of the meaning of "political" to embrace the entire field of human social inter-

action-that Jesus' healing and liberating ministry to those who were sacrificed to the
maintenance of that occupying power and its collaborators among the Jewish elite served
to threaten those in power in tangible ways:' Moltmann's work on the cross makes clear
that it is the cruelty of the particular socio-political system in power in Palestine in the first
century CE. that caused Jesus to be crucified, and not the plan of God the Father.
Moltmann's interpretation of the cross further critiques the concept of God as one who
demands sacrifice through his rejection of the traclitional theory of Jesus' mute acceptance of
his death and through his depiction of the God of Jesus as the Father who suffers in the
death of his Son. His resistance to the notion that Jesus is "an example of patience and submission to fate," [Molttnann 1974 :5 11 serves to buttress his argument concerning the apathy,
despair, and absence of hope which he says characterize the European church in our time.
". . . mhe objection to hope arises from the religion of humble acquiescence in the present,"
he writes IMolttnann 1967:261.5 As Jesus clies in agony and doubt, so also, claims Moltmann,
does God the Father suffer in the loss of his son. He himself asks the question that arises
from classical notion of the impassibility of the deity: "But how can the death of Jesus be a
statement about Gocf' Does that not amount to a revolution in the concept of God?"
[Moltmann 1974:201]. Connecting the Greek idea of apatheia from which derives the
impassible God with the emotional apathy of his own church, Molttnann writes: 'Thus the
metaphysical apathy that denotes unchangeability translates to an ethical apathy ... "
IConyers 1988: I 08: citing MolttnannJ, one that disengages the bourgeois believer from
material suffering in the modem world. The theology of the cross, then, "brings a completely
incligestible element into the idea of an apathetic God'' !Conyers 1988: 11 OJ. As we shall see,
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its primary purpose for Moltmann is to jar the jaded sensibilities of

bourgeois

Ouistians in the northern hemisphere; but it also seives to convey the intense involvement
of God in the suffering of God's creation. The crucified Jesus is, for Moltmann, the "protesting
God involved in human sorrow and suffering'' [Moltmann 1974:226]. The resurrection also
becomes such a symbol of resistance and protest against unjust suffering and oppression.

In the crucifixion-resurrection of Jesus the cross represents suffering and the anticipation of judgment, and the resurrection is the demonstration of the righteousness
of God that creates right for all. [Chopp 1986: 109] 6
What becomes apparent, then, is that Moltmann offers a theological perspective that, in
many aspects, severely critiques aspects of modem theology. He does so vis-a-vis his rejection of the tragic closedness of history and through his eschatology of hope that provokes
transformation of the present via its material promises of God's future. He has not only
rejected the calculated neutrality of modem theology's response to the crises of historical

consciousness and cultural accommodation; he has risked the ambiguity of concrete
cal claims for a material subject: the suffering and the dead of history's sacrificial practice.
[Faith] is the eschatological anticipation of redemption, an anticipation through one
who was an outcast, rejected and crucified. The memory of the crucified anticipator
of the kingdom makes impossible for a Christian any spiritualization or individualization of salvation, and any resigned acceptance of participation in an unredeemed
world. [Moltmann 1974:101]
At this
then, we can identify four areas in Moltrnarrn's work which challenge the narrow confines of modem theology's bourgeois project: I) his critique of the privatism and
individualism of modernity and his criticism of the two major options in the Protestant liberal project, neo-orthodoxy, and existentialism; 2) his delineation of an open horiwn of religious discourse which is not just an empty formalism, but has specific material content; 3)
his attention to the suffering subject of history through his development of a political theology and his description of the figure of Jesus as one who suffered a political death; and 4) his
revolution in the concept of God, forcing us to consider both suffering and God together
[Chopp 1986]. However, the centrality of the language of suffering, sacrifice, and obedience
suggest that Moltrnann has not listened carefully to the voice of his material, suffering subject As we have noted, it is in his focus upon the death on the cross as the necessary and
saving event for bourgeois Christianity, in his language of suffering and obedience, and in his
loyalty to the formal method of neo-orthodoxy, even as he repudiates its wholly other God,
that we perceive signs, both explicit and
of Moltrnarrn's continued complicity with
the limits of the modem theological project So it is to this contradiction at the heart of
Moltmann's project that we now move.
A LIBERATIONIST/FEMINIST CRITIQUE

While Moltrnann's reconstruction of Christology and eschatology has done much to
address the issue of human suffering, the work of liberationist and feminist scholars raise
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serious questions about his heavy emphasis on the central and defining symbol of
Christianity and his language of sacrificial suffering, obedience, and self-surrender. From
their perspective, Moltmann's understanding of suffering is in some ways in direct conflict
with the concern for the oppressed other which he claims in much of his work.' 'Tue
death of Jesus on the cross is the centre of all Christian theology. It is not the only theme
of theology, but it is in effect the entty to its problems and answers on earth" IMoltmann
1974:2041. Although Moltmann is highly critical of Bonhoeffer's statement at his own
death that '"our joy is hidden in suffering, and our life in death'" CMoltmann 1974: 146,
citing Bonhoefferl-recognizing that such a statement contradicts the on-going experience
of "the people of Jesus," whose history has been one of almost unmitigated sufferingMoltmann nevertheless makes the cross the central, saving symbol of Christian discourse
and practice. "Through his suffering and death, the risen Christ brings righteousness and
life to the unrighteous and the dying . . . [as] an event of liberating love. . .. Through his
death the risen Christ introduces the coming reign of God into the godless present by
means of representative suffering" [Moltmann 1974:1851. Moltmann claims that, "Only
Christ's representative suffering and sacrifice 'for them' in his death on the cross brings
hope to the hopeless, future to those who are passing away and new right to the unrighteous" [Moltmann 1974: 1861. And earlier in the same text, he writes,
His death is the death of the one who redeems men from death, which is evil. In
other words, they are the pains of love for abandoned men, which the mysticism of
the cross apprehends when it identifies men with the sufferings of Christ.
IMoltmann 1974:511
Such explicit language of suffering sacrifice is highly suspect within a liberationist reading
of the use of sacrificial death as a means to mystify and obfuscate the true nature of the
violence perpetrated on those who disturb the social-symbolic order and the strategies
employed to maintain it: claims of necessity, obedience, and self-denial. Yet, Moltmann's
discourse repeatedly has the marks of a discourse that encourages the acceptance of suffering as a salvific work and undermines protest and resistance.
Divine righteousness 'happens' here, and the gospel reveals it by proclaiming the
event of the obedience of Jesus even to the death of the cross, by proclaiming the
event of his surrender to this death, and by proclaiming his resurrection and his life
as the coming of the divine righteousness to the unjust [Moltmann 1967:2051
While Moltrnann is obviously concerned to express God's open future for the oppressed
as the meaning of the resurrection, he undercuts its radical power by defining Jesus' death
as an event of obeclient acquiescence.
Thus the Spirit is the power to suffer in participation in the mission and the love of Jesus
Christ, and is in this suffering the passion for what is possible, for what is corning and
promised and the future of life, of freedom and of resurrection. CMoltmann 1967:2121
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With such statements, Moltmann empower.; the bourgeois church to face and engage the suf·
fering of those on the margins of its modem dominance, but he does so by the glorification of
suffering itself and by the use of the traditional language of obedience and sacrifice-an ironic
tum of affairs in the light of Moltmann's interpretation of Jesus' death in other statements as
one of anguish, fear, and abandonment. A more detailed analysis of Moltmann's use of the
cross as a salvific concept, then, is needed in order to sort out the contradictions in his position.
Moltmann explicitly connects the suffering of Jesus with the suffering of God and the
encouragement of Christians to take suffering upon themselves in imitation of Jesus. 'Tue
suffering of love for forgotten, despised and betrayed human beings wherever they are
oppressed is concrete suffering in imitation of Christ. .. " [Moltmann 1974:641 "'Where
we suffer because we love, God suffers in us'" !Conyers 1988: 1 16, citing Moltmann
1974:2531. "According to their own experience, the greatest Christian saints were also
the most profoundly abandoned by God" CMoltmann 1974:551. Moltrnann's implied
claim is that while "' ... suffering means being cut off from God, yet within the fellowship
of Christ's suffering. suffering is overcome by suffering. and becomes the way to commu-

nion with God"' IMoltmann 1974:56, citing Bonhoefferl. Suffering, in this way of think·
ing, is a mystical pathway to the divine and therefore, to be desired rather than resisted.
Oddly, Moltmann himself recognizes the destructive practical impact of this kind of
mystification of the cross has had, saying that the church has historically abused the theol·
ogy of the cross in the interest of the perpetrators of suffering. Noting that slaves and
peasants have been encouraged to accept their sufferings as their "crosses to bear," he
calls such a "mysticism of suffering ... blasphemy'' [Moltmann 1974:49]. He responds, in
support of his own emphasis on a saving significance to sacrificial death, that "the Christ
of the poor has always been the crucified Christ ... [in whom, he claims, they find] their
true identity, hidden and guaranteed in the Christ who suffers with them, so that no one
can deprive them of this identity'' [Moltmann 1974:491. Cone writes that "Jesus' cry of
dereliction ... [shows] the depth of Jesus' agony and the pain of being abandoned by his
Father ... mhe pain of the cross was God suffering for and with us so that our humanity
can be liberated for freedom in the divine struggle against oppression" [Cone 1975: 1391. 8
While we may grant a certain significance to Moltmann' s claims that this identity·in·suf·
fering "contradicts the definitions of suffering and slavery'' [Moltrnann I 974:50l, recent
work in liberation theologies questions the efficacy of the cross as the central salvific image
of the Jesus' narrative and the redemptive power of a suffering God. In their essay, "For
God So Loved the World?," Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker reflect on the tra·
dition of the cross as the locus of Christian salvation. [n agreement with Moltmann, they
grant that the commitment to the creation of a community of mutuality and justice
requires openness to all of life, and that the community brought to life by God's intimate
connection and participation in all aspects of our lives deserves the appellation, "redemp·
tive." But they charge that such a statement in no way implies the necessity of the death of
Jesus on a cross. Suggesting that suffering God theologies like Moltmann's imply that God
in no way shared our suffering before Jesus' crucifixion, Brown and Parker make a searing
critique of their implications for those on the social·symbolic margins.
By confusing 'suffering with' with action that does something about evil instead of
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asserting that testifying for life is what sustains justice, the suffering God theologies
continue in a new form the traditional piety that sanctions suffering as imitation of
the holy one. Because God suffers and God is good, we are good if we suffer. If we
are not suffering we are not good. To be like God is to take on the pain of all. In
this form of piety, pain becomes attractive-the more we suffer the more we can
believe we approach God. By interpreting Jesus' suffering as a sign that chosen suffering is salvific the Suffering God theology baptizes violence done by people resistant to grace and abundant life, and uses Jesus' death to invite people to be open to
all of life. This theology is offensive because it suggests that acceptance of pain is
tantamount to love and is the foundation of social action. [Brown 1989: l 9I'
Brown and Parker's analysis, in which they directly address Moltrnann's project, suggests
that his interpretation of the death of Jesus serves to buttress the suffering of the
oppressed rather than to expose and dismantle it The testimony of women, of death
camp victims, of African-American womanist ethicists, and others is that this kind of theologizing is guilt-producing, that it dilutes resistance to oppression, and that it opens alreadydevastated communities to further abuse.'° As Brown and Parker write, "If you believe
that acceptance of suffering gives life, then your resources for confronting perpetrators of
violence and abuse will be numbed" [Brown 1989: l 8I. And such a theological position
raises the question of soteriological adequacy-in other words, is it enough just to suffer,
or is wisdom, effectiveness, or transformation of that suffering needful?
Given Moltmann's explicit citation of the oppressed as the central subjects of a new,
political theology, then, it is difficult to comprehend his ignorance of how this cruciform
soteriology contributes to their continued suffering. His mystification of the cross as saving,
in and of itself, his explicit and repeated reference to the concepts of obedience and sacrifice, and his characterization of the suffering God suggest not a careful listening to the
oppressed as theological subjects in their own right, but a discrepancy between the margins as the location of his professed material subject and what we can now identify as his
emerging formal subject, the bourgeois Christian male. In order to document this
ancy, it first will be useful to investigate in just what way Moltrnann considers the cross to
be saving, for whom and from what.
Several citations from Moltmann, representative of consistent themes in his work, are
illuminating. The "theology of the cross is a critical theory of God" !Conyers [ 988: 108,
citing MoltrnannI.
To speak metaphorically, the cross of Christ is the course of a permanent iconoclasm of the Christological icons of the church and the portraits of Jesus in
Christianity; and the theology of the cross is a kind of iconoclasm of the
Christological images and titles of the church. CMoltrnann 1974:87]
He also writes that the cross is the call for the self-abandonment of deification !Moltrnann
1974 :2 7J and makes the bold claim that if one experiences powerlessness in pain, it is the
result of unbelief IMoltmann 1974:64]. What becomes readily apparent, then, is that
Moltrnann' s theology of the cross is constructed in accordance with the issues and con-
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cerns of his methodological, rather than his material subject that methodological subject
being the bourgeois male Christian. The cross is not, for Moltmann, a historical instrument
of pain, torture, and death, but a "metaphor," a philosophical negation of modem theology's accommodation to bourgeois values and of the dominant subject's sin of abuse of
power, self-deification, and overweening pride. Rather than being the practical, political theology that he himself invokes, then, Moltmann' s reading and use of the cross becomes
merely a sophisticated update on the crisis of the non-believer, who is still his primary subject [Moltmann 1974: 131. Such discourse is a mystification of sacrificial death, for through
its use of the cross as the means to jar and negate the world and values of the bourgeois
Christian, Moltmann mystifies and abstracts human suffering. and in essence, makes its
continuance requisite and necessaty. That is to say, while Moltmann' s cross of Christ may
serve to call the middle-class church's attention to constrictions of its own thinking and
practice and its neglect of the issue of suffering, it does so at the expense of the historical
bearers of that suffering, in effect encouraging, indeed, requiring their continued existence
in order to prevent the church from returning to its apathetic demeanor.
There are additional indicators, however, that Moltmann's primary concern and primary
theological subject is not the oppressed other on whose behalf he has so eloquently spoken.
His method implicitly continues to belie his words. Moltmann calls for the theological community to engage in an imitatio O.risti by accepting suffering upon itself. He understands
himself to be calling for the bourgeoisie to be in solidarity with the oppressed of the earth
[cf., Moltmann 1974:251; to develop the capability of suffering in an indifferent world
[Moltmann 1974:3141; to abandon power, self-interest, and domination for a share in the

sufferings of the other [Moltmann 1974:691. Moltmann's theology, then, is one for those
who have been protected from suffering. His focus upon remedies for theological and sociopolitical apathy reveals his primary subject to be the one who has been able to entertain
both the bourgeois luxury of apathy'' and a choice about whether or not to allow the intrusion of suffering. A!; Moltmann writes, in reference to his delineation of the suffering God,
The limitations of apathy fall away. Man can open himself to suffering and to love.
In sympatheia with the pathos of God he becomes open to what is other and new
... When we speak positively here of suffering, we mean in general being affected
by something else. [Moltmann 1974:3031
Brown and Parker respond,
Moltmann's intent is to distinguish between what he calls 'active suffering' (i.e., chosen suffering) and acquiescence to suffering viewed as fate. But by continuing a theology that cloaks the perpetrator of violence and calls the choice for life a choice to
suffer, he fails to present a theology capable of moving beyond suffering as fate to
be endured. [Brown 1989: 18-91
We can follow this thread into Moltmann's discourse on solidarity. Having abstracted suffering from the concrete history of the oppressed other, Moltmann now goes on to reveal
that the soteriological goal of his project of suffering in solidarity is the salvation of the "unbe-
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liever," the dominant modem theological subject, through that subject's identification with
the world's oppressed. The cross, says Moltmann, "distinguishes belief from unbelief'
!Moltmann 1974:241; therefore, by implication, the poor and oppressed who suffer the
crosses of the world berome the agents for the salvation of the bourgeois Christian. Such a
position necessitates the continuation of suffering for the ongoing salvation of the bourgeoisie, while at the same time effectively blunting any possibility for a radical critique of sacrificial suffering from within the church or in opposition to it Thus, while it can be fairly
claimed that Moltmann's stated sympathies are clearly with the poor and the oppressed, his
formal subject, glimpsed in his theology of the cross and, as we shall see below delineated in
detail in his ties to nee-orthodox methodology, is the bourgeois Christian male, who is
offered the choice of self-denial and of solidarity with the oppressed for the sake of his own
salvation. His fonnal method becomes a dangerous one if it is taken out of the context of
the constituency it was written to address and is generalized into a program to dismantle the
fragile rationalities and survival mechanisms of subjugated peoples. Such rationalities and
techniques are often formulated out of a tremendous creativity in the face of continued,
concrete social and economic oppression, and thus, require not the call for continued suffering, nor as we shall see, the acceptance of a nee-orthodox dissonance, but safety, nurture,
and compassionate listening in order to transform theological discourse from the perspective
of these suffering others. This is clearly Moltmann's intention; however, one must wonder
whether his embracing of suffering is not an inevitable result of his ties to an unacknowledged constituency-the privatized and privileged bourgeoisie.
Based on the analysis above, then, we can suggest that although Moltmann explicitly
criticizes the material content of nee-orthodoxy's Wholly Other God, he accepts and uses
its formal theological method, dialectical nee-orthodoxy, in order to offer the soteriological discourse he deems necessary for his bourgeois theological subject. Thus, I am arguing
that Moltmann's project is impbdtly sacrificial because it exhibits many of the characteristics of the nee-orthodox method, already argued above to function sacrificially by privileging the issue of identity, attempting to isolate a "pure" Christianity with which to critique
other "religions," by subsuming all suffering into the Trinity (a typological move), and by
using the cross as the means to answer the dominant question of modem Western
Christian discourse-the question of epistemology, thereby effectively marginalizing the
very issues of suffering and oppression which Moltmann has been so careful to name.
Moltmann's formal subject determines his method and his method reveals the primary
position which this subject occupies in his work."
Like other nee-orthodox responses within the liberal theological paradigm, Moltmann
too searches for a point of purity, outside of the troublesome vicissitudes of history, from
which to launch and sustain his critical theory of the cross. Jn attempting to redeem the
church while at the same time securing it from the "conupted" church of the bourgeoisie,
Moltmann adopts neo-orthodoxy's strategy of privileging some iconoclastic form of
Christianity as "true or pure" Christianity and using this privileged position to critique "religion" (that is "conupted" forms). For Moltmann the theology of the cross performs this
particular function .
. . . !Al theology of the cross contradicts the 'golden calves in Christianity itself,' that
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which causes Christianity to fill the role of a civil religion that provides a foundation
for order of the state. [Conyers 1988: 1131"

Moltmann then makes a rapid transition from the suffering of the oppressed other in
history to the subsumption of all suffering into the Trinitarian history.
All human history, how ever much it may be determined by guilt and death, is
taken up into this 'history of God,' i.e., into the Trinity, and integrated into the
future of the 'history of God.' There is no suffering which in this history is not God's
suffering; no death which has not been God's death in the history of Golgotha.
[Moltmann 1974:2461
Such a perspective on the wreckage of human relations and theological discourse is helpful in that it describes God as the bearer of ultimate compassion; but it is also dangerous,
for it reduces individual and historical human suffering to a purified event in the experience of God. As Metz writes of Moltmann's formulation,
It is that the non-identity of human suffering cannot be canceled out, in theological
dialectics of Trinitarian soteriology, and still keep its historical character. [Metz
1980:1321
Through his abstraction of the suffering of Jesus and of all human suffering into the
Trinity, then, Moltmann makes the univocal move of neo-orthodox interpretation in a

way that is subtler, but no less troublesome than that of Karl Barth. While Barth's typological Christology interpreted Jesus as the ultimate signified of every signifier, in effect reducing all meaning in theological language to a univocal point and subsuming all historical differences into the single history of the Jesus who emerges from the canonical scriptures,

Moltmann uses this characteristic neo-orthodox move to subsume all historical suffering
into the Trinitarian godhead. The suffering of the abandoned son and the pain of the
father for that child functions for Moltmann as a type and figure for all human suffering,
thereby depriving it of its radically interruptive character." "If that is taken seriously, it
must also be said that, like the cross of Christ, even Auschwitz is in God himself," writes
Moltmann [J 974:2781. But the question arises as to whether having all human suffering
hermetically sealed in the history of the godhead really offers any hope of redemption
from that suffering or transformation of the world in which it continues.
Christianity is interpreted by a singular event-a sacrificial death-in such a manner that
it can be understood as a pure discourse, over against other corrupted "religious" forms,
including aberrant strains of Christianity. This reading of the gospel, then, can work to
interpret suffering, but-as the gospel is an eschatologically pure form-suffering cannot
interpret, nor critique, it [Chopp 1986: I 021. Moltmann has, instead, secured the church,
safe from the messiness of suffering human history. His conflicting claims both argue the
necessity of the church's solidarity with that suffering, and yet belie that solidarity through
the abstraction of all pain into the eschatological drama of God, which drama relieves
him, in the final analysis, of the necessity of dealing with the wreckage of human history
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and Christianity's complicity in it His Trinitarian transaction may argue that we reconceptualize the apathetic God, but it is an affair of which the historically sacrificed know nothing and which would not alleviate their suffering if they did.
Moltrnann' s iconoclastic and abstract interpretation of the cross and suffering and his
continued use of the formal methods of neo-orthodox theology allow us to conclude, then,
that while he claims the oppressed other as his primary theological subject, he is primarily
concerned to address the issues of the dominant subject of modem theology. While offering a searing criticism of that bourgeois church, Moltrnann' s reading of the figure of fesus
and the cross function chiefly to respond to two issues which have preoccupied much of
modem theology to the exclusion of other concerns: I ) the epistemological question, the
issue of secure knowledge of God in an uncertain world, and 2) the question of identity,
the issue of the preservation of Christianity in a hostile and pluralistic environment
As we saw above, Moltrnann identifies two conflicting issues in the early pages of The
Crucified God: first, the need for modem churches to address the issue of social relevance
as a theological concern [Moltrnann 1974:31, and second, his worry (which he shares
with other contemporary theologians like fohn Cobb), that the involvement of the
Christian community in movements for political change will cause Christianity to lose its
distinctive identity.
When a Christian community feels obliged to empty itself in certain social and political actions, it must take care that its traditional religious and political identity is not
exchanged for a new religious and political identity, but must sustain its non-identity.
CMoltrnann 1974: 171
Trying to critique and revitalize the complacent sensibilities of bourgeois religion in
modernity, Moltrnann is threatened by the abandonment of Christianity by those who
are materially engaged in the political struggle for human liberation. As Sobrino writes,
Moltrnann has distinguished his theological project from the speculative hermeneutics of
such theologians as Pannenberg by developing a theological praxis that he designates,
"political." " ... CMlaintaining that theology has always been political ... the real problem is
to make sure that this political praxis is really Christian" [Sobrino 1978:31 l. Such a con-

cern dominates much of Moltmann' s discourse on the cross and suffering. as he reveals a
crisis of differentiation as central to his theological project. The church, as Moltrnann perceives it, is fighting for its life, and he seeks to secure that survival through the exercise of
a sacrificial process of identification, searching for what can fairly be labeled as a unique

essence of Christianity. The issue of distinctiveness constitutes a consistent refrain throughout his work in The Oucified God, as he seeks to identify for the reader what was distinctive about fesus' death [ 1491 and the Christian Easter faith [ 173-4 l. Thus while Moltrnann
urges the bourgeois Christian to abandon traditional Christian identity, as too tame and
too safe for effective witness in the modem world, he replaces it with what he calls the
non-identity of Jesus' abandonment on the cross [Moltmann 1974: 161. Faith in the cross
and "the worship of the crucified Christ," says he, distinguish Christian faith from the
world of religions and from secular ideologies and utopias CMoltmann 1974:33,381.
Again, we recognize in Moltmann' s concern with Christian distinctiveness the heritage of
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his neo-orthodox methodology, with its attempt to define a point of pure, historically
undisturbed point of identity, and the intrusion of his bourgeois subject into any discus-

sion of the function and interpretation of the cross for human suffering. 15
The other theological issue associated with Moltmann's bourgeois theological subject
and one which has been identified above as privileged in modem theology to the point of
excluding the validity of many other concerns is the epistemological question. The cross
again is necessitated in the service of the dominant subjec(s concerns. Struggling with the
legacy of modem philosophical concern over the possibility of knowledge other than that
available to sense perception and of theology's preoccupation with the anxieties which surfaced with the rise of historical consciousness, Moltmann looks again to the cross and suffering-this time as sources of pure knowledge in a historically contingent world. Moltmann
again draws on neo-orthodoxy as the movement in Europe that responded to the epistemological crisis of liberal Protestantism. Arguing that liberal Protestantism wrongly located
the source of religious knowledge in the individual believer, it argues that the only source
of knowledge of God in the world is revelation, specifically the revelation of the Word of
God in Jesus Christ. This revelation is safe from the contingencies of historical-critical speculation because it is not subject to history-rather it creates history, by interpreting and naming it Thus, neo-orthodoxy provides Moltmann with the methodological tools for responding to the epistemological crisis-the crisis of religious knowledge. As Conyers writes,
"Moltmann's approach might begin with the question, 'How is God made known in history7" -an epistemological question [Conyers 1988: 1201. And Moltmann himself contends
that a primary issue in his project is indeed the "knowledge of God" !Moltmann 1974:281.
In his particular brand of neo-orthodox dialectics, Moltmann again turns to the cross and
to suffering as the answers to his queries. 'Tue knowledge of the cross is the knowledge of
God in the suffering caused to him by dehumanized man, that is, in the contrary of everything which dehumanized man seeks and tries to attain as the deity in him" !Moltmann
1974:711. As Chopp notes, for Moltmann suffering is not an interruption of human history,
but fonnally a vehicle for the revelation of God [Chopp 1986: 1161. Thus, while Moltmann
explicitly claims the poor and oppressed as the material subjects of his theological treatments, it is revealed over and again that his primary subject, seen in the analysis of his fonnal
methodology, is the bourgeois Christian non-believer. And it is to his issues that Moltrnann
directs his soteriological claims, to the implicit exclusion of issues for justice and social transfonnation (despite his claims to a "political theology''), and by means of the explicitly sacrificial practice of mystifying and necessitating further suffering and death.
CONCLUSION

It is the contention of this essay, then, that Moltrnann' s project is one that both critiques
and participates in the sacrificial practices of modem theology. It is a combination of material
risk, in his description of the eschatological promises of Gods open future, coming toward us
on behalf of the poor and oppressed, and of fonnal surety, in the employment of neo-orthodox methodology to secure a purified church from accommodation to the apathy and
anomie of bourgeois society. Moltrnann forces us to think of theology and human suffering in
the same context and calls for a solidarity with the poor and oppressed in the present that will
lead to a transfonned future. Yet, tied as he is to the dominant theological subject and his con-
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cems, he does not allow this oppressed other to radically critique his formal renderings of the
cross and human suffering, At his best when he is arguing the pathos of God, he is nevertheless highly problematic within a liberationist framewmk when he sets about attempting to justify and necessitate the cross. Recognizing the devastation called modernity, he calls for
Christians to engage the world; but like other modem theologians, he wants a faith secure
from the ambiguities of that same history. In the end, it is his formal method of sacrificial security which dominates his material call for attentiveness to historic suffering Moltmann opens a
door for the transformation of Christian theological discourse on the cross as memory and
hope, but his ties to the modem problematic prevent him from taking us totally through it
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NOTES
I. Jurgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (NY: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 217; Jurgen
Moltmann, Theology of Hope (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 356.
2. For a detailed discussion of liberation and political theologies as a new paradigm, see
Rebecca S. Chopp I19861.
3. African-American theologian James H. Cone cautions, however, that European political theologians were not the fi"t to develop a theology of hope. "It is important to point out that black people in their sermons, prayers, and songs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were talking about
the politics of hope long before the appearance of hope theology in Germany." Cone claims that
white theologians of hope in America have been influenced far too much by the Gennan philosophical conversation on hope and far too little "by the actual bearers of hope in our social existencen

[Cone 1975: 1271. Yet to Moltmann's credit, says Cone, in a public conference on "Hope and Future
of Man" held in New York City in 1971, featuring Metz, Moltmann, and Pannenberg, it was
Moltmann who publicly raised the issue that on the panel there was "no one from Latin America,
black America, or Africa" !Cone 1975: 1281.
4. For an interpretation of the messianic hope in first-century Palestine as socio-political, see
Richard Horsley and John Hanson, Bandits, Prophets and Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Tune of
Jesus [ 19851, and the previously mentioned Ho"ley, Jesus ond the Spiro/ of Violencec Popular Jewish

Resistance in Roman Polestine [19871.
5. In The Way of!esus Christ, Moltmann [ 19921 reiterates this theme in his repudiation of
Dorothee Soelle's claim that his work argues "a theology of surrender," p. 175.
6. See also Cone [ 1986: 1 l 8-91 who cites Moltmann's use of the resurrection as a symbol of
protest against the suffering of African-Americans.
7. See, for example, Delores Williams, "Black Women's Surrogacy and the Christian Concept
of Redemption," in Paula Cooey, et al., After Potriardry !Williams, I9881, Joanne Carlson Brown and
Rebecca Parker, "For God So Loved the World," in Joanne Carlson Brown and Sharon Bohn,
Christionity, Potriorchy, ond Abuse !Brown and Parker, 19891; Christine Gudorf, Victimization I19921;
Millicent C. Feske I19921.
8. Cone writes that "Jesus' cry of dereliction ... [shows] the depth of Jesus' agony and the pain of
being abandoned by his Father ... mhe pain of the cross was God suffering for and with us so that our
humanity can be liberated for freedom in the divine struggle against oppression" [Cone l 97S: 1391.
9. Womanist theologians such as Jacquelyn Grant [19891 counter that the cross has been and
continues to be a powerfully liberative symbol for African-American women because it has functioned as a sign that God is not on the side of the oppressor, and thereby has offered sustenance and
hope in a massively oppressive situation. Therefore, they argue, we cannot dismiss the cross as a central, salvific symbol in Christianity. While this witness is instructive to me as a Euro-American feminist,
l would argue that the destructive practical effect of the cross on the lives of so many women, black,
brown, and white, suggests that while the cross may continue as an important symbol of God's liberative power in certain, carefully delineated contexts, it behooves us to acknowledge the dangerous
ambiguity of its power in Christian practice and to radically reconstruct the discourse about it
I0. See Thistlethwaite [ 19891, Des Pres [ 19761, and also Cannon [ 19881, who write of the
wisdom and survival strategies of African-Americans in the face of overwhelming odds.
11. Both Sharon Welch, citing the work of African-American women writm, in her A Feminist

104

Feske

Ethic ofRish [ t 990] and Come! West, in his reviev.· of her earlier, Communities of Resistance and Solidarity
rwest I9881, identify apathy and nihilism as luxuries available only to the middle and upper classes. In
their struggle for survival, they note, African-Americans have had no opportunity for indifference.
t 2. For an extended discussion of Moltmann' s neoorthodox methodology, see Chopp, t 986,
who writes, The "continual trace of Moltmann's neo-orthodox theological method" [Chopp
I 986: I 001 can be followed through a number of characteristic threads in his work. The themes of
paradox, opposition, and the alienation of human reason from God's reason all serve to shape the way
in which Moltmann uses the cross as an iconoclastic epistemological principle. "A thing is alive only
when it contains contradiction in itself and is indeed the power of holding the contradiction within
itself and enduring it" lMoltmann 1967:3371. Moltmann confounds "human expectations and desires"
[Chopp 1986: 100] through his theology of the cross which represents not only a radical contradiction
between God's word and human reason, but in effect, fortifies the necessity of such a sacrificial death
as the paradigmatic confounding event. It is from such a position, then, that Moltmann' s claim that the
cross is either the beginning or the end of all Christology emerges lMoltmann 1974:41. "In so far as
and so long as the cross of Jesus is a scandal and foolishness in the world, his resurrection cannot be
demonstrated to this world, except through the freedom of a faith that runs contraiy to this world and
is therefore constantly on trial" [Moltmann 1974:1731. While such a claim may seem to lend itself to
struggle by the privileged church on behalf of the world's sacrificial victims, what is less apparent but
equally true is that Moltmann' s conception of the wisdom of "this world" encompasses only the selfinvolved bourgeois sensibilities he wishes to destroy; it cannot account for the historical desires of those
who have both suffered and, through both luck and wisdom, have survived.
13. It could also be argued that Moltmann's reliance upon eschatology as the crucial saving discourse in his earlier Theology of Hope is another attempt to construct Christian critique and practice
from a point of purity, not liable to the ambiguities and conflicts of human histoiy.
I 4. Brown and Parker I I 9891, and Brock [I 9881 have argued that this kind of theology represents a theology of divine child abuse, as the abandonment of the son by the father was deliberate
and intentional.
15. A similar problem exists with relation to Moltmann's use of the cross and suffering to
reconstitute the concept of God. As he himself notes, such a practice is essentially an exercise in
theodicy, an attempt to vindicate the deity in the face of the world's massive, historic, and on-going
suffering [Conyers 1988: I 03, I 061. In Moltmann, then, suffering serves to buttress and justify claims
for a just God in a suffering world, yet does little to critique that suffering essential as it is to his project. Writing from the perspective of the poor of Latin America, Sobrino criticizes placing the vindication of God in the center of theological discourse. He writes," ... ITThe real problem is not to justify God but rather to tum the justification of human beings into a reality.... " [Sobrino 1978:361.
Latin American liberation theology "is not concerned with finding some way to contemplate God
and captivity in a meaningful relationship. Instead it is concerned with the practical problem of
building up and realizing the kingdom of God in the face of captivity" !Sobrino I978:361.

READING JURGEN MOLTMANN FROM
LATIN AMERICA

JOSE MIGUEZ BONINO

For more than five centuries now, Europe has been constantly present in what

she herself baptized as "Latin America." As the so-called "new world" tries to understand itself, some of its interpretations celebrate that presence while others bemoan
it, but no serious interpretation can ignore it What is true of the general history and
culture of Latin America is perhaps even more significant for its religious and theological tradition. It should not, therefore, surprise us that the theological production
of the last three decades that has come to be known as Latin American "Liberation
Theology" would relate to the more significant trends in North Atlantic-and above
all European-theology. In particular, the work of Catholic theologians like Juan Luis
Segundo, Gustavo Gutierrez, Hugo Assmann or Leonardo Baff or Protestants like
Rubem Alves, Emilio Castro, Gonzalo Castillo, Julio de Santa Ana or myself can easily be shown to have watered at the sources of the Catholic theological renewal represented by Rahner, de Lubac or Congar and/or the Protestant post-First World
War Barthian stream. Even as we tried to liberate ourselves from the burden of our
Eurocentric inheritance and to root our theology more and more deeply in the
native soil of our land and people, our work betrayed-as many critics have amply
documented-the constant use of categories, presuppositions, and methods created
and developed overseas. After all, for all their originality-which cannot be deniedMedellin is a Latin American interpretation of Vatican II and !SAL (the Latin
American "Church and Society" movement) is a daughter of the World Council of
Churches (more specifically, the developments of the Life and Work movement).'

I.

MOLTMANN AND

LATIN AMERICA

In this love-hate relationship between European and Latin American Liberation
Theology, few people have played such a significant role as Jurgen Moltrnann. To
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explore that relationship during the last twenty-five years is to write a significant chapter in
the history of this movement and, perhaps, to uncover something of its strength and
shortcomings. This paper is no more than an initial attempt to explore that territory. A
few dates and events will suffice to indicate the itinerary of this trip.
I . As Rubem Alves was preparing his doctoral dissertation at Princeton (New jersey,
USA) in 1965-68, his intended title ("Tawards a Theology of Liberation") was transformed by advisers and editors into "A Theology of Human Hope"' to yoke it to the
wagon of "The Theology of Hope" which Moltmann had launched in 1965. In fact, his
thesis can be understood (or misunderstood)-as we shall comment below-as a counterpoint to Moltmann' s book. And when Gustavo Gutierrez published the epoch-making
"Theology of Liberation" (and not "A" Theology of Liberation as the English translation
put it) in 1971 (following several papers with the same title) Moltmann's thought is discussed, mostly in positive terms, in at least three sections of the book. 3
2. 1973 marks an interesting tum in the discussion. In May of that year the World
Council of Churches convened a four-day symposium on liberation theology in Geneva
at the Ecumenical center in Bossey. Hugo Assmann and Paulo Freire from Latin America,
and black theologians James Cone (from USA) and Bodipo Malumba (from Africa) and
some sixty theologians from Europe sustained what was characterized as "heated debates
that did not materialize into an open confrontation-but retrogressed into periods of awkward silence."' In 1970, Hugo Assmann had already published an article in which he indicated the "suspicion" that, against the will and intention of their proponents, European
"political theology" might be functional to the reactionary dogmatics and ethics, in which
political theological discussion derived supposedly "pure" and "uncommitted" dogmatic
formulations; second, by refusing to bring down their "political discussion" to the level of
concrete political options, they left an indeterminate space in which all kind of reactionary
"third positions" could find a refuge. In the polarized environment of 1973-76, when the
internal dynamics of liberation movements drove them to believe that a "popular liberation breakthrough" was imminent and, on the other hand, when the aggressive policy of
the United States was pushing the armies of Latin American countries to take over power
and launch a "security state" with total repression of all dissent, Assmann radicalized his
critique; there was no space for third positions: those who were not with the one and
only socialist revolution were against it. Dialogue, in this context, can easily prove confusing or useless-or both. 5 Moltmann, in his tum, interprets Assmann's position as "[thel
announcement ... that 'incommunication' was to take the place of dialogue with
European theologians because they were Europeans .... "'
3. More ironic-or perhaps more ambiguous-theologians like Gustavo Gutierrez
(Theology of Liberation, 1971 ), Leonardo Baff (Jesus Cristo Liberador, 1972), Jon Sobrino
(Christology at the Crossroads, 1976), or myself <Doing Theology in a RetJOlutionary Situation,
1975), although sometimes sharing some of Assmann's questionings, found in Moltrnann's
writings (by that time The Crudfied God was already published) some important insights
which were worthy of careful consideration and discussion. It is in response to both the
rejection and the invitation to dialogue that Moltmann writes his Open Letter to me in 1976.
4. Slowly, in the years that follow, the occasions of encounter, discussion, and interface
increased. In September 1977, invited by ISEDET (lnstituto Superior Evangelico de
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Estudios Teologicos) Moltmann offered lectures in Buenos Aires that are published in
Spanish under the title, Temas para una teologfa de la esperanzo, with comments which
Armando J. Levoratti and Jose Miguez Bonino offered in the occasion of the lectures.' In
the following month, October 1977, the "Comunidad Teologica de Mexico" organized a
symposium with Moltmann' s participation together with James Cone <Black theology) of
the USA, Sergio Martinez Arce of Cuba and several theologians from Central and South
America. In a sense, this last meeting had something of the hardness of the Geneva symposium. "Moltmann," comments Jean Pierre Bastian in his preface to the publication of
the Latin American contributions to the debate, "has been an important teacher for many
of us in Latin America, and the difficulty of communication and understanding with this
spokesperson for the most progressive European church invited to a reflection on the theological production related to different Christian praxis.'''
II. COINCIDENCES AND DISAGREEMENTS

As I was looking back and re-read all this material, I had a strange feeling: it all looked
so distant, so old-fashioned. We speak now a different language, pose different questions,
have other expectations, struggle at different fronts. And yet, at another level, we move in
the same history, face the same theological and social dilemmas, and carry some of the
same burdens. Was there something fundamental at stake in the coincidences and the disagreements of Latin American and European theologians? Is there something to be
learned in view of Christian thinking and praxis as we move into a new millennium? Can
we trace some parallel, converging or divergent lines in the movement of Latin American

Liberation Theology and the theological production of Professor Moltmann in the two
decades between the 1970s and the 1990s? What I offer from here onwards are my
own reflections, which certainly do not intend to represent "the theology of liberation"even if that were possible for any one person or group-and probably Moltrnann may not
recognize himself in my interpretation. It is mean' rather, as a sign of my gratitude for all
we have received from him and as an expression of friendship for a person I have learned
to esteem and respect. If, besides that, it can provide an opportunity for further conversation, I will feel amply rewarded.
I. I would need to begin the story with the Karl Barth tha' after World War I and provoked by a different ideological and social understanding in search of a political praxis,
challenged the kind of subjective or ethical "continuities" between faith and human life
which had characterized "liberal bourgeois theology" for more than a century. His way of
"clearing the ground" was to pose a total, qualitative distance between the Word of God
and all human creations-theology included. As his own example (though not always that
of his "followers") showed, this did not mean renouncing political commitments or activity. But it did mean that none could claim "divine legitimation." In relation to all ideological, social, or political undertakings (as well as to all religious experiences and cultural
manifestations) God's Word was 'The Great Disturbance."'
In our own Latin American experience-particularly of young Protestants-in the
I 940s and I 9 50s, this message had a liberating power. It reflected our own rebellion
against both the conservative traditional Christendom mentality and order, sometimes
allied to the Catholic Church and the landed aristocracies, and to the "savage capitalism"
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represented by the liberal elites' alliance with foreign interests (Great Britain and the
United States particularly), But, on the other hand, it also liberated us for social and politi-

cal active commitments-for instance in social movements, student reform and socialist
parties-over against the religiously justified "political abstinence" of fundamentalist or
pietist Christians.
2. But Barth did not tell us much about the "positive possibilities" or the concrete
meaning of "the great positive possibility" that also appeared in the contents of his commentary' Some among these young theologians turned briefly to Brunner's "point of contact," or to Reinhold Niebuhr's realism. But, as the social and political crises became more
and more acute in the late fifties and sixties, those alternatives were not clear or meaningful enough. Barth's theology and example were significant only when it was clearly visible
that political decisions involved a matter of faith-like in the question of "German
Christians." This is the strength and the weakness of Barmen. But in the quest for a faithful Christian praxis in the common "affairs of the world" most decisions are not so clear.
Are we left without any clue? Does God retreat into God's otherness and leave us without any direction? Are there no signs at all-certainly not absolute but at least as "pointers"
of God's action in this world 7 Barth himself was aware of the problem and in his
Community, Church and State' 0 tried to suggest "correspondences" which could give some
orientation'' But it is not until the 1960s that some European theologians began to articulate a theological paradigm which, without returning to the liberal idea of natural continuities, could establish the right continuity/discontinuity, or disturbance/affirmation between
God's judgment and God's grace and justice in the affairs of the world. Undoubtedly, the
biblical studies of Old and New Testament prepared the way. But it is the "political theology" of the sixties that was able to offer a new alternative. In this breakthrough Moltmann
played a decisive role.
3. As I see it, Moltmann developed, during these thirty years, three interrelated theological ways to build in the field that Barth had cleared. The first is his Theology of Hope. In
a dialogue between Christian eschatology and Ernst Bloch's Das Prinzip Hoffnung,
Moltmann transposes Barth's "otherness" from a metaphysical to a historical plane and
thus to a place from which this otherness, rather than paralyzing human praxis, calls for it
and gives it a future:
For the element of otherness that encounters us in the hope of the Old and New
Testaments-the thing we cannot already think out and picture for ourselves on the
basis of the given world and the experiences we already have of that world-is one
that confronts us with a promise of something new and with the hope of a future
given by God. The God spoken of here is no intra-worldly or extra-worldly God,
but the "God of hope" (Rom. 15: 13), a God with "future as his essential nature" (as
E. Bloch Puts it)."
In Latin America this orientation soon appears in three directions. Rubem Alves publishes his Toward a Theology of Human Hope, to which we have already referred. His
debate with Moltmann-to which the latter refers in his Open Letter-has to do with the
twofold source of hope: on the one hand, with Moltmann, in the anticipation of God's
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promise; on the other, in the protest of human suffering, the "negation of the negative."
This note was not absent from Moltmann's argument but, from the painful experience of
a Third World situation, demanded a more central place in any consideration of Christian
theology and praxis. On a different plane, Moltmann's theology of hope evokes in Latin
America a reflection on the positive meaning of "utopia." Gustavo Gutierrez tries to relate
what he would call "the redemptive level" of eschatology to the human capacity of developing, from a critical analysis of existing reality, by projecting the positive and negating the

negative in human experience, a "human utopia" which becomes a direction for the more
concrete "historical projects" and the specific strategies and tactics of the human historical
praxis of liberation. " In still a third direction, Franz Hinkelammert distinguishes the alienating and the mobilizing possibilities of utopian thinking. 14
It is not my intention in these references to discuss the directions in which
Moltmann's eschatological provocation was interpreted, but rather to point out, on the
one hand, its positive impact on Latin American liberation theology and, on the other,
the immediate need and effort to re-interpret it from the concrete experiences of suffering and struggle of the poor as the specific area where liberation theology finds its
origin and its structuring principle.
The second direction in Moltmann's effort to relate God's Word to human reality
takes place in the sphere of Christology-now in dialogue with the critical theory of Max
Horkheimer-in The Cn.idfied Cod ( 1972). Here he takes up the question raised by Alves.
The Cross cannot be merely explained as a "step" in God's redemptive plan but as "a
mode of being of God." Here, the crucial question is: ls God's power over death-his
struggle against the "vicious circles of death" in human life and experience-carried from
outside or from the inside of history? If we take seriously the biblical witness of Christ's
relation to God, the unavoidable question is: How is God's kingdom (his sovereignty) present in the cross ofjesus? Now we are forced to reformulate God's transcendence, not as
"distance" but in a new relation of power and love which is not visible except in faith.
Power is generated from within the circle of death: "the possible overcoming of the negative is effective by entering the mechanisms of negation," interprets Jon Sobrino in his
Christology.' 5
This last quotation already introduces us into the "Latin American reception" of The
Cn.idfied God. In fact Sobrino' s Cristo logia desde America Latina is a long dialogue with
Moltmann. This, again, points to the particular "slant" in Latin American interpretation. No
doubt Moltmann's argument-both in this and the previous book-raises a number of complex philosophical and theological questions, which have been amply (and sometimes hotly)
debated in European theology. In Latin America, the crucial question had to do with
Moltrnann's proposal of "theodicy" which is not a theodicy of "rationality" but of "participation," an invitation to discipleship, a space created for a praxis of love within the sufferings of
the world." In a somewhat similar vein, I tried to re-read The Cn.idfied God as an invitation to
a praxis, while at the same time requesting a more specific and analytical consideration of
the structural reality of the "vicious circles of death" which would deepen and critique the
initial, and in my view insufficient, comments in the final chapter of the book."
The third direction is-as it corresponds to the subject-more elusive, but extraordinarily important: the several comments and discussions, particularly in some of Moltmann's
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more recent writings, to the person and the work of the Holy Spirit. It appears in relation
to Christology in his Der Weg /esu Christi: Christologie in messianischen Dimensionen," to
ecclesiology in his Kirch in der Kraft des Geistes," to Creation in the Gifford Lectures of
I 984-85, '° in relation to eschatology in his The Coming of God" and more systematically
in The Spirit of Life." It has frequently been noted that Pneumatology, particularly in the
Western tradition, is the least developed doctrine. Sometimes, the Holy Spirit is absorbed
by ecclesiology, other times it becomes simply a rubber stamp to certify the authority of
Scripture or is totally subjectivized in "religious experience." Some years ago, Hendrikus
Berkhof opened the way to a more comprehensive understanding of the work of the
Spirit in his Warfield Lectures at Princeton of 1964," where he emphasized both the
unity and the specificity of the work of the Spirit in its different dimensions: mission,
church, individual, creation, and eschatology. These are precisely the areas in which
Moltrnann has developed a Trinitarian doctrine of the Spirit.
The importance of this theme for Latin American theology in general and for Liberation
Theology in particular can hardly be exaggerated. Jose Comblin's 0 Espirito Santo e a
Libertacao" has explored the doctrine in relation to the Latin American experience in the
life of the communities, of the "spirituality" of liberation and in a renewal of ecclesiology
(here with a specific reference to Moltrnann's book on the Church). But still two important
issues which have become more and more significant for Latin American theology were
not discussed in CombIin' s book. One is the work of the Spirit in the preservation, renewal,
and consummation of creation, to which Moltmann has given a significant place in his
pneumatology. Boffs recent works on "ecology" and on the doctrine of the Trinity have
underlined the importance of this question for Latin America." The other area has to do
with the experience of the Spirit in the growing Pentecostal movement in the whole of
Latin America (and many other areas of the world, including the industrial countries).
While Moltrnann refers to this fact in his book on the Spin't of Life, and deals briefly with
specific Pentecostal doctrines like "the gift of tongues" and "healing" (present also in other
of his writings), it seems to me that he still owes us deeper dialogue with the emerging
Pentecostal theologians in Latin America, in Africa, and in the North Atlantic world."
Ill. DEALING WllH THE DIFFERENCES?

As we review these different lines which converge-in a Trinitarian framework-to root

the understanding of the triune God's presence and operation in the world in a way
which respects both God's transcendence in relation to any human action and the theological significance of human historical praxis and experience, we have found a certain

tension between Moltmann-and other European progressive theologians-and the reception and interpretation of their approach in Latin America. Although somewhat in caricature, it would be possible to say that the first concern is preeminent in European theologians while the second dominates the Latin American view. In his Open Letter, Moltrnann
reviews the work of his critics and shows that those who reproach him for not giving a
greater theological significance to human action in social and political projects, nevertheless speak of the "fragmentary," "proleptic," or "penultimate'' status of these actions and
achievements. In strict terms, his observation is correct. But there is little doubt that, in
terms of emphasis, of intention, the differences are reaL at least, in tvvo ways.

'" ................ , ............ ,, ............. -

.............. w. ................ ,, ... -......,.,,
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I . On the one hand, Latin American authors try to specify Christian liberating praxis in
terms of very concrete decisions related to specific issues-«onomic, political, social. To
illustrate with one instance: while a particular form of class analysis can be debatable, a
general discourse about poverty which does not relate to any specific understanding of
the "anatomy'' and "physiology" of poverty remains undecided and admits all kinds of
responses-some of them definitely reactionary! It is true that Liberation theologians have
learned-from experience and dialogue with colleagues from other Third World areasthat class analysis is not enough to define "poverty''-and therefore is insufficient for a
strategy of liberation. In this sense, the discussion of race and gender, for instance, has
become constitutive of our understanding of the condition of oppression and of the
strategies of liberation. The examples can be multiplied. But in any case, the need to
move from general definitions of oppression and liberation to specific structural, anthropological, cultural, and even religious analysis and the discussion of definite-however
imperfect or conjectural-projects continues to be central to our theological work and, in
our view, a dangerous shortcoming in the work of many of our European friends.
In saying this, however, I am quite conscious of the changes that have taken place during the last decades in the conditions of our analysis and strategies and which have
moved us to a much more flexible and open definition of "diagnoses" and "concrete
options," and therefore to be much more careful in defining "allies" and "enemies." We
would also expect our European friends to have learned from their own experience that
some of their own implicit choices-like their confidence in the progressive movement of
their societies in the direction of increasingly "social democracies" or "democratic

socialisms" cannot be taken for granted anymore, and that our denunciation of the intrinsic polarizing and "excluding" tendencies of modem capitalism have begun to appear
more clearly in their own societies. In other words, we may still have much to talk about
and discuss in relation to the specific face of oppression and struggles for liberation in our
respective conditions, but it seems that we can share an increasing awareness of the "global" nature of our problematics and of the challenge of a theology concerned with liberation." This is a particularly acute problem because it is precisely in this area where we
miss in our European friends-Moltrnann included-a more direct engagement with the
global economic processes which are shaping-although in different forms and with
diverse intensity-the nature and future of all our societies. While we have felt that theology cannot avoid, without betraying our responsibility, examining the economic and social
nature and consequences of the so called "new international economic order'' and to discuss its quasi-religious language and its theological legitimation, it seems that our North
Atlantic colleagues (with some exceptions, to be sure) have concentrated too exclusively
in the psychological, cultural, or ecological side-effects.
2. The other question is more specifically theological. It has to do with the unity and
distinction between Cod's acts of liberation and human praxis. To be sure, the "causal"
relation which Segundo seemed to claim in some of his expressions-human liberation
praxis has a "causative" relation to the establishing of God's kingdom-is at least questionable. Moltrnann's answer, however, that "the kingdom, rather attains a causal character for
the experienced event of liberation""does not help much in solving the dilemma. We
need a different way of posing and discussing the old debate about "synergism." In recent
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years, several Latin American theologians have begun to try to articulate some of our the-

ological concerns in the framework of a Trinitarian paradigm. In this direction, a doctoral
dissertation of a young Argentine Lutheran theologian has advanced an interpretation of
the question of synergism in what seems to me an original and promising way. The issue,
as he sees
is the theological status of what could be called "the human mediation" in
God's acts of liberation, which he characterizes-going back to a language strongly present
in early patristic and orthodox theology-as the "assuming" or the "incorporation" of the
creature in God's saving-in our case liberating-acts of justice for the sake of the poor. In
this direction, Guillermo Hansen recovers and reinterprets the traditional Christo!ogical
concept of "enhypostasis" to address this issue. I cannot attempt here to summarize his
carefully developed argument, which of course should be discussed in detail. But, while
we might want to look more carefully into this analogy to the Christo!ogical use of the
concept of enhypostasis, the central point relevant to our theme seems to me well
expressed in a brief paragraph of his thesis:
It is in this manner ... that we reach the final
namely, that precisely in the enhypostatic nature of Christian praxis, the event of the divine-human "cooperation"

coheres, not as a reality pertaining to two causal, agential entities involved in a reciprocal-conditional exchange, but as the relationship existing between the hypostatic terrnino posited by God's decision to be God not without the creatural--i.e. to be triune."
If "enhypostatic'' means "to find one's identity in the other'' then the divine initiative gets its

historical "identity" as it becomes incorporated ("incarnate") in human praxis, and human
praxis gets its transcendent meaning and reality as it is assumed by the Holy Spirit.
Certainly, we are aware of the protections needed by such a formulation. Hansen points
out that we are not yet at the point where "God is all in all" but in the intermediate time

where the human actor still maintains "the characteristics and constraints of any human
witness and praxis (thus always subjected to the judgment of God."'° I would myself wish
this caveat to be further developed in terms of Luther's "simul justus et peccator.'' But the
central theological insight-which is not so distant from the Orthodox understanding of
"theosis"-seems to me a necessary overcoming of the dualistic presuppositions which have
plagued the discussion of synergism and human-divine so called "cooperation."
Certainly, the concrete shape of Christian praxis will not be "deducted" from some theological premise. It is always an act of discernment in which the effort to rationally understand the historical conditions, the ideological and ethical convictions and the availability, in
personal and community prayer and meditation, to the guidance of the Spirit are finally
synthesized in an action which is offered in faith and trust to God and to our neighbor. But
it is not insignificant both to recognize the precarious and limited nature of that praxis and
to trust that, even in its limitation, it is taken up and assumed in God's action.
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JORGEN MOLTMANN S ECOLOGICAL
THEOLOGY IN PROCESS PERSPECTIVE

JOHN

B.

COBB, JR.

Process thinkers in the United States long thought that German theology, even
when it affirmed itself as nonphilosophical, was too deeply under the sway of Kant to
take the world of nature seriously. This seemed true of the Neo-orthodox theologians,
and the shift to an emphasis on the future and on political liberation did not seem to
change matters much in this regard. Theologians who turned to Hegel for inspiration
were partly freed from the anthropocentrism so strongly established by Kant, but only
partly. Even Thomists, who had in their heritage the possibility of overcoming Kant,
have tended instead to reinterpret Thomas to fit the Kantian, anthropocentric mold.
The most striking exception has been Jurgen Moltmann. For many years he has
taken the ecological problem seriously. For a long time, almost alone among political
and liberation theologians, he included "peace with nature" as an essential part of
the goal. Gradually others have followed. But it is only just to recognize his pioneering work and his continuing leadership in an area that appears to process theologians to be of utmost importance.
When 1 wrote my critical evaluations of several German political theologians in
Process Theology as Political Theology I recognized and affirmed this distinctive contribution of Moltmann. 1 nevertheless presented process theology as an ecological theology to be, in general, compared with the societal focus of political theology.
Despite impressive statements about the importance of ecological issues, Moltmann
had not, at that rime, written extensively or thematically on the topic. Sometimes
what he did write seemed to instruct us more about practical attitudes that are
needed than about the actual condition of nature, humanity, and God.
When 1was asked to write again about Moltmann's political theology for this volume, 1 requested permission to focus my remarks on his Gifford lectures of 198485, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation.' I had not previously had the
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chance to respond to this book. Because it is such an important statement on a topic of
such central interest to me, I appreciate the permission given me to write about it.
What is most striking to a process theologian is the wide range of agreement in the
understanding of the ecological problem and of how theology is, and should be, related
to it Secondly, there is wide agreement on how Christians should understand the natural
world and the place of humanity within it. Thirdly, there is wide agreement as to the relation of God to humanity and to the natural world. Fourthly, whereas we process theologians have done little more than claim that our views are congenial to the Bible,
Moltmann has developed very similar ideas quite directly out of his study of the Bible. For
all of this, process theologians can only be grateful and stand in admiration of Moltrnann' s
creativity, scholarship, and wisdom.
There is, nevertheless, a parting of the ways. Moltmann distinguishes three phases or
periods in God's relation to the world. There is, first, the phase before the creation of the
world culminating in calling the world into being out of nothing. There is, second, the
phase in which we live and which exhausts our empirical knowledge: namely, that in
which God pervades the creation and guides it. There is, third, the phase of consummation, that to which we look forward in hope.
The close correspondence between Moltmann and process theology is in what he says
about the second phase. Process theologians claim no knowledge of either the first or the
third phase in so far as those phases differ fundamentally from the present one.
Moltrnann, on the other hand, speculates freely on these phases, drawing, of course, on
biblical and traditional images but going far beyond them.
Process theologians are not averse to speculation. We understand our philosophical
method to be speculative. However, we see speculation as an intermediate stage to be
followed by empirical testing-understanding "empirical" here very broadly and loosely.
That is, speculation is the framing of hypotheses which are to be tentatively adopted to
the extent that they illuminate the available data or guide in the discovery of new data.
Moltrnann's speculations are not subject to this kind of test.
Moltmann's speculations are not, however, casual or idle. They are in the service of
rendering certain traditional Christian doctrines consistent with what we now know of the
world through the natural sciences. Hence they can be tested in two directions: the natural sciences and traditional doctrines. With regard to the former it is required that they not
be in contradiction. With regard to the latter it is required that they be confirmatory.
Process theologians seek a stronger relation to the former and demand less in relation
to the latter. For us the Bible and Christian tradition are sources of hypotheses about the
way things are and should be, hypotheses which seem to us of utmost importance.
Indeed, we know that our own perceptions and convictions are deeply formed by them.
But we think it necessary to differentiate between those convictions that most deeply
shape our lives now and beliefs that were plausible and convincing in earlier times but are
less so today. This leads us to limit ourselves to hypotheses about how God and the
world are now related and to push to the extreme periphery speculations about possible
phases of God's life before and after the time we now experience.
It has been my intention to formulate this difference descriptively rather than normatively. As one who believes that Christian wisdom should go on the offensive against the
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limitations of the dominant modem and postmodern minds, I am deeply impressed with
Moltmann' s achievement. He preserves and makes somewhat plausible numerous themes
and subthemes of the Bible and tradition that I have viewed as expressing a worldview that
can no longer be taken with full seriousness. He shakes my own skepticism. I am grateful.
Furthermore, his presentation of all of these doctrines is keenly sensitive to the danger
that they can be used in negative ways. As in all his writings, the practical implication of docUines is as important to Moltmann as their theoretical justification. For example, process theologians have been concerned that the docUine of aeatio ex mhilo is so associated with views
of God's unilateral exercise of coercive power as to adversely affect our concern for the selfdetermination of creatures. We have also thought that it presents a view of power over the
powerless that has distorted Christian understanding and exercise of power. Moltmann
shows that the docUine can be maintained without any such negative consequences. Thus
he disarms much of the criticism process theologians have directed toward the traditional
doctrine he affirms.
Despite these remarkable achievements, I remain doubtful that this is the best way to
go. In a time when the appeal to traditional authority arouses so much suspicion, I wonder whether gaining a hearing for Christian wisdom may not be handicapped by the
extent of this appeal in Moltmann. There are times when he presents Christian views as
canying forward current secular thinking and solving problems inherent in it If we limit
ourselves to putting forward Christian insights in this way, they may gain greater credibility than when we call for acceptance of particular speculations as the only way to save
otherwise incredible traditional Christian docUines.
In the remainder of this essay I will discuss these very general comments in some
detail. Section 1 will consider Moltmann's account of the ecological crisis and how that
informs his theology. Section 2 will discuss his eschatology as formulated in this volume.
Section 3 will interact with his doctrine of creation out of nothing. Section 4 will return to
the agreement between process theologians and Moltmann in the understanding of our
present world and the task of theology within it Section 5 will conclude with appreciative
comments on Moltmann' s fresh and original discussion of the Sabbath.

I. THE ECOLOGICAL Crusts IN MOLTMANN'S THEOLOGY
In the Preface Moltmann writes:
What we call the environmental crisis is not merely a crisis in the natural environment of human beings. It is nothing less than a crisis in human beings themselves. It
is a crisis of life on this planet, a crisis so comprehensive and so irreversible that it can
not unjustly be described as apocalyptic. It is not a temporary crisis. As far as we can
judge, it is the beginning of a life and death struggle for creation on the earth. (p. xi)
Moltmann appreciates how profoundly contemporary institutions and practices must
change.

The processes which intervene destructively in the natural environment originate in
the economic and social processes. So if the desttuction of nature is to be halted,
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the economic and social conditions of human society must be changed. Societies
which are primarily out to develop production, and increase the efficiency of
human labor, and make further strides in already existing technologies, can neither
restrict nor overcome the progressive destruction of the environment which they
are causing. (pp. 23-24)
Since there are few signs that the socio-economic system described by Moltrnann is losing its hold on global affairs and many signs that it is growing ever more totalitarian in its
control, Moltrnann' s accurate statements are deeply disturbing. Like others of us who share
his judgments, however, Moltrnann is not able to keep this understanding fully in view as
he writes his book. Precisely because he deals so thoroughly and insightfully with traditional ideas and debates that were formulated when this crisis did not exist, at least as a planetary one, the reader can lose sight of the crisis in large sections of the book. Furthermore,
Moltrnann does not think it is part of the theologian's task directly to challenge the contemporary economism at whose altars the world now worships or to propose alternatives.
Nevertheless, awareness of the crisis deeply informs Moltrnann's thinking.
In this regard the major systematic theological question left unclear in the book is how to
relate the Christian promise of a new creation to the degradation of the earth. Recognizing
that we are in "a life and death struggle for creation on this earth" and that the creation in
question includes us, one would anticipate that the Christian hope for a new creation would
be explained in relation to the apparent threat of planetary death. Regretfully this does not
happen. The promise of a glorious future formulated when no such life and death struggle
was going on is renewed by Moltrnann without reference to this struggle.
The danger, from my point of view, that this kind of promise can distract attention
from the life and death struggle. It can tell Christians that, serious as planetary dangers
appear, they should not be allowed to weaken our sure confidence. l am not saying that
Moltmann in fact communicates that kind of otherworldly message. But he does leave us
in a tension between genuine concern about the fate of the planet and the confidence
that all will be well regardless of what we do or fail to do.
On the one hand, he tells us, rightly: "Unless there is a radical reversal in the fundamental orientation of our

societies, and unless we succeed in finding an alternative

way of living and dealing with other living things and with nature, this crisis is going to
end in a wholesale catastrophe" (p. 20l. On the other hand, he assures us:
Participation in the divine nature and conformity to God, flowering into perfect
resemblance, are the marks of the promised glorification of human beings. The
God-likeness that belongs to creation in the beginning becomes God-sonship and
daughterhood in the messianic fellowship with the Son, and out of the two springs
the transfiguration of human beings in the glory of the new creation. (p. 229)
One is left wondering whether this new creation is to arise out of the wholesale catastrophe, or whether Christian believers can be confident that in fact no such catastrophe
will occur. This problem could be avoided if we understood the new creation to be
another world alongside this one. But that is far from the tenor of Moltmann' s eschatolog-
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ical thought either in this book or in earlier ones.
This problem that seems so central to me is not the one that occupies Moltrnann's attention. His concern is to rethink the Christian doctrine of creation in such a way that it removes
any possible support for those features of Western culture that have led to irresponsible
degradation of the natural world. This is surely an extremely important undertaking.
Moltrnann sees the problem in terms of Western affirmation and practice of human
domination. Although the practice of domination belongs to modem technological societies, Moltrnann recognizes that the way the Christian doctrine of creation was understood
in the West provided a favorable context. This is especially true of the way in which the
command to "subdue the earth" was read. Moltrnann's project is to reclaim the biblical and
traditional teaching of creation from these modem distortions and, instead, to present it as
supportive of the new relation of human beings to nature that is so urgently needed.
Despite his recognition that Christian tradition could be used in support of modem
domination of nature, it is important to Moltrnann to minimize its role. He does not here
simply point to science, technology, and new social structures as bearing the chief responsibility. Instead he points to the emergence of the nominalist philosophy. According to
this, Moltrnann points out,
God is almighty, and potentia abso/uta is the pre-eminent attribute of his divinity.
Consequently God's image on earth, the human being (which in actual practice
meant the man) had to strive for power and domination so that he might acquire
his divinity. Power became the foremost predicate of the deity, not goodness and
truth. (pp. 26-27)
Reading this as a process theologian, I am deeply appreciative. We have been critiquing the idea that God is to be understood in terms of totally controlling power for a
long time. We prefer to understand God's power as persuasive and empowering. We,
too, have seen nominalism as having given the starkest expression to the objectionable
view of divine omnipotence.
Nevertheless, there is some difference. In reading Moltrnann one might come to the
conclusion that this feature of nominalism was a minor and temporary deviation from an
otherwise favorable Christian tradition. Thus one could remain comfortable with the tradition as a whole and simply reject this minor aberration. One might even suppose that
nominalism was not really a part of the Christian tradition at all. Moltrnann says nothing
about the large role of nominalist thinking in the Reformers, especially, but not only, in
Calvin, and among their followers as well.
From the process perspective it is better to be fully open about the importance of the
notion of absolute divine power from an early point in the tradition and its special prominence in the Reformation. We agree that it is a misreading of scripture, and we deeply
appreciate Moltrnann's support in exposing this erroneous reading. We agree that the
Bible in fact supports an appropriate relation of human beings to the other creatures, one
beautifully and brilliantly articulated by Moltrnann. But we believe that the Christian tradition bears a larger responsibility for modem domination of nature than Moltrnann's formulations suggest and that many of its contemporary formulations continue to support
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destructive human domination.
We think that as Christians today we need to repent of the errors that we have inherited from our tradition rather than minimizing or concealing them. We believe that these
errors still influence the way we worship and the way we think and
that they are not
simply incidental errors in the past. As a result, we often polemicize against such elements
in the tradition. But in our own understanding, our repentance is itself a fuller following of
the deeper tradition.
By repentance I mean here turning or changing direction. This should be accompanied
by some pain and regret over the past, but wallowing in guilt is certainly not helpful. Hence
the difference from Moltrnann is not great. He offers us a way of turning and changing
direction, one which I admire and largely appropriate. That is of primary importance.
Perhaps Christians can follow him the more easily because he is so little critical of our shared
tradition. But from our point of view, there is a danger that when we fail to bring out clearly
our collective responsibility for what is destructive in the modem relation to nature, we may
not uproot from ourselves the deep-seated habits of thought that are involved.
Moltmann is certainly correct that the primary bearers of domination today are science, technology, and economics. Hence correcting Christian teaching will not suddenly
change public attitudes and policies. But as theologians, helping the church to repent is
our central responsibility. Clarifying the different sort of science, technology, and economics that are called for by a repentant Christianity will be another important step.
This book by Moltrnann is focused on the doctrine of creation. In the first chapter
MoltJnann provides us with "so1ne guiding ideas fur an ecological doctrine of creation."'

The congeniality of his thought with that of process theology is nowhere more evident
than in these guiding ideas.
Alfred North Whitehead, whose work is so influential in process theology, commented
that the Alexandrian theologians in their reflection on the relations among the members
of the Trinity made the one great metaphysical advance since Plato. This was in their doctrine of the mutual immanence of the persons of the Trinity. Whitehead understood his
thought as canying out that program philosophically. He believed that what is needed in
Christian theology also is the extension of this insight to the relation of God and the creatures and of the creatures to one another.

In Moltrnann Whitehead's hopes for theology are fulfilled. Moltmann writes:
Our starting point here is that all relationships which are analogous to God reflect
the primal, reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration of the trinitarian perichoresis: God in the world and world in God; heaven and earth in the kingdom of
God, pervaded by his glory; soul and body united in the life-giving Spirit to a
human whole; woman and man in the kingdom of unconditioned and conditioned
love, freed to be true and complete human beings. There is no such thing as solitary
life. Contrary to Leibniz's view, every monad has many windows. In actual fact it
consists only of windows. All living things-each in its own specific way-live in one
another and with one another, from one another and for one another. (p. 17)
This is not a minor part of Moltmann's thought. On the contrary, it shapes his doctrine
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of how God is related to the world and the world to God. He rightly employs "panentheism" to name this relationship, for although it initially names only the way creation is in
God it has come to imply the immanence of God in the world as well. The difference
between panentheism and pantheism is emphasized, rightly, again and again. In all this
the agreement of process theologians is virtually complete.

2. EscHATOLOGY
Moltmann argues that for a doctrine of creation to be Christian it must be messianic.
A Christian doctrine of creation is a view of the world in the light of Jesus the
Messiah; and it will be determined by the points of view of the messianic time which
has begun with him and which he defines. It is directed towards the liberation of men
and women, peace with nature, and the redemption of the community of human
beings and nature from negative power>, and frcm the forces of death. (pp. 4-5)
The understanding of the present and the future are thus intimately bound together.
Human beings already experience the indwellings of God in the Spirit here in history,
even if as yet only partially and provisionally. This is why they hope that in the kingdom of glory God will dwell entirely and wholly and for ever in his creation, and will
allow all the beings he has created to participate in the fullness of his eternal life. (p. 5)
Although a process theologian can read this passage with appreciation and without disagreement, it also raises questions. First, what is intended by God's dwelling entirely and
wholly in "his" creation? It might mean that the creation will lose its creaturely character,
that it will become simply part of God. In that case process theologians could not agree.
But Moltmann's explanations elsewhere rule out this interpretation.
On the other hand, it might mean simply that the divine indwelling, while having the
basic character it now has in creatures, will be more fully expressed in what the creatures, in their freedom and contingency, become. In that case process theologians will
devoutly share the hope. But for Moltmann this increased effectiveness of God's
indwelling seems not to suffice.
Process theologians can read this passage in terms of our own eschatological thinking.
While hoping for a world in which God's presence is much more effective than the pre-

sent one, we also find assurance in the conviction that in God all creatures live on forever.
Much that Moltmann says about his hope fits quite well with this one. Nevertheless, for
him it seems to be important that the glorification of which he writes occur at a temporally future point on this planet.
In Moltmann' s fuller expositions it seems that at a future time, creatures, while remaining creatures, will become immortal. The nature of time itself will change. The situation for
which he hopes is a metaphysically different one from what we now know. Here a process
theologian cannot follow. We do not preclude great changes in the cosmos, changes which
may be fuvorable to creaturely life. But we do not consider the cosmic images employed
by biblical writers a safe guide to predicting the future destiny of the cosmos today.
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We assume that the biblical passages in which images of the hoped-for future are
found express the ideas that were available and possible to Jews living and thinking in the
context of a radically different worldview from ours. We take them seriously, but not literally. We do not believe they authorize us, in our very different context, to construct anticipations of metaphysical changes in the nature of process and time.
The second key question is about "hope." This is a very important notion for process

theologians. We live by hope. But for us it is important to distinguish between our hopes
and our assurance. We share with Moltmann hope for radical reversal in the character of
our present global society. But this by no means makes us confident that the needed
change will occur soon enough to avoid catastrophe for humankind. Our assurance is
that whatever happens in the course of events on this planet, God will not be finally
defeated, and that God will redeem and preserve forever all that we have been. Some of
us also believe that the cosmos we now inhabit has dimensions that radically transcend
those to which our sense organs relate us, and that in such dimensions we may live on

after death in a changed relation to God. Moltmann's discussion of heaven and comments about angels may mean that he is open to something of this sort as well.
If "hope" had for Moltmann this openness to lack of fulfilment, this recognition that it
may be thwarted by human sinfulness, then the fact that his formulations differ somewhat
from ours would be a minor point. Hope is most important with regard to how it shapes
the efforts and expectations of those who hope and their interpretation of their present
Process thinkers find many apocalyptic formulations disturbing at this point. These picture
a future so disconnected from the present as to weaken concern to realize what possibili-

ties the present holds. But Moltmann's sensitivity to such dangers is superior to ours. He
has done more than anyone else to formulate Christian hope in a way that draws forth
Christian concern for the poor, the oppressed, and the exploited earth. We have learned
from him, and we hope to continue learning.

Nevertheless, in our reading of Moltmann, "hope" seems to carry a weight of assurance that is lacking for us. What he finds promised in the Bible, he seems to say,
Christians can be assured will come to pass. Thus faith seems to be bound up for him
with the confidence that in fact the temporal future will have the metaphysically transformed character that he describes. To us this appears too heavy a burden to place on
faith, too tight a connection between faith and a particular metaphysical speculation, one
for which our present experience of reality, including our present experience of God and
our historical knowledge, provide no support.
The speculative side of Moltmann's work in this book is not a minor one. He devotes
entire chapters respectively to "the time of creation" and "the space of creation." These
speculations are informed by contemporary science as well as by scripture and tradition.
They are original and imaginative. 1 do not disparage them. Indeed, 1 commend his daring
and his genius. If they are intended only to show that we should not exclude the possibility of radical changes in the nature of time and space, my response would be detailed
engagement with his proposals. It is because I read them as claiming more than thismuch more-that I distance myself from them.
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Metaphysical changes in the future are discussed by Moltmann in connection with
metaphysical changes in the past, and it is here that he engages process theology most
directly. He rightly accuses process theologians of opposing the doctrine of creario ex nih11o.
It is our belief that the theological strengths of this doctrine can be retained without raising
the mysterious and fruitless questions about what God was doing before creating the
world.
The traditional doctrine rightly affirms that nothing other than God now exists or ever
existed apart from God's creative work. It rightly affirms, therefore, that there is no matter
existing apart from God. It also rightly affirms that the world did not emanate from God,
that is, that it is not of divine substance. And, finally, it rightly makes impossible any form
of pantheism or any identification of the world with God.
But with all its strengths, it also has weaknesses from the point of view of process theologians. (I) It requires a beginning of time, or at least of what we know as time, thereby
raising questions about "before time" that are unintelligible to our creaturely minds. (2) It
implies that the way God worked in the beginning is discontinuous with the way God
works now. (3) It encourages a doctrine of radical transcendence that is at odds with
Christian teaching of incarnation and the indwelling Spirit. (4) It supports thinking of God
in terms of unilateral actions upon the world from without and expectations that God will
intervene in such ways to save us from our predicaments or to prevent such horrors as
the Holocaust. (5) And because of the attempt of human beings, especially of men, to
model themselves upon their understanding of God, it encourages a quest for control and
domination on the part of men.
Moltmann is keenly sensitive to the third, fourth, and fifth of these dangers. Although I
am not sure that his sensitivity can prevent some tendency in these directions being supported by his doctrine of creario ex mhilo, I have nothing but admiration for the way in
which he deals with those features of the doctrine that have been, for me, most troubling.
Hence, what divides us is the insistence that time as we know it must have had a beginning and that God's mode of being and action prior to that time differed from God's subsequent behavior.
I do not wish to dispute the abstract possibility that this is so. Some people see the current astrophysics of the Big Bang as supporting such a view. I, on the other hand, find
Kant convincing on the point that we can neither think beginninglessness nor a beginning;
so my mind boggles at these questions. I do not pretend to understand my own preferred
doctrine of the beginninglessness of time. I have thought it sufficiently difficult to understand the temporality and spatiality in which we are now immersed, and I have seen no
theological need to speculate about another one. Indeed, I have seen it as theologically
dangerous and damaging.
It is certainly correct that creario ex nihilo has been a part of the Christian theological tradition. If this fact alone makes it necessary for the contemporary theologian to affirm it,
then l understand Moltmann's commitment. My own judgment is that this fact does
make it necessary for the contemporary theologian to understand the theologically important concerns that the doctrine expresses. l have given my list of such concerns above. To
be persuaded that more is gained than lost by taking on this burden to credulity as a
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requirement of faith, I will need to hear some concrete gains to contemporary faith that

cannot be attained in another way, namely, the way I have adopted.
I find two such arguments at least implicit in this book of Moltmann. First, he claims
that the Bible supports the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. He is a far better biblical scholar
than I, and I do not doubt that his conclusions are possible, even plausible. On the other
hand, it is unlikely that a beginning of time was an issue among the ancient Hebrews or
among the Jews of Jesus' day. The overwhelming likelihood, I believe, is that there was no
clearly articulated consensus. Contemporary scholars differ in their interpretation of the
first verse of Genesis, and Jews have never been as committed to creatio ex nihilo as
Christians.
Even if we suppose that most biblical writers if asked the question would have opted
for a beginning of time, that is not in itself of much importance. We would have to ask
what that meant to them in terms of their understanding of themselves, of the world, of
God, and of the future. If these meanings are central to biblical faith, do they require a
beginning of time in order to flourish? If not, then we are no more bound to this than to

the biblical cosmology generally.
Moltmann himself, when relating biblical teaching to evolutionary theory, provides for
the kind of freedom that process theologians assume also with regard to creatio ex mhilo.
Like the other writings of the Old and New Testament, the biblical creation narratives
originated in different historical eras. Each of them itself represents a successful synthesis between belief in creation and knowledge of nature. It is a biblicist misunderstanding of the biblical testimonies to think that they are laying down once for all particular
findings about nature, and render all further research superfluous. The history of the
biblical traditions themselves shows that the stories of creation belong within a
herrneneutical process of revision and innovation, as the result of new experiences.

Since they are testimonies to the history of God with the world, they themselves actually direct their readers to new experiences of the world in this divine history. This
means that they offer themselves for productive new interpretation and further development. So it is not merely possible to relate the biblical testimonies about creation
and God's history with his creation, to new insights about nature, and new theories
about the interpretation of these insights; it is actually necessary to make this connection, and to reformulate the biblical testimonies in the light of these things. The openness for ever-new syntheses is rooted in the openness for the future which we find in
the biblical testimonies themselves. But it is of course also true that this openness for
the future turns every synthesis into a provisional draft, and permits no dogmatism.
(pp. 192-193)

Given this understanding of biblical authority, it is clear that Moltmann' s commitment
to a beginning of time as we know it does not arise from the slight and indirect support
that a few biblical texts provide for this speculation. The process treatment of this doctrine
conforms fully to the implications of this excellent passage. Hence Moltmann's criticism of
process theology on this point must rest on something deeper than its possible nonconfor·
mity to biblical teaching.

Jurgen Moltmann's Ecological Theology in Process Perspective

125

This deeper ground is the second argument which I find implicit in this book. The
plausibility of a metaphysical change in the cosmic situation in the future is bound up
with the idea that there has been an analogous change in the past Only if time as we
know it had a beginning are we likely to believe that time as we know it will have an end.
Since the way God acts in our time is not of the sort that would bring about a metaphysical change, we must believe that God is capable of a mode of action not taking place in
our time. The strongest way to demonstrate that ability is to argue for a-eario ex nihilo.
Whereas creario ex nihilo is at best peripheral to biblical writings, hope for a radical
transformation of the world is central, especially in the New Testament. Furthermore, in
the New Testament the hope is also a profound confidence. The failure to share that confidence on the part of process theologians expresses a distance from the New Testament
that is, understandably, unacceptable to Moltrnann. This failure on our part is an expression of our expectation that God has acted in the past and will act in the future in much
the way God acts in the present. We understand that way of acting and its purposes to be
revealed in Jesus. We share the hope that these purposes will be fulfilled on earth as in
heaven. But we do not envision even the ideal fulfilment of that hope as involving a
metaphysical change. And we are by no means sure that God's purposes will in fact ever
by so fully realized as we pray may be the case.
How can we justify our distance from the expectation so important in major parts of
the New Testament? First, we assume that in fact the expectation was not fulfilled as anricipated. The transformation was expected imminently. To suppose that in all respects
except timing the expectation was accurate and grounds the assurance that at some time
it will be fulfilled seems to us arbitrary.
The hope of Jesus, Paul, and others was conditioned by specific features of their time
and place. It cannot be turned into absolute truth On the other hand, this stance of hope,
and specifically for God's will to be done on earth, has proved to be of immense worth in
that history in which it has operated. No one has displayed this so fully and insightfully as
Moltmann. For Moltrnann this means that our hope must be for at least as radical a
change as any biblical author imagined. For process theologians the challenge is so to formulate hope as to continue many of the consequences effected by New Testament
images of hope that are no longer convincing today. Still, we respect Moltrnann's theological program even where it does not speak to the need we feel within ourselves and see
widely expressed in the old-line churches in the United States.
Moltrnann's program involves setting the whole of our cosmic epoch in a larger context of before and after. Our efforts are exhausted in seeking to find hope within our cosmic epoch. The difference, then, is great.
4, CONGENIAUTIES WITH PROCESS THEOLOGY

What is remarkable is that, when Moltrnann attends to our cosmic epoch, he sees
humanity, the world, and God in ways so very congenial to that of process theologians. I
indicated above our agreement on the mutual indwelling of God and creatures as well as
of creatures one with another. Quite strikingly, the agreement goes further, into more
technical matters.
Although process theologians do not speculate about the beginning and the end of our
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cosmic epoch and about what preceded it and what will follow, we do speculate about
how God acts in our world. Those who follow Whitehead understand God to order
potentials in such a way as to call us each moment into a new future, realizing what value
is possible for us in such a way as to benefit others as well. Whitehead speaks of this
ordering of potentials for the sake of creatures as the Primordial Nature of God. It is
God's valuation of these potentials for us that enters into our becoming each moment,
giving us direction and freedom. Without this participation of God in the creature, no
creature comes into being.

Consider now a passage from Moltrnann:
God the Creator is the source of creative potentialities, and for the potencies for
the creation and completion of the processes we have described. By determining
that he will be the Creator of his world, God decides out of the whole wealth of
his potentialities in favor of the potentialities which are creative and against those
that are destructive; he decides for the process of creation and against its omission,
says the doctrine of decrees. But if the resolve is an essential resolve, and not an
arbitrary decree, then the whole wealth of potentiality of the divine Being flows
into the fount of creative potentialities. There is no 'dark side' to God-no side
where he could also be conceived of as the destroyer of his creation and of his
own being as Creator. If God is himself supreme goodness and truth, then the
wealth of his potentialities is determined by his essential nature. 'All things are possible with God' does not mean his undetermined omnipotence; it means the
determined power of his goodness. (p. 168)
Remarkable also are the similarities in the treatment of evolution. Process theologians

have often felt ourselves in a lonely place. We reject the attempts of "creationists" to
replace evolutionary theory with pseudo-scientific ideas determined by their understanding of biblical authority. But we also criticize the dominant form of evolutionary theory.
We believe that this theory is hostile to central Christian affirmations and that the evidence does not support it. And we believe a proper role for the theologian is to challenge
objectionable scientific theories on these sorts of grounds.
In the case of the dominant form of neo-Darwinism, what is most objectionable is its
systematic effort to remove any role for purpose from the interpretation of evolution. The

scientific orthodoxy here is deterministic and reductionistic. The implications for the
meaning of human life and creation as a whole are diametrically opposed to Christian
understanding of human freedom and responsibility and of the working of God in the
world. We believe that the theological resistance to Darwinism was justified despite its
numerous scientific mistakes.
The non-Fundamentalist theological community in general, however, has resolved the
issue by adopting a dualistic stance. Science, it is said, should be free in its own field.
Theology is free to ignore scientific findings and to proceed in its quite different field.
Often this is grounded in a neo-Kantian dualism of facts and values.
Moltmann' s analysis of the situation is much the same as ours. He rejects creationism,
but he writes as follows:
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In German Protestant theology, Karl Beth, Adolf Titius, and Karl Heim tried to
achieve a productive synthesis between evolutionary theory and the doctrine of creation. This attempt was of interest to both sides, but it ceased to be pursued once
the ethical theology of liberalism, and also the new dialectical theology, accepted
what Heinrich Ott calls 'the indifferentist solution', which meant the mutual 'noninterference' of theology and science. But this proposal brings no solution to the
problems. It simply means excluding them from consideration. Consequently theology must start again from the early attempts at a synthesis, if it is to comprehend
creation and God's activity in the world in a new way, in the framework of today's
knowledge about nature and evolution, and if it is to make the world as creationand its history as God's activity-comprehensible to scientific reason also. (p. 192)
In his brilliant proposals for moving toward a new synthesis Moltmann makes many
points familiar and congenial to process theologians. He points out that natural events,
like human ones, constitute "a unique irreversible and non-repeatable process with a particular direction" (p. 199). Natural laws are statistical generalizations rather than controlling principles. The whole deterministic mindset should be abandoned. "Open systems are
determined by the time structure of the qualitative difference between future and past
They realize possibilities, and through this realization again acquire new ones" (p. 203).
"God is the origin of the new possibilities" (p. 206).

5. THE SABBATH
Perhaps the most distinctive and original feature of Moltmann' s distinctive and original
doctrine of creation is his emphasis on the sabbath. He highlights the importance of the
sabbath to the understanding of creation in the first chapter of Genesis, correctly noting
that the seventh day has not been included in the doctrine of creation as commonly formulated. He argues that "the creation of the world points forward to the sabbath" (p. 5).
The sabbath "is the prefiguration of the world to come' (p. 6). Thus the creation story
itself points forward to eschatological redemption!
This means that the sabbath is not primarily established as a day of rest for human
beings. Moltmann quotes H. Gese <Zur biblische 1heologie, Munich 1977, p 79) "The main
purpose is the non-intervention of human beings in the environment-the restitutio in integmm of creation .... In principle, what is at stake is the inviolability of creation, which at
least on every seventh day is to be preserved from man, as a sign and symbol" (p. 321 ).
The sabbath
points beyond itself to the sabbatical year, in which the primordial conditions between
human beings, and between human beings and nature are supposed to be restored,
according to the righteousness of the covenant of Israef s God. And this sabbatical
year, in its tum points in history beyond itself to the future of the messianic era. (p. 6)
These themes, introduced at the beginning of the book are repeated and enlarged in the
concluding chapter. Moltmann shows how the neglect of the seventh day in the creation
story has had profound and deleterious effects in Christian history and upon us today.
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God is viewed as the one who in his essential being is solely 'the creative God', as
Paul Tillich says; and it follows from this that men and women too can only see
themselves as this God's image if they become 'creative human beings'. The God
who 'rests' on the sabbath, the blessing and rejoicing God, the God who delights in
his creation, and in his exultation sanctifies it, recedes behind this different concept.
So for men and women too, the meaning of their lives is identified with work and
busy activity; and rest, the feast, and their joy in existence are pushed away, relegated to insignificance because they are non-utilitarian. (pp. 276-77)
As a process theologian addicted to work I am reminded once more of the richness of
the biblical literature and of the importance of encountering it again and again afresh,
with as few preconceptions as possible. The connection between the sabbath and peace
with nature is surely explicit in the texts, but without Moltmann's help, 1 would not have
noticed it. Further, these texts do not provide simply additional arguments for changing
our attitudes and practices toward the natural world, they also suggest different attitudes
and practices-proposals that should be taken seriously even today. It is Moltmann's
genius, again and again, to find in our common heritage fresh insights and perspectives
which challenge and inspire us. 1 hope that my belaboring those points on which process
theologians do not follow him has not obscured the great debt we owe him.
Noru
I. Jurgen Moltmann, Cod in Creation, trans. M. Kohl (NY: Harper and Row, 1985).

RESPONSE TO THE ESSAYS

JORGEN MOLTMANN

A Word of Thanks:
It is a great and undeserved stroke of luck when one finds companions, both critical and supportive, who are willing to travel for some distance with him along his
theological path. It helps to overcome the loneliness and separation pains that one
suffers when he leaves behind the usual paths of tradition and forges ahead into
new territory. One expects neither absolute approval nor obedient followers who
merely repeat everything that one says. Rather, what one really needs are companions who, from their own presuppositions break out in the same direction and get
fresh impetus for their own ideas. I have found this in great measure in this book
edited by Bob Cornelison. The essays fill me with deep gratitude.
As the ancient Latin saying goes, books "have their own destiny." What the
author thinks and how well he expresses his ideas is one thing; what the readers
make of the book in their own minds, how they understand the book and what
they ultimately do with it is another thing entirely. Therefore, the impact of a book
resides in the reader, and seldom, if ever, wholly in the intentions of the author. It is
both exciting; yet stressful for an author to recognize the history of the impact of his
thought in the echo and exchange of opinion of his readers. The author is always
merely an actor in the drama and the history that books create. If his books are published, they go their own way and cannot and must not be controlled by the author.
Whether friend or critic, or both in the same person, interpret my theological
thought, it does not so much interest me whether they have interpreted it correctly,
but rather what they have made out of it either consciously or unconsciously.
Something new always arises and that profoundly stimulates me to look at things
anew and to learn from that new perspective. I have read these essays with great
interest and have benefited immensely from them.
Robert T. Cornelison was my assistant during the 1984-1985 academic year at
Emory University. His book, Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian Realism and Jurgen
Moltmann's Political Theology: The Realism of Hope (Mellen, 1992), revealed to me
some of the boundaries of my own standpoint and also clarified for me the rich
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American tradition of political theology typical at that time. He also pushed me to further
develop and deepen a theory of modernity out of my Theology of Hope. 1 hope he recognizes the fruits of his influence in my recent collection of essays, Cod fOr a Secular Society
(SCM/Fortress, 1999). When 1 think about the theme of the public relevance of theology,
I often remember our discussions in Atlanta and in Tilbingen.
Clarke Chapman of Moravian Theological Seminary in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, is
an old friend and a true intellectual companion. 1 no longer remember exactly where we
met, but I know that he is one who has followed all of the various turns (and wrong
turns?) I have taken. He has comprehended all of my changes of thought, even when I
was not consciously aware of them. He knows Dietrich Bonhoeffer' s influence on me better than I do myself. Early on, he recognized my sympathy with the developing Black
Theology of James Cone, and because he, himself, has an amazing grasp of the work of
Carl Jung, he always forced me to think about the anthropological consequences of my
'"high"" theology. Through him, my interest in Zinzendorf s theology and the Moravian
community (an interest that was further reinforced later in Nicaragua) was awakened.
A.J. ("Chip") Conyers, I met in the Baptist community in Louisville, Kentucky. His
book, Cod, Hope, and History fi.irgen Moltmann and the Christian Concept of History (Mercer,
1988), clearly and methodically presented my somewhat disordered thoughts about history, eschatology, and the experience of history. In that book, he accomplished something
that I had not. His essay in the current volume is so clear, that I could not have presented
it any clearer. He brought to light what was still darkness in my thought, and for that I
remain grateful.
Stephen Rhodes was a doctoral student at Emory University when 1was visiting professor there. I met him again at the Presbyterian Seminary in Memphis, where he had moved
on to working with poor congregations in Appalachia. I admire how he has made his way
out of the ivory tower of academe into the real world of practical community work, for L
myself, moved from the practical work of being a pastor in a rural congregation to the thin
air of the academic world, and yearn to return to the '"touch" and "feel" of real life.
My thoughts on ecclesiology which formed the book Church in the Power of the Spirit
( 1975) were not developed at my writing desk, but in house-to-house visits from family
to family in rural congregations, and in discussions in student groups. For me, the concept
of "love· was always a bit too emotional and abstract. As Rhodes points out, the concept
of" open friendship;· the personal affection for the other that is bound up with respect for
his or her freedom, is for me much more concrete. I can "live" friendship better. As the

beautiful poem by Joan Walsh states it, "A friend is someone who likes you; what better
thing is there, than to find such a friend?'"
In November 1992, I was asked to give the Ryan Lectures at Asbury Theological
Seminary where I had the honor of meeting Laurence Wood. In 1993, an entire volume of The Asbury 1heologicnl journal was dedicated to my work. Wood approaches my
thought from the Methodist perspective, a rich tradition with which I had come in contact
when I was guest professor at Duke and at Emory. Wood correctly traces my path from
Barth's trinitarian Christology to my trinitarian pneumatology. I would like to tread further
down this path because 1believe that as we enter the third millennium of the Church, we
stand at the brink of a new experience of theology and of the Holy Spirit. During the first
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millennium of the Church, in the name of God the Father, a "holy supremacy" and hierarchy developed. During the second millennium, in the name of God the Son, a "brotherly community'' arose. Now, in the third millennium of the Church it is time, in the name
of God the Holy Spirit, for a "charismatic community'' to be discovered, in which women
and men with different abilities and calls can live together. We have always understood
the Spirit either as the "Spirit of the Father'' or as "Spirit of the Son,'' not as God the Spirit
whose saving economy is the full and fulfilled life of all creation.
A response to the essay by Millicent Feske is naturally difficult for me. When one
peers into a mirror and does not fully recognize oneself, the problem can lie with the mirror itself. In her essay on my theology of the cross, Millicent Feske basically repeats a wellknown argument that has been leveled against Christianity as a whole. While she claims
that these opinions arise out of a liberationist/feminist perspective, in reality they arise out
of the liberal, bourgeois, indeed masculinist theology (or anti-theology) of the
Enlightenment. Whether God the Father is "sadistic,'' whether the sufferings of Christ is
"child abuse," whether the cross of Christ can somehow take on the sufferings of the
poor, the oppressed, and debased women, whether the sufferings of Christ support a religious and thus also militaristic/nationalist cult of sacrifice, was first raised by Lessing and
Voltaire, and now two hundred years later these claims seem to me to be merely repeated again. It seems to me that such claims ultimately serve neither the emancipation of
women nor the liberation of slaves, but ultimately lead only to an abandonment (as with
Voltaire) of Christianity. Such perspectives do not seem to get to the heart of the problem
of suffering in any critical sense.
I am also a bit bewildered that Millicent Feske seems content with negatively applying
the label, "Neo-orthodoxy," to my thought, rather than dealing with Barth, or others, critically. It is not totally unknown that the martyrs of the Confessing Church in Germany
who were murdered by the Nazis were "Neo-orthodox." There were no Liberal
Theologians there.
It also strikes me as a bit strange that Dr. Feske, (a white, middle-class "EuroAmerican") focussing on my social location as a "white, middle-class, Christian male,''
seems to label my theology as "bourgeois.'' Although I may be a member of the First
World and also male, that does not necessarily mean that my theology is only reflective
and supportive of my social location and automatically results in the oppression of the
Third World and of women. Oppression must be overthrown from both sides. In my theology the liberation of the Third World and of females is intimately linked with the liberation of their oppressors and the humanization of males. This has little to do with the
phantom of a liberal "formal subject" of my theology, as Dr. Feske seems to think, but has
much to do with the struggle for liberation.
Anyone who, out of a love for justice, chooses to enter such a struggle, must be prepared to suffer for it. In my theology of the Cross, I have consistently maintained the necessity for "active" suffering on behalf of the other, not about some sort of "religious mystification" of passive suffering. One who does not see that simply misunderstands my wo1k
John Cobb, Jr., is one of my oldest acquaintances and one of the most respected and
admired theologians in America. He takes theology seriously and one feels taken seriously
by him, even when he disagrees with one's own perspective. I have long awaited his

132

Moltmann

response to my doctrine of creation, because, indeed, my book is, in a sense, a response
to his ecological theology in a process perspective.
I first learned of his theology through Wolfhart Pannenberg, and must admit that I held
him for a liberal theologian of culture who had little understanding of the revolutionary
changes of the 1960s. As I first heard about ecological concerns in the mid- l 960s, I
thought about nature conservancies. As I read Cobb's Natural Theology, I had a Barthain
shudder, and held him to be naive. That view, however, quickly changed. As my eyes
slowly became open to the oil crisis of 1973, I realized that john Cobb had already long
been there, and learned from him. My generation in Germany came out of the "horrors
of history," searched for a "sense to history," and was enmeshed in political conflicts.
"History" was the field and milieu of our thought. "Nature" appeared romantic to us. This
changed after the end of the Vietnam War and the beginning of horrible man-made natural catastrophes. My path took me from history to nature, especially the Nature of the
blue planet Earth. As many critics noticed, my theology became somewhat "greener."
Cobb, on the other hand, approached the problem from the opposite direction, from
"Nature" to ecology, and then from ecology to economics and politics. So he and I often
met in the middle, with him sometimes following my lead, and with me sometimes following his, with our theologies mutually influencing each other. I must
however,
that he is a master of relational thinking, and does it much better than I do.
In front of me is the book Hope and the Future of Man, that Ewert Cousins had edited in
1972 after a conference of theologians of history, hope and Political Theology
(Pannenberg, Metz, and myself) along with process theologians (Cobb, Hefner, Daniel
Williams, Schubert, Ogden). Charles Hartshorne was also present, both in person and
very much in spirit. john Cobb spoke on "Whitehead's Vision of the Future," and I
explored the relationship between oppressed creation and liberated creation. So that is
how we met in those early days.
I would like to address briefly two questions that Cobb raises in his essay.
1. In God in Creation I was not merely addressing the struggle for the protection of the
environment, but was also attempting a revision of the entire Christian doctrine of creation. It may well be, as Cobb points out, that the struggle may not be explicitly recognizable in every chapter. There is, however, something that lies between the current conflict

over nature and the divine promise of a new earth: the experience of God the Spirit of
Life and the life-giving life of God (vita vivificans) not only in the new life of human
beings, but also in the new creation of Nature. When Process Theology calls God's power
"persuasive and empowering," it means this presence of the eternally living One. If one
desires to express this theologically, then it means that pneumatology is the "present"
eschatology that arises out of "futurist" eschatology. I attempted to develop this pneumatological doctrine of Creation in The Spini of Life (199 ll, but did not take it far enough. In
writing God in Creation, I found the expectation of a fundamental metaphysical transformation of the cosmos, as expressed by Process Theology in its concept of the "objective
impassability'' of all things in the memory of God, a great help. If this memory is already
present in the consequent nature of God, it is not difficult to understand the new creation
of all past beings into eternal creation. Cosmologically, of course, this is a huge extrapolation that offers no real picture of the history of the cosmos, but it does resemble the big-
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bang theory, which the Judea-Christian doctrine of the contingence of the cosmos and its
"beginningless Beginning" seems to come close to portraying.
My hope for a consumatio mundi does not arise out of soothsaying or prophecy, but out
of the Judea-Christian promissory history: God not only promises, God keeps those
promises. It is not that I am prophesying like a fortuneteller. Indeed, my ideas on creatio ex
nihilo, like my ideas on the resurrection, are not as speculative as they may seem. They are
grounded in the present experience of the faith of Abraham in the God who "brings the
dead to life and calls into existence that which does not exist." This is the faith of "hoping
when there is little to hope for." (Romans 4: 171 We need this sort of belief and hope for
the next century, after having "survived" the present century of wars and genocide and
the destruction of the human and of Nature. Those who come after us must somehow
live with the abyss of extermination. In order to do this, they will need a strong and supportive hope.
Jose Miguez Bonino is one of those unusual friends who, even when critical of one's
perspective, carries so much respect that one wants to immediately agree with him. We
have known each other for thirty years, but apart from my 1977 lectures at ISEDET in
Buenos Aires, we have only met with each other in the United States. We were both
guest professors at Candler School of Theology in Emory University where, in 1988,
together with President Jimmy Carter, we held a conference on Theology, Politics, and
Peace IT. Runyon, editor, Theology, Politics and Peace, 19891. That was a year before the
fall of the Iron Curtain, and the unification of Germany. Whenever I think about my
Argentinean friend, I always feel a bit ashamed about my 1976 "Open Letter" to him. It
was phrased so adversely that many thought that I had turned my back on Liberation
Theology. Rubem Alves most certainly thought so. The letter was simply a call to overcome Liberation Theology's incommunication with outside perspectives that Hugo
Assmann had announced in Genf, and then practiced on me personally in Mexico Oty in
1977. On the following morning, Sergio Arce from Cuba, a "theologian after the
Revolution," came to me and asked if I would take on his son for study in Tiibingen. His
trust in me provided a bit of comfort. If I were to write an "Open Letter" at all, it should
have been after my travels through Latin America.
As one of the editors of Condlium, I entered into a long, friendly discussion with
Gustavo Gutierrez, Leonardo Baff, and Jon Sobrino, and came to understand that Latin
American liberation theology indeed needed some space to develop its own perspective
in order to prevent the theological syncretism that had previously existed. In 1991, I came
to know parts of Nicaragua while on a trip funded by the Goethe Institute. I held lectures
at the Protestant seminary CIEETS, was involved in the founding of the Universidad
Evangelica Nicarauense and since then have often been in Managua. So finally, the "lovehate" relationship between liberation theologians and me finally turned into a "close relationship."
In response to Jose Miguez Bonino' s essay, I can only say that he is correct: the way
that Third World theology has been treated, in fact mistreated and disrespected, by
European theology is totally unsatisfactory and indignant, especially by a European theology that is becoming more and more provincial. I recently wrote an article, "Political
Theology and Liberation Theology; in which I attempted to show that since modem
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"globalization" not only brings the economy of the First World into the Third, but also
brings with it the consciousness of the social injustices of the Third World into the First,
then we must also bring Liberation Theology out of the Third World and into the First
(Cod for a Secular Society, pp. 66-70, Fortress, 1999). However, it is certainly not enough
for our generation alone to deal critically with global economic processes; our students in
the next generation must also struggle with them, if they wish to survive.
At this point, I would like to address a theological issue in which I have changed my
perspective. Since Gaudium et Spes and the Latin American Bishop's Conferences in
Medellin and Puebla, a new theological paradigm has developed, one that is firmly
stamped by Liberation Theology. Jn place of the old, Thomistic "Nature-Grace" schema,
the Nature side is replaced by "Dynamic of History" with its "signs of the times."
Consequently, the "Grace" side can no longer be understood as "supemature," but must
be understood eschatologically as the coming "kingdom of God" and the "New Creation
of all things." Nature-Grace is thus replaced by a History-Eschatology schema, in which
the present and future are understood as reciprocally influencing each other: the eschatological future is already present in history, and present suffering and praxis exists in the
future of God. As Gustavo Gutierrez states in the recent revision of his book, Theology of
Liberation, ( 1992), "Every healthy, fruitful Liberation Theology is grounded in the kingdom
of God." Similarly, we find Jon Sobrino stating that the kingdom of God is the "fullness of
life" here and now, and from the operation of the Spirit of God, is "fulfilled life." In the
creative energy of the Spirit, the eschatological dynamic of the coming kingdom is present. If he is correct, then we are not to look for what is "not yet," as Gustavo is proposing, but (in the presence of the Spirit of God) must identify the future kingdom of God
with the present desire for liberation. What I had criticized in 1976, now appears to me
to be the strength of Liberation Theology: in "presentist" eschatology, the future of God is
pulled into the human present, without, however, disappearing there. It is the martyrs
who say to us "what comes nex(' and "for whom the bell tolls." In 1994, at the graves of
the slain Jesuits in San Salvador, I sensed what the martyrs were saying to us:
When, if not now?
Where, if not here?
Who, if not we7

Translated by Robert T. Cornelison
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